A Framework for Digital Emotions by Rosatelli, Meghan
Virginia Commonwealth University
VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2011
A Framework for Digital Emotions
Meghan Rosatelli
Virginia Commonwealth University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Interdisciplinary Arts and Media Commons
© The Author
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.
Downloaded from
http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/239
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright  © 2011 by Meghan Rosatelli  
All rights reserved
 
 
 
A Framework for Digital Emotions 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Meghan Elizabeth Rosatelli  
Bachelor of Arts, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004 
Master of Arts, Virginia Commonwealth University, 2007 
 
 
Director: Dr. Richard Fine 
Professor, Department of English 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia 
August 2011 
  ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………..……………..…iii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………….iv 
 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………….v 
 
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………...……1 
 
 
PART 1. A FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL EMOTIONS……….…………………….……….22              
                                                                           
Chapter 1. Emotions are Fickle Things………………………………………………………..…23     
                           
Chapter 2. Emotions Put the “New” in “New Media”……………………………………….…..61  
  
Chapter 3. A Framework for Digital Emotions………………………………………………….79 
 
 
PART 2. APPLICATIONS………………………………………………………………………94 
 
Chapter 4. Technology: Affective Computing…………………………………………………..95 
 
Chapter 5. Community: Social Media and Gaming…………………………………………….124 
 
Chapter 6.  Aesthetics: Digital Community Artworks………………………………………….153 
 
 
CODA………..…………………………………………………………………………………192 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………... 203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii
 
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1.  The feedback process of a digital emotion…………………………………………………...91 
2. The AIDS Quilt…………………………………………………………………………..….160 
3. Learning To Love You More, Assignment #39…………………………………………..…..164 
4. Found, “Find of the Day,” October 16, 2009……………………………………..….…….. 165 
5. Dear God, opening page…………………………………………………………..…………167 
6. The Dear God Project…………………………………………………………………..……168 
7. Original PostSecret postcard……………………………………………………………...…170 
8. The “9/11 Secret” ……………………………………………………………………………177 
9. Lovelines, “Pictures” ………………………………………………………………...………179 
10. Universe, “Superstars” ………………………..……………………………………………181 
11. We Feel Fine, “Madness” …………………………………………………….……………184 
12. We Feel Fine, “Montage” …………………………………………………….……………185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ARG  Alternative reality game 
ATS  Affective tutoring system 
CMC  Computer mediated communication 
EIC  Expressive Internet communication  
fMRI  Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
HCI  Human-computer interaction 
IGBP  It Gets Better Project 
ITS  Intelligent tutoring system 
SMS  Short message service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL EMOTIONS 
 
By Meghan Rosatelli, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011. 
 
Director: Dr. Richard Fine, Professor, Department of English 
 
 
 As new media become more ubiquitous, our emotional experiences in digital space are 
increasing exponentially as well. While there is much talk of “affective” computing and 
“affective” new media art, a disconnect exists between networked emotions and the popular 
media that they inhabit. This research presents a theoretical framework for assessing “digital 
emotions”—a term that describes the feedback process between digital technologies and the 
body with respect to short, networked inscriptions of emotion and the (re)experience of those 
inscriptions within the body and through digital space. Digital emotions display five basic 
characteristics that can be applied to a variety of media environments: (1)  They describe a 
process of feedback that link short, emotive inscriptions in digital environments to users and 
their (re)experiences of those inscriptions; (2)  This feedback process includes, but is not limited 
to, the inscriber, the medium, and the receiver and the emotive experience fuels the initial 
connectivity and any further connectivity; (3)  The emotional value varies depending on the 
media, the community of users, and the aesthetic experience of the digital emotion; (4) Digital 
emotions influence our emotional repertoire by normalizing our paradigm scenarios; and (5) 
They are highly malleable based on changes in technologies and their ability to both expand
and contract emotional experiences in real time.   
 The core characteristics of digital emotions are applied to three broad and overlapping 
categories: technology, community, and aesthetic experience. Each of these aspects of digital 
emotions work together, yet they exist along the massive spectrum of our online, emotional 
experiences—from our casual click of the “like” button to digital community artworks. Applied 
to digital spaces along this spectrum, digital emotions illuminate the feedback process that occurs 
between the media, the network, and the environment. The framework ultimately suggests that 
the process of digital emotions explicates emotions experiences that could only occur in digital 
space and are therefore unique to digital culture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The rapid evolution of new media over the past decade, from social networking to iPhone 
applications, has no doubt changed the way we communicate. Over seventy-four percent of 
American adults regularly use the Internet (roughly 163 million individuals) on 285 million 
wireless connections. User statistics spike when citing teens and young adults—over ninety-three 
percent regularly use the Internet, with approximately a third of those users communicating 
through short status updates. 1 Combined with the 1.5 trillion text messages sent in 2009, 2 
declaring a twenty-first century communication revolution seems almost redundant.   
 Yet revolutions, if we agree that new media has incited one, disrupt more than existing 
hierarchies and cultures—they change our emotional lives as well. Historically, emotion existed 
as the unfortunate opposite of reason—a binary that propagated many other erroneous binaries, 
such as male and female, passive and active, or weak and strong. The consequence of such a 
devaluation still creeps into our digitally mediated lives and results in emotion being casually 
questioned, but often critically overlooked in relation to digital media conversation and 
scholarship. Yet everything from advertising to online dating is being affected by the need to 
emote in new ways within new media. Furthermore, recent interdisciplinary research on 
emotions describes a critical bodily reaction that dictates not only how we feel, but also who we 
are, and how we remember, reason and understand others. The recent discovery of mirror 
neurons, brain cells that automatically mirror action and emotion, suggests that we are hardwired 
                                                
    1 Pew Internet and American Life Project, http://www.pewinternet.org/ (accessed March 30, 
2010).  
 
    2 CTIA, CTIA–The Wireless Association Announces Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey 
Results, http://www.ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/1936 (accessed March 30, 2010).  
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to empathize and understand others. This innate ability to mimic everything from throwing a 
pitch to feeling happiness not only connects us to each other, but also builds a unique human 
culture. Our changing emotional landscape combined with recent scientific discoveries on 
emotion calls into question traditional knowledge of community, place, and self. We know that 
new socialization practices in cyberspace are changing our cultural landscape, but what are the 
consequences of this new culture on our emotional lives?  
 The parallel development of digital communication and emotion-based research also 
yields fascinating questions about our popular culture. How do emotions fit into the vast array of 
digital communication? How do we emote in digital space? What is lost in these media? What is 
gained? And perhaps most importantly, if emotions are inextricably tied to communication, 
culture, and our understanding of self, can digitally emoting fundamentally change who we are? 
This dissertation will examine the co-evolution of emotion studies and digital communication 
through the lens of popular culture by focusing on emotional experiences that occur, whether we 
recognize them as such or not, in our digital lives. While many researchers rightfully argue that 
new media continue to shape our culture, I will further argue that emotional experiences in select 
new media are shaping our emotional, and therefore rational, selves. As the line between digital 
space and the “real” world continues to blur in the midst of ubiquitous computing, and as the 
bodily distinction between “real” experiences and simulation continues to be questioned, the role 
of emotions in digital space foreshadows the function of emotions in our twenty-first century 
lives.  
 Perhaps the most expansive look at digital emotions comes from an artist and a computer 
engineer, not a social scientist or neuroscientist. In 2005, Jonathan Harris and Sep Kamvar 
launched the emotion collecting website We Feel Fine—a website that algorithmically collects 
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feelings from bloggers all over the world. We Feel Fine catalogues these feelings based on 
various metrics and attempts to build community and understanding through empathy. 
Recognizing the unprecedented collection of emotions from around the world, researchers at the 
University of Pennsylvania and Stanford recently began conducting studies linking happiness 
and age using the site’s data. Digital community artworks, such as We Feel Fine, along with the 
proliferation of emoticons, and many other uniquely evolving communication tools and media, 
illustrate the scope of digitally communicated emotions and the exciting intersections of 
scientific research. It is through these media that I investigate the integrated, changing landscape 
of emotions in digital space and the possibility of distinctly digital emotions.  
 
*** 
 When I began research on this project in late 2007, I focused on a handful of innovative 
web-based artworks that display emotions in new and beautiful ways—websites such as We Feel 
Fine. I describe We Feel Fine, and similar projects, as digital community artworks because they 
represent an emerging emotional community online. Specifically, digital community artworks 
are websites that collect and aesthetically arrange instances of human emotion with the goal of 
building community through empathy. The broad scope of digital community artworks, and their 
fascinating reflection of human emotion, inspired my inquiry into emotions in digital space. Yet 
the connectivity of the web began to complicate the growing scope and influence of digital 
community artworks, and I soon came to realize that these websites were inextricably tied to 
other new media. Consequently the scope of the research now encompasses a wide spectrum of 
digital media, from affective computing and social networking to digital community artworks. 
This broader scope creates a dynamic, and more realistic, context for constructing a conceptual 
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framework of emotions in digital space while showcasing the extent of our emotional 
experiences in digital media.  
 The theoretical scope of the research is equally inclusive. Research on emotions often 
combines elements of neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, and sociology, yet emotion 
theories were once notoriously contradictory. Neuroscientists intuitively focus solely on the 
neuronal response to the environment when discussing emotions, while cognitive psychologists 
are more interested in the cognitive categories of emotion. Currently, embodiment theories of 
emotion attempt to bridge this micro/macro divide by examining the neuronal response in 
conjunction with what the individual feels. In a special edition of Emotion Review on 
embodiment theories, Paula Niedenthal and Marcus Maringer explain the various benefits of 
broadening the scope of emotion research beyond judgments or simple emotional responses.3 
According to Niedenthal and Maringer, embodiment theories understand emotion as a simulation 
or (re)experience of emotion, which deems emotional content researchable on an individual and 
cultural level. Because individuals literally recreate the emotional response, the body’s response 
to stimuli becomes a credible source of emotional information—the object of thought is 
traceable. For example, if an individual “knows” anger, he or she will recreate a neurological 
angry response to trigger stimuli, such as watching an angry tirade on television. The experience 
becomes embodied because it is actually occurring as though the individual were engaged in the 
tirade. Embodiment theories allow for shifts in culture because they are dependent on the 
individuals emotional repertoire. Applied to the culture of digital media, the plasticity of 
embodiment theories allows for a more comprehensive discussion of emotional response as it 
pertains to individuals and the environment.  
                                                
    3 Paula M. Niedenthal and Marcus Maringer, “Embodied Emotion Considered,” Emotion 
Review 1, no. 2 (April 2009): 122-128. 
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 Embracing synaptic plasticity in conjunction with embodiment theories combines the 
(re)experience of emotion with the notion that individuals evolve based on these experiences. 
Understanding plasticity allows us to recognize ourselves as not only agents of change but as 
that change. Through what Ronald de Sousa calls “paradigm scenarios,” various narrative 
structures (based on life experiences) “serve to define and differentiate each person’s 
idiosyncratic repertoire of emotions.”4 Memory retains what is emotionally significant, so these 
paradigm scenarios are evolving, plastic, and highly influenced by the changing environment, 
whether we recognize our shifting emotional repertoire or not. (Perhaps surprisingly, many of 
these emotional responses never reach conscious awareness.) This active development works in 
conjunction with the ever-present evolution of digital media and virtual worlds. If we are as 
malleable and emotionally responsive as embodiment theories suggest, the impact of our 
changing environment on our person is undeniable. 
 The changes and construction of a “self” that plasticity enables work hand in hand with 
our emotional responses. Embodiment theories cite various hypotheses on how we 
(re)experience emotion; two notable theories explore “as-if body loops” and mirror neurons. 
Antonio Damasio argues for “as-if-body loops,” which describe internal brain simulations that 
rapidly modify ongoing body maps (almost like a perpetual, biological status update).5 These 
simulations, according to Damasio, result in a (re)experience of emotion. Research on mirror 
neurons more centrally locates this (re)experience within specific neurons in the frontal cortex. 
Mario Iacoboni, Vilayanur Ramachandran, and many others argue that mirror neurons create our 
                                                
    4 Ronald de Sousa, “Emotions: What I Know, What I’d Like to Think I Know, and What I’d 
like to Think,” in Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion, ed. Robert 
C. Solomon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 65.  
 
    5 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (London: 
Harcourt, 2003), 115. 
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sense of self and other, from our ability to empathize, and can create a sort of group 
consciousness. Iacoboni in particular strongly suggests a link between phenomenology and 
mirror neurons by citing Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s theories linking action and 
perception—a line of inquiry he names “neurophysiologic phenomenology.”6 He dismisses any 
suggestion that mirror neurons are “like being in someone else’s shoes.” Iacoboni explains, “By 
firing as if we are actually making those facial expressions we are simply observing, these 
neurons provide the mechanism of simulated facial feedback. This simulation process is not an 
effortful, deliberate pretense of being in somebody else’s shoes. It is an effortless, automatic, and 
unconscious inner mirroring.”7 In short, we are hardwired to empathize. After reviewing the 
many functions of mirror neurons, Iacoboni argues that their main role is to facilitate social 
behavior by allowing us to understand the intentions and emotions of others. Because mirror 
neurons map the actions of the other onto the self through neural firing, they create a sort of 
“other self” in the body. This linking, or embedding of other into the self, is where Iacoboni 
picks up the phenomenological aspect of his argument. The “coupling” (as described by Edmund 
Husserl) of self and other creates a dialectical relationship that parallels much of existential 
phenomenology. This shared, social connection, claims Iacoboni, is where we can look to create 
a better, more empathic society. Mirror neurons link to what Damasio describes as the “as- if-
body-loop” in the sense that certain neurons fire in an emotive fashion before any (or if any) 
cognitive thought occurs. Perception is key for mirror neurons because of their intention tracking 
capabilities. When discussing the sudden ubiquity of digital media in our everyday lives, the 
discovery of mirror neurons and the theoretical impact of their function, complicates our 
                                                
    6 Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect With Others (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2008), 17. 
 
    7 Ibid., 120. 
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changing relationships and experiences in virtual worlds. Suddenly, the “rational” mind is no 
longer as reliable as we once thought, and our once touted ability to ignore the impact of 
environmental changes becomes naïve in the face of these automatic responses. Applying 
embodiment theories of emotion to our interactions in digital space is a logical next step when 
discussing the convergence of the body and computational media because both processes are 
both highly plastic and interaction-dependent. Focusing these theories on our emotional 
experiences in digital space suggests a sweeping biological and cultural influence for our new 
media revolution.  
 The integration of neuroscience and new media is growing in popularity, as is 
neuroscience within the humanities on a broader scale. Some see this coupling as the “next big 
thing” in humanities research. Merging cognitive psychology and English literature, Lisa 
Zunshine’s research examines the theory of the mind “which involves one person’s ability to 
interpret another person’s mental state and to pinpoint the source of a particular piece of 
information in order to assess its validity.” 8 Zunshine takes what is essentially described by 
embodiment theories and applies it to our experience reading literature. Similarly, journalist 
Jonah Lehrer and child development scholar Maryanne Wolf both published books on Marcel 
Proust and the brain, and Rhonda Blair published The Actor, Image, and Action: Acting and 
Cognitive Neuroscience as a guide for actors to understand the cognitive engagement of 
becoming a character—all in 2008 alone. New scholarship is on the horizon, and with a lively 
debate following Zunshine’s profile in a March 2010 article in the New York Times about the 
                                                
    8 Patricia Cohen, “The Next Big Thing in English: Knowing They Know That You Know,” 
New York Times, March 31, 2010.  
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neuro-humanities,9 the conversation has only just begun. Furthermore, much of this new research 
cites the resurgence of emotions in the self/other construction and interaction. Gone are the days 
of critically understanding emotion and reason as binaries. Emotion and reason exercise mutual 
dependency in each of us, and because of this recent recognition, emotion research is cropping 
up in diverse disciplines. By combining cognitive science, neuroscience, popular culture, and 
even art history into the scope of this project, an inclusive, complex network of scholarship 
begins to build the foundation of our digital, emotional lives. While digital emotions may not be 
the “next big thing” in the neuro-humanities (if such a field even comes to exist on its own), they 
speak to a changing cultural, emotional, and personal landscape that affects each of us.  
 Even with the rise of the “neuro-humanities,” much of this coupling focuses on 
traditional subject matter, such as literature or theater, and neuroscience. Specifically for 
embodiment theories, a bulk of the science is used to explore epidemics such as autism (currently 
being linked to a mirror neuron malfunction) or socialization disorders. Joined with questions 
concerning digital mediation, these case studies often maintain their narrow focus and simply 
append the online or digital component to the scope of research. As a result, the bulk of our daily 
emotional communication in digital media is overlooked and unquestioned. Without a critical 
look at emotion and digital space, all other particular occurrences, such as the role of depression 
in online social groups, falls short. “Normal” is a dangerous term, but in many ways, most of us 
are rather well adjusted in our lives and take the changes of digital media in stride. The new 
media revolution arrived quickly, yet almost intuitively, because new media seemed to make life 
easier. Free services such as Facebook and Skype facilitate convenient communication, so 
grandparents in California can talk to their grandchildren through video connections with ease. 
                                                
    9 Ibid. 
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The extraordinary hyper-evolution of the technology takes a backseat to the intimacy of the 
exchange. Understanding how these revolutionary, yet strikingly implicit, changes affect our 
emotional lives should really be the first of a series of questions concerning digital media and an 
inevitably changing humanity. Much like the brain defines what we call “me” through constant 
neural plasticity, our increasingly networked digital environment is defining what we call “we.” 
Strangers coming together to solve an alternative reality game, teenagers text messaging under 
the sheets, or artists attempting to capture a snapshot of human fragility from blog postings are 
components of our new cultural landscape, and the role of emotions in this plastic landscape has 
yet to be fully uncovered. My research begins the process of contextualizing and connecting 
user’s increasingly common emotional experiences in digital space. 
 There are, of course, a few problems when dealing with media “users”—namely that the 
“user” population is quite diverse.  The troublesome caveat to this fact is that we often describe 
“users” as a single, hegemonic population when discussing new media. While race, gender, and 
socio-economic backgrounds comprise much of our personalities and experiences, these factors 
are mitigated in much digital communication when dealing with emotion because emotional 
responses are so often researched at the neural level. In regards to embodiment theories of 
emotion, individual emotional repertoires are considered when differentiating the single user 
from the network. While these generalizations are not perfect, they do allow for a flexible 
definition of a “user.” 
 The term “new media” poses similar problems because definitions vary drastically. New 
media has recently transformed into a highly inclusive term that, as Mark Hansen explains, is 
both singular and plural. Hansen argues that new media is therefore accurately described by the 
“new inflections of mass media…new gadgets…and new experiments with the effects of these 
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inflections and gadgets on the senses, emotions, and perceptual, social and imaginary 
experience.”10 This sweeping inclusivity—from the hardware of iPods to the experience of 
communicating with an avatar—is popular in our use of the term, but the “newness” of new 
media complicates the very definition that Hansen presents. The “newness” of the plural aspect 
of new media designates the linear progress of media as innovation. Tom Standage documented 
an example of this progression in his book The Victorian Internet where he argued that the 
telegraph transformed culture more so than the modern Internet. Yet, as Hansen argues, new 
media has also come to designate a singular, perhaps more complex transformation in our 
culture. While the plural form of the term will continue to function as an important facet of 
digital innovation, the singular form suggests that media is, perhaps for the first time, “separated 
from the technology that mediates it.”11 The consequence of such a distinction suggests, for 
Hansen, that we are at a fundamental turning point as humans because media is now distinct 
from its own technical infrastructure. The telegraph most certainly transformed communication, 
yet the hardware—the wires, the actual telegraph, the paper, etc.—defined the message. Today, 
the computer does not indicate, in anyway, the “singular media that it transmits, and therefore 
is.”12 By expanding the definition of new media to include not just technical innovation, but also 
aesthetic and social developments, Hansen opens the door for a discussion of “new media” as a 
singular, emotional experience.  
                                                
    10 Mark Hansen, Critical Terms for Media Studies. Edited by Mark Hansen and W.J.T. 
Mitchell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010.), 184. 
 
    11 Ibid., 172. 
 
    12 Ibid. 
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 Working from a literary perspective (Hansen is an art historian), N. Katherine Hayles 
similarly argues for the necessary role of embodiment in computation. She forwards the concept 
of a post-human subject that is reliant on a “dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent 
machines.”13 The post-human subject, according to Hayles, links us back to nature and to the 
importance of our own bodies in conjunction with the technical world. Because emotions and 
feelings are the key communicative agents in the body, in a sense, emotions become the “new 
media” when working from these arguments because they facilitate the relationship between the 
body and the screen. In essence, new media is the post-human subject, and emotions are the ties 
that bind. Digital emotions arise from these hybrid and experimental terms because they require 
a necessarily link between computation and human experience. Building on Hansen and Hayles, 
digital emotions provide a more focused, and perhaps more tangible, understanding of “new 
media.”  
 The decision to include a wider range of media presents a more comprehensive and, 
hopefully, robust understanding of emotions in digital space, while continuing to underscore the 
evolution of “new media” as we understand it. These new human experiences permeate our 
popular culture and are often praised or demonized based on their functionality and/or ubiquity. 
Yet, just as the computer fails to represent the new media it transmits, catchy advertising or 
cautionary headlines also fail to explain the human—the emotional—impact of new media. We 
must continue to broaden our view.  
 
***   
                                                
    13 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 288. 
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 Part one begins with a review of current emotion research and computing, which 
subsequently grounds a working framework of digital emotions. Part two explores applications 
that integrate (on varying levels) the three major contributors to digital emotions: technology, 
community, and the aesthetic experience. Some of the applications, such as Facebook, may be 
familiar while other media may be completely unfamiliar, such as the massive-multiplayer game 
I Love Bees. Despite their diversity, each of the media share a similar ability to tighten the 
already intertwined relationship between computation and human experience—what N. 
Katherine Hayles calls the post-human, and what Mark Hansen similarly dubs “new media.”   
 To ground the framework of digital emotions, the first chapter explores theories of 
emotion beginning with the James-Lange theory and ending with a discussion of embodied 
emotion research. In the nineteenth century, William James and Carl Lange hypothesized, 
contrary to intuitive belief at the time, that emotions preceded feelings. Instead of crying because 
we are sad, we are sad because we cry—our bodies perceive the world around us and we, in turn, 
adapt to that perception.14 What eventually became known as the James-Lange theory of 
emotions fell out of favor in the 1920s, only to reemerge, though tweaked, in the past few years. 
Interestingly, the re-emergence of the James-Lange theory set the stage for a flurry of embodied 
emotion research that includes Antonio Damasio’s “as-if body loops” and mirror neurons.  
 As emotions began to be understood as part of a feedback process between the body and 
the environment, researchers began to take a look at emotions as more than perceptions about the 
world but instead as actual recreations of bodily states. Mirror neurons are opening the door to a 
wide range of hypotheses highlighting the essential bond between others, our environment and 
                                                
    14 William James, “What is an Emotion?,” in What is an Emotion? Classic Readings in 
Philosophical Psychology, compiled by Cheshire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984): 127-141. 
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ourselves. Interestingly, the age-old question of whether humans are inherently selfish or 
generous is beginning to be answered, and coupled with our growing social networks, the 
implications of research like Vilayanur Ramachandran’s is staggering. Ramachandran argues 
that the empathetic power of mirror neurons not only creates a sense of self and other, but also 
builds civilizations.15 The transfer of knowledge between individuals and cultures could be more 
implicit than we once believed. Many civilizations are built from revolutions, and the non-motor 
impact of mirror neurons sheds light on our changing world. To frame the argument for 
embodiment theories of emotion, chapter one is further broken down into three sections—
simulation and/or (re)experience, culture, and subjectivity. These three core characteristics of 
embodiment theories lay the foundation for the framework of digital emotions.  
 Chapter two builds on the history of emotion research and the description of embodiment 
theories as they apply to new media theories. New media theorists, such as Andy Clark, N. 
Katherine Hayles, and Mark Hansen, have all embraced, to various extents, the concept of 
“extended cognition”—the idea that cognition exists within a bodily and environmental feedback 
loop, not simply locked within the brain. While these theories have their differences, three 
general themes emerge that utilize embodiment theories as their gateway to the body/media 
hybrid: (1) embodiment, (2) the importance of the arts to embodied feedback, and (3) quasi-
utopian futures based on heightened connectivity. Chapter two also explores the complexity of 
the term “new media” and how it relates to various permutations of the network, such as the 
controversial and always colorful visual message board 4chan.org.  
                                                
    15 Vilayanur Ramachandran and Lisa M. Olberman, “Reflections on the Mirror Neuron 
System: Their Evolutionary Functions Beyond Motor Representation,” in Mirror Neuron 
Systems: The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition, ed. Jaime A. Pineda (New York: 
Humana Press, 2008): 39-45. 
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 Influenced by embodiment theories, as well as new insight into the role of new media and 
the post-human, the framework of digital emotions is presented in chapter three. The process of 
digital emotions is an intrinsically hybrid concept that clarifies the numerous permutations of 
emotions in digital space. The framework implicitly claims that digitally communicated 
emotions, while limited, are none-the-less an integral part of the body/environment feedback 
system that incites emotional responses. Digital emotions are thus not watered down, generic 
representations of “real” emotions, but perhaps more influential in scope and effect because of 
their prolific digital mediation. Whether we call the combination of computation and human 
experience “post-human” or “new media” depends only on the privileged perspective. The 
embodied experience of interacting with new media, as Hansen argues, has come to define new 
media itself, and the consequence is a ripe opportunity to understand the changing shape of the 
traditional body/environment feedback system in relation to emotional response. Digital 
emotions are necessarily embodied, yet they occur in conjunction with the digital environment, 
which includes other individuals. The ever-heightened connectivity of new media influences how 
we emote, and how, when, and where we emote directly influences our state of being—our 
personhood. Emotions, and the potential of emotion, are thus magnified and limited in these 
ubiquitous spaces. This seeming contradiction is what makes digital emotions so fascinating. As 
we continue to emote in digital space, and therefore with new media, we are gaining and losing 
aspects of what it means to be an emotional human.  
 Part two comprises a three-chapter series that applies the framework of digital emotions 
to various technologies/media, communities of users, and aesthetic experiences. In the early 
1990s, around the same time mirror neurons were being tested for action-mimicking behavior in 
monkeys, Rosalind Picard published her first paper on affective computing. This paper heralded 
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not only a groundbreaking book by Picard on the subject, but an entire field that focuses on 
imbuing computers with empathy. Chapter four begins with a discussion of Picard’s seminal text 
Affective Computing, and discusses the role of emotion in artificial intelligence. Picard defines 
affective computing as “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences 
emotions”16 Because emotion plays a central role in communication, she argues that our 
interactions with computers display similar affective behavior as our interactions with other 
humans. Picard’s ideas gained increasing attention over the years, and today MIT hosts the 
Affective Computing Research Group that studies human/computer interactions with a focus on 
the emotional exchange.  
 Picard’s pioneering efforts influenced countless studies and innovations in affective 
technology. For example, Expressive Internet Communication (EIC) seeks to revolutionize the 
primitive emoticon by manipulating a personal photograph’s facial expressions. By changing 
“your” facial expression based on emotional cues, researchers believe that communication will 
be more effective (and affective!). The MIT Media Lab is currently conducting research on 
FaceSense, which can detect subtle facial movement and register a like or dislike to the 
computer. This technology could allow computers to react to the user by sensing their frustration 
and renegotiating a more likeable response to a problem.  
 So, could empathic computers running programs such as EIC and FaceSense positively 
influence our own daily interactions with others? Perhaps. If our emotional intelligence is based 
on a cultural repertoire of emotions, as argued by embodiment theories, then programs that 
potentially widen such a repertoire directly impact our emotional lives. The more affective 
                                                
    16 Rosalind Picard, Affective Computing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 3. 
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computation becomes the more singular “new media” becomes, and the more our emotional 
experiences become necessarily linked to digital media.  
 Affective computing illustrates a key feature of digital emotions: they reinforce the 
strength and affectivity of biological interactions. Although the focus appears to be on 
computers, the goal of affective computing is to create a more human experience when dealing 
with technology. What is so interesting about this often-stated goal is that the technology is 
influencing the human experience whether or not it attempts to mimic affective responses. 
Nonetheless, recognizing the importance of emotional experiences when developing new 
technology heightens the possibility of an emotional response, therefore the importance of 
understanding the effect of that emotional response in the context of these new, specifically 
constructed interactions is critical. The digital emotions that these areas of research stimulate are 
only going to become more pervasive as we continue to recognize the extent of human/computer 
influence.  
 Chapter five focuses on how users communicate emotion in online communities—from 
social networking sites, such as Facebook, to massive multi-player gaming. Moving from a 
rather narrow human/computer focus, this chapter is more interested in the human-to-human 
interactions that are facilitated and transformed by digital media. The subject matter in this 
chapter is probably more familiar than any other, and rightly so. The Internet has become host to 
incalculable connections and communities over the past decade, and usage will only rise with a 
new generation that views digital interactions as equivalent to face-to-face interactions.  
 Renowned game designer Jane McGonigal fully embraces the emotional human potential 
within the network. She believes that games and gamers can change the world by refocusing 
gamers’ creative spirit, community, and desire to succeed. By creating games that are focused on 
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real world problems, such as her 2010 project in collaboration with the World Bank, Evoke, 
McGonigal argues that the immense talent pool of gamers can begin to solve the world’s 
problems through collective critical thinking. Evoke calls on youth culture from around the world 
“to start tackling the world’s toughest problems: poverty, hunger, sustainable energy, water 
security, conflict, disaster relief, health care, education, [and] human rights.”17 McGonigal, along 
with game designers and players across the world, understands that games only succeed if there 
is an emotional commitment to what she calls “the epic journey.”18 She cites recent cognitive 
science research that links gaming to optimism and mutual respect. As games evolve, and they 
are evolving at a rapid pace, further understanding the emotional connection between users and 
virtual worlds can help us better understand how to mimic these emotions in reality—exactly 
what McGonigal and others are trying to accomplish.  
 Although gaming is ubiquitous, with 500 million global gamers (just online),19 Facebook, 
the most popular social networking site to date, boasts over 400 million users from its inception 
in 2006 to the present (April 2010).20 Much of the research on Facebook focuses on certain 
demographics, such as age, and highlights the changing socialization of these populations. 
Sometimes these effects are positive and sometimes they are utterly tragic, yet the research 
suggests that social networking is a permanent fixture in twenty-first century culture. In these 
                                                
    17 Jane McGonigal, “Avant Game blog,” http://blog.avantgame.com/ (accessed March 1, 
2010).  
 
    18 Ibid. 
 
    19 Jane McGonigal, “Gaming Can Change the World,” TED Talks site, March 2010 
http://www.ted.com/talks/jane_mcgonigal_gaming_can_make_a_better_world.html (accessed 
March 30, 2010).  
 
    20 Facebook, “Press Room,” http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (accessed 
April 27, 2010).  
 
  18 
spaces, users create emotional portraits of themselves to share online through emoticons and 
other indicators, which relay emotional states to other users.  
 Emoticons—“emotion” “icons”—comprise the bulk of an ever-increasing index of 
emotional language that caters to truncated, digital communication. Without critical facial cues 
to guide the tone of a conversation, emoticons () and other textual abbreviations (LOL—
laughing out loud) emotionally punctuate everything from text messages to status updates. They 
are ubiquitous, primitive, often puerile, and increasingly unavoidable as we continue to 
communicate digitally. The index of emoticons and their use is increasing because our use of 
mobile phones and status updates to communicate is skyrocketing. The period between April and 
October 2009 witnessed an eight percent increase in Internet users claiming that they use Twitter 
or another service to share updates about themselves, or to see updates about others.21 With 19% 
of Internet users communicating via short status updates, recognizing the influence and potential 
of emotive status updating lays the groundwork for a value-based understanding of networked 
emotions. Status updating provides a picture of the spectrum of digital emotions and how various 
technologies facilitate emotional communication within the network.  
 Recent research suggests that we could soon search for people and images based on 
emotional markers, such as happiness and anger, which points to the looming potential of status 
updating culture. Currently, through communal tagging systems, photographs and music can be 
indexed by common emotional responses to the material.22 How soon before a catalogue of a 
                                                
    21 Amanda Lenhart and Susannah Fox, “Twitter and Status Updating,” Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, February 12, 2009  http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/Twitter-
and-status-updating.aspx (accessed March 30, 2010).  
 
    22 Stefanie Schmidt and Wolfgang G. Stock, “Collective Indexing of Emotions in Images. A 
Study in Emotional Information Retrieval,” Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology, 60, no. 5 (February 2009): 863-876.  
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user’s status updates or “tweets” creates a searchable profile of you as an optimist? Or pessimist?  
One of the key features of embodied emotion is the almost instant changeability of emotional 
responses. Emotions work fast, so fast that sometimes they never reach our conscious mind. This 
fact complicates digital emotions and the future of emotion-based indexing. On the one hand, 
digital media refreshes constantly, whether you are viewing a constantly reloading news page, or 
receiving social media updates, this flux runs parallel to our emotional lives. On the other hand, 
digital media is also redundant. The constant refreshing gives the impression that information is 
always new, but this is not necessarily the case. This redundancy has the potential to distance 
emotional engagement. The simultaneous flux and redundancy of digital media is what often 
magnifies emotions in digital space—the landscape is constantly refreshing, which augments the 
content and our response to it.   
 Social networking and gaming build varying types of online communities, but none quite 
fit into the unique niche of online community art—what I like to call digital community 
artworks. Digital community artworks collect and aesthetically arrange instances of human 
emotion with the goal of building community through empathy. Emotion is implicit to these 
projects, and many of them, I believe, provide us a glimpse into the future of digital emotions 
and our changing culture. The final chapter of the dissertation focuses on digital community 
artworks and their distinctive relationship to digital emotions.  
 Within these collective spaces, individual participants provide brief textual and/or visual 
elements to the project, yet the artwork as a whole takes precedence over its parts. As the social 
context of participation gives way to the evolution of the artwork, emotions take on an 
interesting role, because the user, often assuming the dual role of spectator and participant, gains 
access to emotions and/or emotional experiences that appear to be context free. Unlike 
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mainstream social networking sites, digital community artworks impose a new context on the 
emotion by juxtaposing the emotion and/or emotional experience with those of other 
participants. The result is an unprecedented collection of human emotions that, through mass 
assembly, appear to present a singular, feeling subject (think back to the massive emotion 
collecting website We Feel Fine). The liminal space between the individual and the collective 
that many of these sites explore inspires a fresh perspective concerning the role of emotions in 
digital space. For example, Frank Warren’s PostSecret project invites users to submit an 
illustrated postcard that reveals a secret. Compiled on the Sunday blog post, the secrets blur the 
line between the individual user and the collective voice of the artwork. With more and more 
willing participants, digital community artworks redefine our understanding of “community” art, 
and the depths of emoting in digital space because they exemplify the potential of all other new 
media. By combining emotional, aesthetic, and digital experience, they really define what “new 
media” continues to become—an immersive, highly affective experience. Digital emotions are, 
above all else, a unique experience limited to the singular new media relationship between 
computing, collective human experience, and aesthetics, and they typify the future of digital 
media and our emotional lives.  
   
*** 
 Social networking sites spread revolutions, and in the not-too-distant future, low-energy 
game consoles that run through wireless phone networks will transform community gaming all 
over the world (a projected one billion user increase in gaming). Artists continue to explore 
digital technology and embodiment in their work, and teachers are embracing, for better or ill, 
truncated, electronic communication in their interactions with students. If these trends continue, 
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and I believe they will exponentially, a discussion of emotions within these new conversations, 
connections and communities is essential. Emotions are the glue that holds these relationships 
together, and as our once local relationships become global, our understanding of digital 
emotions will only evolve.  
 By applying embodiment theories of emotion to new media theory, I present a practical 
framework to understand the value of emotions in digital space. Digital emotions necessarily 
occur in the body, but they are also dependent on the digital media that incite them. They are 
autonomic, plastic, and represent the complex influence of new media on our culture. 
Understanding how this feedback process incorporates various media opens the door to 
understanding our twenty-first century selves.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Emotions are Fickle Things 
 
 
 
 On June 6, 2010, Frank Warren, founder of PostSecret—an ongoing community art 
project that web-publishes secrets mailed on postcards—published a secret that sparked a public 
outcry. It read: “I have lived in San Francisco since I was young … I am illegal … I am not 
wanted here. I don't belong anywhere. This summer I plan to jump off the Golden Gate.”23 Each 
line of the secret was typed, cut out, and pasted to a colorful image of a globe, which gave the 
visual impression of a cheerful postcard from abroad, not a haunting suicide note. Upon reading 
the note, a concerned PostSecret fan immediately created and dedicated a Facebook page to the 
author of the note, and within twenty-four hours twenty thousand people joined the digital 
community pleading with the anonymous author to reconsider. The Facebook group inspired a 
suicide prevention rally at the Golden Gate Bridge (which is, unfortunately, the most popular 
place to commit suicide in the world), and inspired a similar event over seven thousand miles 
away in Brisbane, Australia.24 By the end of 2010, the Please Don’t Jump Facebook page had 
roughly 25,400 members, and the overflow fan page boasted over 68,000 fans.25 Messages of 
hope are continually posted asking those who are thinking of suicide to hold out hope for a better 
day. It is impossible to know if the author of the postcard was ever exposed to the outpouring of 
                                                
    23 Frank Warren, PostSecret, www.postsecret.com (accessed March 1, 2010). 
 
    24 Krisiti Oloffson, “PostSecret Suicide Confession Starts an Offline Movement,” TIME, June 
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    25 Facebook, “Please Don’t Jump,” www.facebook.com/pleasedonotjump (accessed February 
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concern for his or her wellbeing, but based on the numerous Facebook posts, it is clear that 
others who are contemplating suicide have found solace in the spontaneous community built 
around his or her secret. 
 When Warren was interviewed about the unprompted chorus of supporters for the author, 
he said he couldn’t think of anything like this before,26 yet the world didn’t have to wait long to 
see a response that dwarfed the Please Don’t Jump reaction. The back-to-back suicides of seven 
gay youth in August and September of the same year inspired author Dan Savage to create the It 
Gets Better Project (IGBP) “to show young LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] 
people the levels of happiness, potential, and positivity their lives will reach – if they can just get 
through their teen years.”27 The It Gets Better Project’s website hosts over 10,000 videos of 
people from all over the world—from Barack Obama to anonymous teens in China—assuring 
LGBT youths that adults are typically less cruel than children and the emotional hurricane of 
being a LGBT teen will eventually subside. And on Facebook (the barometer of all things 
popular) the IGBP fan page cites over 117, 000 fans28 who post similar words of encouragement 
for those who feel hopeless and alone.   
 We can credit Frank Warren, Dan Savage, the incredible unifying power of Facebook, the 
up-to-the-minute meritocracy of blogs, and even the Internet itself for the success of these 
spontaneous communities, yet these were only conduits for a primed emotional community to 
come together and support two politically and culturally charged states of being: citizenship and 
sexual orientation. Primed emotional communities are difficult to define when discussing social 
                                                
    26 Oloffson, “PostSecret Suicide.”  
 
    27 Dan Savage, “It Gets Better Project,” www.itgetsbetter.org (accessed February 24, 2011). 
 
    28 Facebook, “It Gets Better Project,” www.facebook.com/ itgetsbetterproject?ref=ts (accessed 
February 24, 2011). 
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media—the term “community” takes on an entirely new meaning when individuals amass 
hundreds of “friends” on Facebook whom they have never met. And for every act of human 
courage and empathy in these spaces, we find acts of cowardice and cruelty. For example, on 
Christmas Day 2010, Simone Back, a forty-two year old British woman, posted a brief suicide 
note on Facebook. It read: “Took all of my pills be dead soon bye bye everyone.”29 Minutes after 
her stunning declaration, her Facebook “friends” began bickering over the status update. They 
called her bluff, traded accusations of guilt and lack of empathy, and some even questioned a call 
to the authorities. Ultimately, no one acted to save her life and Ms. Back died as the result of her 
overdose. Author Malcolm Gladwell argues that spontaneous emotional communities and 
spontaneous acts of citizenship, much like the Please Don’t Jump fan page, are simply activism 
built around weak ties. According to Gladwell, “social networks are effective at increasing 
participation—by lessening the level of motivation that participation requires.”30 Such 
participation is low-risk activism, or merely networking, not high-risk activism that puts bodies, 
jobs, and ingrained hegemony on the line (Gladwell cites the Woolworth’s lunch counter sit-in as 
an example of high-risk activism). Ms. Back’s death was the result of her overdose, but the 
response, and her potential savior, was drowned out by the shallowness of the communication. 
Gladwell laments a perceived death of high-risk activism as it is replaced by the “messy” 
networks of Facebook and Twitter, and when we juxtapose the inspiring stories of Please Don’t 
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Jump and It Gets Better to the tragic story of Simone Back, the complexity of digitally 
networked empathy is apparent. 
 These networks are a lot like viruses: left to prey on a weakened host, they will ravage 
the body. Weakened and sensibly injected, they will help your body build immunity. Both lethal 
and life saving, viruses must be controlled, manipulated, dealt with responsibility, and, to really 
work, be totally ubiquitous.  What Gladwell fails to recognize when touting the discipline and 
strategy needed to propel the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s forward are the parallel 
success stories of the Facebook and Twitter generation. Gay rights and illegal immigration are 
the civil rights issues of the day, and social media are tools that enhance “high-risk” activism and 
emotional ties. The digital outpouring of emotional videos and Facebook posts supporting 
suicide prevention for LBGT youth creates community where none existed (being a lonely 
LBGT teen), not simply by eliminating an already tight knit, yet marginalized community. If the 
first responder to Ms. Back’s suicide post expressed deep concern for the apparent overdose, 
who knows what the response would have been—one immediate and cruel comment diverted the 
conversation. If users are to take anything from Ms. Back’s story it should be the increased social 
responsibility that digital space requires, which is continually reiterated on her Facebook 
memorial page. The responses to these dramatic events show us the potential reach of empathy 
and other emotions in digital media. Whether we lament or celebrate these changes to our 
paradigm scenarios is beside the point—the landscape has changed and continues to change quite 
rapidly. In the midst of this social and cultural transformation, we must ask: what is a twenty-
first century emotion?  
 The question of emotional understanding dates far beyond William James’ famous 1884 
essay “What is an Emotion?,” yet he sparked our modern debate on the role of emotion in our 
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daily lives. James argued that emotional experiences were the result (not the impetus) of a 
stimulus. As he explains, we are afraid of bears because we run from them, not the other way 
around.31 The debate surrounding James’ definition of emotion rages on amid a recent explosion 
of emotion research and theory over the past few decades.32 At times it seems that the only thing 
emotion researchers can agree on is their fundamental disagreement. Yet, many advances in 
emotion research suggest to us a highly complex feedback system that dictates our lives more so 
than we ever could have imagined. In the midst of this avalanche of new research, it is critical to 
understand emotions in the context of our current, networked world. Most of us will never find 
ourselves face-to-face with a bear, or in a lab setting hooked up to countless wires responding to 
pictures of bears. What we do find is a perpetual relationship with digital culture. Instead of 
bears, we have digital postcards, Facebook pages, and primed emotional communities ready to 
answer prayers, pleas, or just acknowledge a user’s current emotional status. What do emotions 
mean in this space? And what does that mean for us?  
  
 Frustrated (as all emotion researchers are) with the lack of consensus on the definition of 
“emotion,” psychologist Carroll Izard set out to discover exactly where the commonalities and 
disagreements lie. Based on the responses of thirty-four scientists in the field of emotion 
research, Izard constructed this description of emotion:  
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Emotion consists of neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), response 
systems, and feeling state/process that motivates and organizes cognition and 
action. Emotion also provides information to the person experiencing it, and may 
include antecedent cognitive appraisals and ongoing cognition including an 
interpretation of its feeling state, expressions or social-communicated signals, and 
may motivate approach or avoidant behavior, exercise control/regulation or 
responses, and be social or relational in nature.33 
 
Jargon aside, this description should not come as a shock to anyone who has ever experienced 
emotion. Emotions rely on the brain and on some parts more than others, to respond to external 
stimuli in such a way that motivates a person to recognize the situation as being emotive and act 
accordingly; furthermore, one may or may not recognize this process based on the context of the 
situation. (Ever been cut off in rush hour traffic? Remember jerking the wheel? The fear of 
collision? The cold stare directed towards the hazardous driver? This series of events, based on 
the country of origin, the demeanor the driver, etc. would fall under Izard’s description.) Izard is 
careful to note that such a pluralistic description is not a definition, and considering the fact that 
his 2010 survey updates a twenty year old investigation into the description of emotion,34 we 
may not have a concrete definition, or attempt at a definition for some time. Emotions are fickle 
things.  
 Still, Izard’s survey confirmed a few ongoing assumptions about the nature of emotions. 
Many of the scientists surveyed recognized neural circuits and neurobiological processes, 
phenomenal experience and feeling, and perceptual-cognitive processes as fundamental aspects 
of emotions.35 According to Izard, “all of the scientists agreed that there are rapid and automatic 
connections among emotion and cognition…such processes may operate unconsciously….[and] 
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have implications for emotion activation, emotion regulation, and emotion utilization.36 With a 
few key aspects of emotion generally agreed upon, Izard’s description allows for various 
approaches to emotion to co-exist; yet the research is ongoing. As Maria Gendron notes in her 
response to Izard’s survey, the description “only reveals what some scientists believe about 
emotion.” Furthermore, “the fact that these assumptions have only recently entered into widely-
accepted definitions of emotion suggests that we ignore history at our own peril.”37 
Unfortunately, when discussing emotion, we are often relegated to what one believes. Even in 
the lab, human subjects are asked to rely on their phenomenological experiences in conjunction 
with measured bodily responses. Gendron does elucidate a rather frustrating point nonetheless: 
we know what we already thought we knew, but we still are not sure. 
 Further complicating any consensus on emotion, when editors at Emotion Review asked 
scholars to share their vision for future emotion research, they found that “investigations must 
situate emotions more clearly and unambiguously in the immediate social context, the broader 
cultural context, as well as the historical context, [which includes] real-life settings.”38 The 
overall tone of the special section on the future of emotion research seemed to eschew lab 
research for a more organic approach to understanding emotions in various contexts. Rosalind 
Picard, the pioneer of affective computing, believes that computers can help us understand 
emotions in genuine life situations as opposed to laboratory constructs. According to Picard, 
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“research can be done for the people by the people,”39 by tentatively replacing the lab technician 
with computers.  Instead of scientists creating virtual emotional situations that only imitate a 
mildly recognizable context, such as driving in traffic, Picard suggests outfitting actual rush hour 
drivers with devices that gauge their emotional response to trying traffic situations. By shifting 
the focus out of the lab and into the real world, we not only allow human research subjects 
access to their own generated data, but we get better data. Reminding us why emotions are so 
critical to research in the first place, Picard states that “emotions are about what’s real: they 
change with what truly matters to you, which can differ from what experimenters think 
matters.”40 When researchers call for more empirical evidence to forward our understanding of 
emotions, the real world seems to be the most logical and compelling way forward. Approaching 
emotions from a digital perspective—questioning how emotional interactions differ in online 
environments—therefore makes sense in the context of future emotion research. Ignoring how 
communication has changed, how our acceptance of data in the context of online environments 
has changed, and how we as digital users have changed, we can begin to understand emotions in 
a very hands-on, person-to-person fashion.  
 Picard’s suggestion to bring emotion research to the people to benefit the people (not 
simply to enrich a small group of emotion researcher’s portfolios) encompasses many other 
futures for emotions. Accepting literature and the arts into the fray of emotional research will 
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greatly expand the reach of how and why we emote. Sometimes dismissed as “neurobabble,”41 
neuroscience meets the arts books have entered the mainstream—whether discussing Jonah 
Lehrer’s acclaimed Proust Was a Neuroscientist or Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction: 
Theory of Mind and the Novel, the recognition that we have something to learn from fictions is 
gaining momentum. Literature taps into our empathetic emotions and is therefore somewhat 
limited, yet, as Patrick Colm Hogan argues in Emotion Review, literature produces a simulated 
experience that could be valuable missing piece of the emotion puzzle.42 Hogan’s claim seems 
almost pedestrian given our own memories of emotional experiences prompted by literature or 
other forms of art. General experiences of crying during films, throwing books across the room 
(this rather violent response to depressing stories runs in my family), or being in awe of a piece 
of art sweeps over us all throughout our lives. When reviewing the recent proliferation of 
emotion research, the combination of the arts and emotions as scientific points of study are often 
written off as a humanities’ huckster attempt to broaden their field.43 Dismissing the global 
tradition of the arts omits a history of emotion and a ripe field of study—it is almost as 
irresponsible as ignoring previous empirical research when discussing emotions because we 
consequently ignore emotional expression by those who have a remarkable talent for conveying 
what it means to be human.  
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 In the twenty-first century we have come to experience, in a sense, a living literature 
through ubiquitous networked communication. Studying digital emotional communities and 
communication combines what Picard, Hogan and others believe to be the necessary future of 
emotion research. No one is arguing, as far as I can tell, that empirical science step aside to allow 
the digital “pro-ams” to take over—lab studies and hard science set the foundation for all other 
inquiries into emotions—yet, we need to incorporate real people, moving fictions, and ordinary 
technologies into the mix to supply a complete picture of our emotional lives. Hogan notes that 
emotional experience is often representational anyway, much like the encoded and represented 
works of literature that he studies as a literary scholar. What could more encoded and represented 
than our constantly updated digital selves? Through literature, online communities, and pieces of 
art, emotion creates cultures through language and representation. These cultures influence our 
emotional repertoire and in turn allow us to empathize and contribute more complexity to our 
naturally kaleidoscopic lives. Studying emotions in context allows us to exercise the empathy 
needed to understand emotion in the first place. Viewing the hundreds of videos on 
www.itgetsbetter.com prompts an emotional experience—not because all users are gay teenagers 
with thoughts of suicide—but because feelings of loneliness are common, because hope is 
common, and the passion with which the contributors believe they can inspire change is 
contagious. The videos are emotional and provoke emotion in the viewer. They are also part of a 
future of emotion that changes the meaning of cultural and social context with their spontaneity, 
ubiquity, and collective force. When I discuss “digital emotions” I am recognizing the new 
power of this emotional triple threat and its ability to change the way we historically emote—for 
better or worse.  
  33 
 A concrete definition of emotion is complicated by each new publication and study, yet 
advances can be (and often are) made when, as Izard suggests, researchers and scholars clearly 
define emotion in the context of their research to help alleviate an already cumbersome 
description.  Amid the chaos of recent emotion research and theory, not to mention the long 
history of writings on emotion—from Aristotle to Spinoza, Hume to Kant, James to Schachter 
and Singer—the focus of research that most speaks to our digitally hybrid world are embodiment 
theories. Embodiment theories not a clearly defined set of theories, but they generally agree that 
what we know about emotions is dependent on our ability to simulate and/or (re)experience those 
emotions.44  This group of theories loosely overlaps with more traditional categorical and 
cognitive theories, but where as cognitivist theories view emotions primarily as judgments and/or 
appraisals about the world that are rather consistent over time and space, embodiment theories 
typically stress the importance of culture on emotional repertoires and subsequent paradigm 
scenarios. If the future of emotion research depends on a more intimate interaction between 
scientific studies and real life, then embodiment theories lay the groundwork for a closer 
understanding of how emotions shape our lives. They suggest that our emotional lives are largely 
dependent on our social and cultural context and open the door for the possibility that dramatic 
changes in our environment can influence our emotional lives.  
  
 This is not to say that cognitivist or appraisal theories lack merit in a digital context. 
Many of these theories overlap and influence each other in profound and important ways. 
Published posthumously in 1677, Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics experienced a bit of a rebirth in 2003 
with the publication of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and 
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the Feeling Brain. Damasio’s much-cited study updates the late philosopher’s writings on 
emotion with modern evidence linking the mind and body interactions that Spinoza describes. 
Spinoza opposed the prevailing dualistic view of the mind and body (championed by René 
Descartes) and instead argued that emotion, or “passivity of the soul,” is a modification of the 
body. He defines emotion as a “confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or 
any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the 
presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.”45 This 
definition of emotion still views emotion as a misguided thought (much like the Stoics) and 
believed that we should seek to overcome emotions with reason (or reason-induced emotion).46 
Spinoza’s writings on emotions in Ethics failed to inspire an entirely new outlook on emotions in 
the seventeenth century. Three hundred years later, his forward thinking reflects aspects of our 
modern understanding of emotion as inextricably linked to the body and working in both passive 
and active fashions. As Izard suggests in his description of emotion, the belief that emotions are 
inextricably linked to the body is almost universal. The extent to which the body proper is 
responsible for emotions drives current arguments.  
 Spinoza first linked emotions and body, and William James (later with Carl Lange) 
argued that stimuli induce a physical reaction and the reaction causes emotion. Walter Cannon 
and Philip Bard challenged the notion of causality, in the early 1920s when they noted that 
physiological changes are caused by emotions, not the other way around (as James and Lange 
suggest). In the Cannon/Bard view, someone can only react to a stimulus if they are 
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simultaneously experiencing the corresponding emotion. Where James and Lange proposed a 
clear stimulus  physical reaction  emotion trilogy, Cannon and Bard believed that the 
arousal and emotional response happened simultaneously after the perception of the stimulus. By 
the 1960s, the Schachter and Singer model attempted to update the James/Lange theory, which 
combined the Jamesian physiological component of arousal and a cognitive component 
discussing how emotions are labeled. This theory was aptly labeled the “two component” or 
“two factor” theory of emotions because it recognized the physical arousal and the understanding 
of that arousal. Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer conducted an experiment using epinephrine 
to (as they argue) prove that the mind “cognitively attributes” feelings of arousal with patterns in 
the environment. Schachter and Singer conclude that  
given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no explanation, 
he will label this state in terms of the cognitions available to him…it must follow 
that given a state of physiological arousal for which  the individual has a 
completely satisfactory explanation, he will not label this state in terms of the 
alternative cognitions available…Finally, it has been suggested that given 
constant cognitive circumstances, an  individual will react emotionally only to the 
extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal.47 
 
These conclusions are based on a simple experiment where 182 college students were given a 
shot of either epinephrine (disguised as an experimental vitamin) or a placebo. The subjects were 
then told that the shot would produce the effects of adrenaline, a dull headache or nothing at all. 
The participants were then led into a room where a stooge attempted to sway the group into 
feelings of anger or happiness. As Schachter and Singer explain, those subjects who expected to 
feel side effects from the shot (the “epinephrine informed” group) were not as responsive (or 
swayed) by the stooge—they anticipated an increasing heart rate, a flushed face and shaky hands. 
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The subjects who were uninformed felt the angriest or happiest because, according to Schachter 
and Singer, they did not have any explanation for their physical symptoms, so they depended on 
cognitions available to them—anger, happiness, etc.—as dictated by the context of their 
situation. (The placebo group was less angry or happy than the uninformed group, but more so 
than the informed.) These foundational theories of emotions each incorporate the basic 
ingredients for emotions that Izard found in his 2010 survey. The order of the stimulus, 
perception, response and emotion continues to be contested.  
 Still on the periphery of embodiment theories, James Laird’s self-perception theory 
refashions the more traditional James-Lang theory and downplays the role of cognition that 
Schachter and Singer appear to prove when describing feelings. Through clinical testing, Laird 
argues that first we react and our perception of the reaction as it occurs is the feeling. He believes 
that feelings are different things from behaviors and bodily responses. They are information, or 
knowledge about those behaviors and responses, but not the cognitive responses. Basically, the 
self-perception theory arose from a series of tests that attempt to show that when behaviors 
related to feelings are manipulated, then those feelings occur. For example, Laird argues, “The 
feeling of happiness is not a direct consequence of the smile, but rather is a product of the 
relationship between the smile and the context in which it occurs.”48 Feelings, then, are 
conscious experiences and “are not the forces that produce actions; instead, they are the feedback 
information about the effects of those actions, information that permits the control an shaping of 
action.”49 Context is critical for the Self-Perception Theory because feelings are not automatic, 
but are based on behaviors in various situations—they are the information about those behaviors 
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and this information is largely perceptual. Even though feelings do not cause behavior, they have 
a central role, according to Laird, because feelings can in turn affect subsequent behaviors. This 
creates a feedback loop that Laird links to Damasio’s well-known “as-if-body loop,” which 
describes an internal brain simulation that quickly and falsely constructs a bodily state, but which 
the brain cannot identify as a false bodily state. (The “as-if” loop would account for twinges of 
pain when you witness an accident—your body reacts “as-if” it were experiencing the action 
and/or behavior.) “As-if” feedback is important to embodiment theories because it explains what 
the body does and what we perceive the body doing—sometimes two very different things.  
 Explanations of simulation and perception do not necessarily dominate current debates on 
emotion and feeling. Noted researchers such as Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, and Roland 
de Sousa all construct theories around a more cognitive understanding of emotions. Inspired by 
the same foundation theories of Spinoza, William James, Carl Lange, Schachter and Singer, and 
others, cognitive theories often overlap with embodiment theories, but are often more restrictive 
when discussing the neurological and phenomenal components of emotions.  Cognitive theories 
typically argue that emotions are judgments about the world, which are subjective and therefore 
political, social, and highly dependent upon context. The most prominent champion for a 
cognitive view of emotions is Robert Solomon, who notably detests the term “affect,” which 
implies short-term neurological arousals, because it leads down a road of fuzzy reductionism 
that, for Solomon, cheapens the cognitive sweat of our emotions grappling with the world around 
us in a very real way: 
A cognitive theory of emotion thus embodies what is often referred to as affect 
and feeling without rendering these unanalyzable. There are affects/feelings 
critical to emotions but they are not distinct from cognition or judgment and they 
are not mere read outs of processes going on in the body. They are judgments of 
the body and that is the missing element in the cognitive view of emotions. They 
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are profound manifestations of our many ways of emotionally engaging with the 
world.50  
 
Judgments are geared toward perception, according to Solomon, but they are not dependent on 
any object of perception. The benefit of viewing emotions as a complex of judgments about the 
world—or even viewing them as our active engagement with the world—renders them 
researchable and cuts through a lot of theory (notably neurophenomenology) to focus on the 
consequence of emotion in our social and cultural lives.  
 Also working within a cognitive paradigm is Martha Nussbaum, who champions the 
cognitive evaluative view of emotions from a humanist’s perspective. Where Solomon argues 
that emotions are judgments about the world that can exist without any object perception, 
Nussbaum believes that emotions always involve the thought of an object combined with that 
object’s importance for the subject. Emotions, according to Nussbaum, are eudiamonistic 
(meaning they are concerned with our own flourishing) and therefore can wield control over the 
way we behave or wish to behave. The cognitive evaluative view sees emotions as value-laden 
judgments about the world, and if emotions are concerned with one’s own flourishing, then 
emotions can be modified to change the way we evaluate objects.51 It is no wonder that 
Nussbaum advocates for the importance of literature and the arts because the very foundation of 
her theory lies in our ability to cultivate our best emotional lives through empathy, and what 
better to incite empathy than art? According to Nussbaum, our ability to relate to each other 
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through the arts is central to public life and therefore to our personal flourishing as well.52 (This 
argument appears again and again when emotion research is combined with the humanities.) It is 
a relatively straightforward feedback loop: we glean emotional experiences from aesthetics, 
attribute value to those experiences, become enlightened by them, and go on to seek similar 
experiences or even create objects to provoke similar experiences. On the surface, the cognitive 
evaluative view of emotions seems to account for the neurological underpinning of this entire 
feedback process—Nussbaum even cites Damasio and Joseph LeDoux—yet, her description of 
emotion is more akin to what Damasio describes as feelings, which are decidedly (according to 
Damasio) not cognitive.53 While the intricacies of Nussbaum’s theory are perhaps at odds with 
emerging science, her intuitive desire to merge the arts and our emotional lives is worth noting—
especially in the context of aesthetic experiences in digital spaces.  
 For Solomon, Nussbaum and others (such as Jerome Neu, Justin Oakley, and William 
Lyons), much criticism comes from their use of the term judgment or appraisal. Even though 
Solomon notes that some judgments are unconscious, the criticisms override the explanation. 
Ronald de Sousa attempts to bridge the gap between a hard line cognitive view and more 
phenomenal one by replacing the judgment model with a perception model. Perceptions can be 
conscious or unconscious and provide a complex experience in the world. These ongoing 
experiences comprise what de Sousa calls “paradigm scenarios,” which are narratives that arise 
out of complex emotional experiences.54  He explains, 
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Emotions derive behavior not so much by motivating, but by orienting our 
attention toward this or that among the plethora of considerations that might think 
relevant at a particular juncture. These scenarios have narrative structures where 
emotions play a determining role. Elaborated by art and literature, early 
experiences and they serve to define and differentiate each person’s idiosyncratic 
repertoire of emotions.55  
 
These scenarios construct a “parallel representational system for understanding the world” based 
on our memories of emotional experiences (whether we recognize them or not).56 Here again, 
emotions are highly subjective, but now based on a complex narrative of individualized 
experiences that, according to de Sousa, are so diverse that reducing them to a single thing may 
be impossible. The theory of paradigm scenarios appeals to a wide range of emotion research 
because it accounts for the inherent miscellany in our everyday lives. De Sousa also accounts for 
the “biological facts” of our emotional responses, but notes that these are only relevant in 
conjunction with individual biography and social norms.57 Paradigm scenarios are worth looking 
at for several reasons: they attribute emotions to either conscious or unconscious perceptions 
about the world; they account for the influence of culture on our emotional lives; they highlight 
our experiences (memories) in the world and the role of those experiences on current and future 
emotional experiences; and they present the subject with an emotional repertoire that 
encompasses common culture and individual experience that may conflict with that culture. Each 
of these aspects—culture, memories, narratives, and ongoing subjective experiences—
compliment an already inclusive work of embodiment theories because they account for the 
culturally traceable aspect of (re)experience when dealing with emotions, not just the short-term 
neurological simulation.  
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 While some may try to avoid sticky explanations of emotions to construct a tidy 
definition (emotions are judgments! emotions are perceptions! emotions are synapses firing!), I 
see the effort as utterly useless and perhaps reckless. It is like saying that the Constitution of the 
United States can answer every complicated situation that arises in a changing world while 
ignoring the countless rulings and precedents that interpret the original document based on social 
and cultural context. Just as Izard was careful not to define emotion, but describe it based on 
relative consensus in the field, I find that a more inclusive, malleable description allows for the 
biology and the experience to coexist while remaining open to new discoveries. This path is 
messy, no doubt, but emotions are fickle things. We have come a long way since Spinoza 
merged the mind and body, since James privileged the body over the mind when darting from a 
bear, and since Schachter and Singer injected kids with adrenaline and then tried to make them 
angry. We know that many of these experiments and theories were missing critical 
components—Spinoza never had the privilege of looking at an fMRI image of a brain emoting to 
see that emotions are not necessarily misinformation, James did not witness a series of 
experiments that show how thinking of an emotion can create a bodily response, and Schachter 
and Singer’s experiment overly focuses on cognitive factors. Yet all of these experiments and 
theories contribute to a growing understanding of emotions in our world. They each speak to an 
aspect of embodiment theories that will help construct the framework for emotions in digital 
space.  
  
 Theories beget studies and studies beget theories. It is a feedback system much like the 
very emotional process that researchers attempt to explain. Embodiment theories, while diverse, 
all focus on the importance of (re)experience, or simulation when discussing what subjects 
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“know” about emotion. Paula M. Niedenthal and Marcus Maringer cite two beneficial aspects to 
this knowledge: (1) Instead of reducing emotions to generic categories (such as anger, happiness, 
etc.), embodiment theories remove the distinction between the conceptual and the perceptual; 
and (2) they account for individual and cultural differences in emotional experience.58 Looking 
back at de Sousa’s description of paradigm scenarios, we can see how the second aspect is 
critical to understanding emotions in the round. Removing the distinction between the conceptual 
and perceptual allows for emotions and emotional knowledge to be understood together—think 
of Damasio’s “as-if” loop. It is not just that bodily changes constitute an emotion, but “peripheral 
input works with the brain’s modality-specific systems to very rapidly create and recreate bodily 
states of emotions.”59 Culture and simulation: a multi-faceted approach to emotions that 
compliments our evolution towards the digital.  
 In an effort not to get bogged down with scientific jargon, or an overly comprehensive 
review of literature, the following discussion of embodied emotions is broken down into three 
overlapping areas: simulation and/or (re)experience, culture, and subjectivity. Each aspect is 
inextricably linked to the other, but various points of research stress one aspect over the others 
and so the distinction aids in our overall understanding of how embodied emotions work, what 
we still have left to figure out, and how they open the door for digital emotions.  
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(Re)experience and/or Simulation 
 
 With the rise of cybernetics in the 1950s and the subsequent explosion of science fiction 
narratives, the concept of simulation evokes radical, futuristic, and even dangerous feelings. 
Exiled “replicants” doing our bidding (or not) in Ridley Scott’s 1982 classic Blade Runner, (an 
adaptation of Philip K. Dick’s 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?), or 
genetically mutated humans, “pre-cogs,” re-experiencing imminent murders in Minority Report, 
create a dystopic future where humans are imprisoned by simulation gone awry. Simulation, in a 
pop culture context, typically means a world where we are no longer in control—where the 
“real” is beyond the pale and only can be found through trust in our “natural” capabilities. The 
inability of “replicants” to emote in Blade Runner taps into these fears and comforts: the 
“replicants” are phenotypically human, but they are kept from developing emotions because they 
are given short life spans.60 This absence of emotion makes them “robotic” and decidedly not 
human. (We tend to love emotions when they separate us from robots, but demonize them when 
they separate us from each other.) In another Philip K. Dick adaptation, the film Minority Report 
centers around three mutant humans who can see the future, specifically murders, and through 
these visions they (re)experience the entire, gory, emotional scene. Here, hypersimulation is a 
blessing and a curse—the “pre-cogs” (short for pre-cognitive) alert authorities (the pre-crime 
unit), to would-be murders, but the “pre-cogs” are virtual prisoners of future (re)experience. Of 
course, the list goes on and on…science fiction loves clones, mind readers and matrixes. Not to 
mention a exhaustive philosophical history of simulation—from Plato’s Cave to Jean 
Baudrillard’s seminal Simulacra and Simulation—we seem to be obsessed with the idea of 
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copies, mimesis, and/or (re)experience, and perhaps naturally so. Recent neurological studies 
suggest that our ability to simulate other’s actions constructs the core of our understanding of 
self and other. (In the rare intersection of empirical science and philosophy, the 
phenomenologists scored!)   
 Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, believed that the science of the mind 
should be established on a scientific foundation even though these “sciences” were, according to 
him, not physical.61 Husserl championed the concept of intersubjectivity, which functions 
through the expression of human empathy. He believed that the intersubjective experience 
allowed the subject to emerge and recognize others as subjects in a spacio-temporal world. In 
short, without empathy we would be less than replicants; we would be clueless to our distinction 
from others and our surroundings. Max Scheler, a contemporary of Husserl’s, argues that some 
emotions are reasons, with “value feelings” being intentional and “feeling states” being 
unintentional. Published in 1913, Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of 
Values, makes a phenomenological connection between emotion, perception, other and self that 
survives clinical trials almost one hundred years later. Phenomenologists—Husserl, Scheler, 
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others—find their theories explicating neuro-
simulation. Marco Iacoboni dubs this unlikely intersection neurophysiologic phenomenology, 
claming that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty had it right when they linked action and perception, 
except that we do not have to pretend that we feel the same—“being in another’s shoes” as 
Husserl would argue—we are feeling the same.62 Iacoboni studies mirror neurons, a group of 
cells with sensorimotor properties first discovered in the macaque monkey, which are shown to 
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fire when monkeys observe a grasping action as though they are grasping the object.63 From the 
humble macaque monkey comes a elaborate theory of (re)experience that attributes everything 
from speech perception, music perception, empathy, altruism, emotion, imitation, autism, and 
others to the mirror neuron system.64 Supporting the foundation of humanity on its humble 
shoulders (or in its synapses), simulation theory via the mirror neuron system is criticized for 
being over celebrated and overly attributed to social engineering.65 As with any recent discovery, 
hopes are high despite evolving evidence. New discoveries will continue to clarify the role of the 
mirror neuron network, and the results could teach us a lot about ourselves and the way we 
socialize.  
 Mirror neurons are a popular cornerstone of embodied cognition, or embodiment 
theories, which recognize the brain as an extension of the body where perceptual and motor 
experiences are the product of our movement through the environment.66 Mirror neurons aid this 
perception by (re)experiencing actions of others—we perceive how others act, therefore feel, by 
creating an experience of those actions in our own bodies. Iacoboni argues that mirror neurons 
are not deliberate enough to go through the work of creating a conscious “I’m in your shoes” 
experience, but instead create that experience in an effortless fashion.67 Mirror neurons are 
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concerned with the goal of an action, the intention, more so than the actual action itself. This is 
where the phenomenological tradition comes into play. Because mirror neurons act on intention 
they are intimately in tune with space, time, and emotional cues. Mirror neurons, sometimes 
dubbed “empathy neurons,”68 allow us to understand other’s mental states by experiencing their 
intentions, which deepens the intersubjective experience.69 Iacoboni does not go as far as Husserl 
in describing this experience as “coupling,” where subjects become “one,” but he does argue that 
this (re)experience is more than mere imitation. For example, recent science suggests that 
monkey’s mirror neurons fire when they watch another monkey reach for an object. According 
to the monkey’s brain (the F5 region), they are reaching for the object, and not just any object, 
but that object. The firings are specific to the size and shape of the object being observed. 
Studies also suggest that people watching a sport, for example tennis, play along with the 
athletes. Even tennis playing muscles in their body fire unbeknownst to them as they observe 
(and simulate) a powerful serve. Amputees with “phantom limb” pain present an interesting case 
for mirror neurons because they experience pain or discomfort in a limb that no longer exists. 
Researchers found that hand amputees observing a hand being touched evoked “vivid, precisely 
localized sensations in their own phantom hands.”70 Where a non-amputee would recognize the 
difference between the simulation and the actual touch (note: the conscious mind recognizes the 
difference, not the mirror neurons—they fire whether watching or acting), the amputee 
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recognizes the simulation as actual touching. Furthermore, other studies with amputees suggest 
that when observing their non-amputated limb in a mirror (projected as though it is replacing the 
amputated limb), subjects claim that phantom pain is erased or weakened with massage, or 
merely viewing the simulation of the limb as thought it existed.71 Interestingly, these studies 
suggest that one does not confuse empathy with actual experience, unless they are unable to, in a 
sense, complete the simulation. While this research is in its infancy, the repercussions are quite 
fascinating. The less body we have, the more our brains confuse other’s actions and feelings as 
our own.  
 Studies also show that the human mirror neuron system not only processes action stimuli, 
like playing tennis, but specifically action stimuli with social relevance. The mirror neuron 
system seems to be sensitive to the presence of social cues in a stimulus and even more sensitive 
when those social cues are interactive. If the viewer identifies with the stimuli, even more social 
interaction is perceived.72 Take the tennis example, in the context of this study, a viewers mirror 
neurons would fire watching Rafael Nadal bounce a tennis ball on his racquet along side Roger 
Federer bouncing a ball on his racquet, her mirror neurons would fire more if she observed Nedal 
and Federer playing tennis with each other, but they would respond the most to Nedal and 
Federer playing tennis and then serving the ball to her (or at least towards her). If a subject 
perceives herself as being part of the game, then her brain “plays” along. Furthermore, other 
studies show that individuals are more inclined to simulate actions from people with whom we 
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have a close relationship.73 So, if an individual is lucky enough to know Rafeal Nedal and Roger 
Federer, the experience would be that much more intense. Mirror neurons aside, studies also 
show that humans have higher levels of “social sensitivity,” meaning they can perceive and 
appropriately react to others emotions, which can increase brainpower in small groups. This 
increased collective intelligence exceeds the separate intelligences of each member of the group. 
The whole, it seems, is truly greater than the sum of its parts.74 These and other studies show that 
the mirror neuron network in humans is both action and social oriented. The exciting (or 
reckless) leap comes when mirror neurons are discussed as being the foundation for mind, 
empathy, and language.75 
 Similar to the mirror neuron system, Antonio Damasio’s theory of an “as-if body loop” 
attempts to explain our ability to simulate or (re)experience the actions and feelings of others. 
According to Damasio, an as-if body loop is an internal brain simulation that consists of rapid 
modification of ongoing body maps when certain brain regions directly signal the body-sensing 
brain regions.76 This loop works extremely fast and brings thought and affective feeling close 
together in time—like a “gut” feeling. Again, this is not a “being in your shoes” type process. 
Damasio explains: 
The result of direct simulation of body states in body-sensing regions is no 
different from that of filtering of signals hailing from the body. In both cases the 
brain momentarily creates a set of body maps that does not correspond exactly to 
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the current reality of the body. The brain uses the incoming body signals like clay 
to sculpt a particular body state in the regions where such a pattern can be 
constructed…what one feels then is based on that ‘false’ construction, not the 
‘real’ body state.77 
 
Emotional stimulus activates brain systems involved in emotion, feeling and decision-making by 
bypassing the body proper and responding “as-if” the body is changing.78 This speed (or 
trickery) is beneficial to us because we can respond to anticipated stimulus. Studies have also 
shown that the as-if body loop could assist in vivid emotional imagery. In highly vivid imagery 
experiences, the central nervous system strongly simulates the emotional experience and body 
information plays a lesser role. Researchers hypothesize that this is because the “as-if” loop 
works exclusively with the vivid emotional experience and shuts down signals from “outside.”79 
Consequently, in low vivid imagery experiences the reverse occurs—the central nervous system 
does not simulate very strongly and more information is gleaned from the body proper. 
Practically speaking, our response to high impact visual imagery verse low impact may influence 
our understanding of new media, such as 3D entertainment, and how we physically respond to 
powerful images. 
  Damasio does not cite the mirror neuron system when discussing this “as-if” body loop, 
but many of the same brain regions are identified. In this construct, the mind is a process—the 
processing of the body’s response to thoughts and actions.  Understanding how the body uses 
simulation, and when simulation is advantageous for our emotional experiences and responses, 
raises interesting questions when discussing our interactions in digital space. Does digital 
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simulation beget corporeal simulation? How important is the body proper to our emotional 
experiences? And can we really demonize simulation in our digital worlds if simulation seems to 
be a keystone of our emotional intelligence? 
 
Culture 
 
 Both Damasio’s as-if body loop and studies surrounding the mirror neuron system offer 
promising insight to simulation and/or (re)experience. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, one of three 
neuroscientists that conducted the study on mirror neurons and social relevance cited in the 
previous section, presented a persuasive argument for the relevancy of mirror neurons at the 
TED Conference in 2009. He suggested that understanding the mirror neuron system in humans 
could breakdown the barrier between the humanities and the sciences, much like mirror neurons 
break down the barriers between individuals. Alluding to Eastern philosophy and the already 
cited phenomenological accounts, Ramachandran believes that these “empathy,” or “Gandhi,” 
neurons hold the key to civilization because they allow humans to understand each other and 
each other’s intentions. Only through this understanding can we begin to build social ties, larger 
social groups and entire civilizations. Our instantaneous ability to experience perceived action or 
touch brings us closer together. Empathy creates culture.  
 Embodiment theories account for cultural differences because they recognize simulations 
or (re)experiences as being dependent upon context and selective attention.80 Paula Niedenthal 
and Marcus Maringer explore the benefit of this consideration in this example:  
…Imagine that a child observes a hawk swoop down and snatch an innocent baby 
chick out of a farmyard—unquestionably to its doom. For the child, witnessing 
the hawk attack involves, among other things, specific encoding in vision, 
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audition, as well as feeling consciously a highly activated state of emotion. 
Populations of neurons in the modality-specific sensory, motor and affective 
systems are richly interconnected and their activation supports this multimodal 
experience for the child. Together, the neural bodily, and subjective experience 
might be recognized and labeled by individuals in the child’s cultural (or 
subcultural) environment as “fear.” …In another cultural context…the hawk 
might be seen as a powerful and courageous bird, whose act represents something 
positive about the cycle of life or the power of nature. The experience might in 
this context be labeled by child’s entourage as “awe.”…Over very little time, 
children who have had similar experiences that produce similar bodily states will 
remember this event in a different manner and may represent it as modal 
experience for different reasons.81   
 
The memory of the hawk for each child involves a complex interconnection of neuron 
populations that is activated during the initial experience and will reactivate when stimulated—
perhaps by a vivid sound or vision that will recall the memory. Parallel simulations of either fear 
or awe could also occur, even though they were not part of the original hawk and bird 
experience. Situations like this are played out countless times throughout our lives and the ways 
in which we respond to them has a lot to do with our culture. These neurological patterns 
contribute to our paradigm scenarios—we can pull upon our growing repertoire of emotional 
experiences throughout our lives (for better or ill). Emotions, then, are not consistent across 
cultures. We understand our experiences differently based on our environments and act 
accordingly (most of the time).  
 As global cultures continue to blend and we become increasingly exposed to diverse 
cultures and emotional communities, it is worth noting how these differences might break down. 
Think of the video website YouTube. Every day over two billion videos are watched from the 
site and over twenty-four hours’ worth of videos are uploaded every minute.82 YouTube can be 
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accessed in twenty-nine different languages and boasts a global audience. Most of this audience 
is between the ages of eighteen to thirty-four, but the site’s content is so diverse, people of all 
ages typically stumble upon a video in some online context. The power of web-video is 
growing—not just with the expansive reach of YouTube, but also with video content websites 
such as TED.com where short “talks” by Ramachandran and other innovators can reach a global 
audience. Video seems to spur innovation in these spaces. After TED began posting the content 
from their yearly conference online, producers found that subsequent talks became better, and 
speakers began to prepare and practice for the aggressive eighteen-minute slot provided.83 On the 
more popular site, YouTube, break-dancers post videos and virtually “compete” with each other, 
which greatly increases the daringness and innovation of the moves. TED curator Chris 
Anderson dubs this phenomena “crowd accelerated innovation” where a crowd, some visibility 
and the desire to improve come together to magnify talent.84 The idea of crowd-accelerated 
innovation with the power of visibility through online video opens the door for sharing emotion 
across cultures. The ubiquity and ease of use with video on the web is providing a shared image 
of people all over the world—music, dress, language, habits, dance moves, science—it all 
becomes accessible. Embodiment theories account for differences in culture by acknowledging 
the importance of context. Video sharing is the ultimate keyhole into other cultures and may be a 
harbinger of change when we discuss emotional repertoires in the twenty-first century.  
 The example about the bird and the hawk tells us something else interesting about 
emotion and culture: not only are emotions dependent on cultural context, but also they are 
dependent on a fallible memory. Culture helps to shape the memory by combining it with other 
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experiences or even “false” experiences that are so ingrained, or pervasive in the culture that one 
takes them on as their own. Memories are not perfect simulations of past experiences—like the 
digitally archived YouTube videos—but are imperfect interpretations of those experiences that 
change over time. Memories can be modified by new information, whether this information is 
accurate or not.85 Our brain’s plasticity allows for this constant updating and rerouting to occur. 
This can be a good thing. Researchers have shown that older people (sixty-five years and older) 
are better able to control emotions by processing emotionally-charged material in areas of the 
brain typically used for rational thinking rather than feeling. Furthermore, older people are less 
likely to remember images that inflict negative emotions due to this control.86 This type of 
plasticity and emotional maturity is both biological and culturally dependent. If our memories are 
being continuously shaped by new experiences, then we could expect the hypothetical fear of 
hawks to change in the future based on new experiences therefore new neural patterns.  
 Emotions are malleable depending on our evolving emotional repertoire, our changing 
cultural landscape, and our age and circumstances. Perhaps surprisingly, emotional standards 
reflect each culture and period differently.87 We do not progressively master our emotions with 
the passage of time, or the evolution of culture. Emotional standards are often contradictory, and 
historians who studies emotional standards throughout history understand the importance of 
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identifying emotional systems, styles, and regimes based on emotional shared emotional practice, 
not simply social norms and ideals.88 Emotions are a vehicle of culture. They allow a common 
foundation of communication for people within a culture and they allow for culture to influence 
changes in a community’s emotional repertoire. Historical research on emotions is inherently 
interdisciplinary and relatively recent. Carol Z. Stearns and Peter Stearns argued for the creation 
of a separate “history of emotions” sub-field in the 1980s based on the varied emotional 
standards present in different cultures in different time periods. William Reddy and other 
emotion historians (Nicole Eustance, Barbara Rosenwein, and others) argue for a 
multidisciplinary approach to emotion research that considers recent advances in the 
neurological understanding of emotion combined with more genuine historical research of 
emotions in their historical context. According to Reddy, “What is needed now is consideration 
of how the coalescence or breakdown of emotional styles has set limits on, or shaped, other kinds 
of change.”89 Understanding how our new digital culture influences our own emotional 
repertoires and influences changes in our culture, other cultures and ourselves, is part of this way 
forward.  
 
Subjectivity 
 
 Embodiment theories of emotion depend on our ability to (re)experience or simulate 
emotional information; therefore embodied cognition is dependent on our own emotional 
knowledge—our experiences with emotions. The mirror neuron system is so fascinating for 
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researchers and emotion enthusiasts (like myself) because its function seems to justify decades 
old philosophy on the subjective experience; particularly the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. While references to Husserl abound in simulation and/or (re)experience explanations, 
Merleau-Ponty is a favorite of Mario Iacoboni, Raymond Gibbs, Evan Thompson and others who 
readily link embodiment and embodied simulation with phenomenology because Merleau-Ponty, 
more so than Husserl and other pheneomenologists, seeks to uncover abstractions when 
discussing lived experience. All under the ever-broadening purview of embodied cognition, 
Iacoboni dubs this intersection “neurophysiologic phenomenology,” while philosopher Evan 
Thompson names essentially the same intersection “neurophenomenlogy.” Phenomenology and 
neuroscience are strange bedfellows. Celebrating qualia (the subjective quality of experience) 
flies in the face of traditional neuroscientific research because it implies that there is some sort of 
“content” in the brain beyond the highly complex physical network of neurons. Theories like 
Daniel Dennett’s multiple-drafts theory, or Paul Churchland’s map-indexing theory of 
perception, rely on the hardware of the brain to explain concepts like feeling, consciousness, and 
selfhood. Perhaps the most influential materialist theory comes from Joseph LeDoux, author of 
The Emotional Brain (1996) and The Synaptic Self (2002). LeDoux believes that emotion is a 
critical component of the mind, arguing that the mind is a trilogy: cognition, emotion, and 
motivation, and the self is the result of Hebbian plasticity, or synaptic plasticity, occurring in 
multiple neural systems.90 While LeDoux’s view of the subjective experience is too exclusively 
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“neural” for some embodied cognitivists,91 plasticity plays an important role in understanding the 
subjective experience in many embodied theories; therefore it’s worth briefly exploring. 
 Neurons, or nerve cells, communicate with each other through synaptic space via 
electrical and/or chemical signals. LeDoux argues that our sense of self exists solely in our 
synaptic connections because these are the spaces of plasticity. Brain plasticity allows for 
incalculable synaptic connections that respond to incalculable environmental experiences; 
therefore, the unique configuration “rewires” as we learn and grow. This constant rewiring 
presents a “self” with both stable and changing characteristics. LeDoux notes that plasticity was 
not intended to construct a “self,” but is a feature of the brain that allows it to work better (in his 
opinion). The “synaptic self” is “the totality of what an organism is physically, biologically, 
psychologically, socially, and culturally” and is a “unit, but not unitary.”92 Plasticity allows for 
all of these components of the self to work together through a highly complex system of ever-
changing neural maps that is dependent on patterns of activity. The classic axiom “neurons that 
fire together wire together” comes from this neural mapping concept and explains why one child 
may be frightened of a hawk and why another would find a hawk a noble creature. Synaptic 
plasticity creates pathways for understanding and we interpret experiences through these 
pathways, while building new ones along the way. 
 Plasticity accounts for much of what makes us distinctly human, but most embodied 
cognitivists believe that relying solely on synaptic plasticity ignores the role of the body in 
cognition, emotion, and feeling. Where LeDoux dissolves the self down to patterns of synaptic 
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activity, embodiment theories incorporate plasticity into a much larger sensing body network that 
culls environmental information both in and outside of the brain. Welcome Merleau-Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty notably argues that the body is an expressive being, and what it expresses is 
subjectivity.93 Critics argue that phenomenology is subjectivistic, implying that it relies on 
problematic notions of dualism that have corrupted our understanding of the mind and brain for 
centuries, yet, according to proponents of phenomenology, this is a shortsighted understanding of 
the method. Phenomenology, especially when linked to recent sciences of the mind, instead lays 
the groundwork for highly intersubjective experiences—meaning that reasoning takes place in 
the real world with others through language established by the culture.94 Merleau-Ponty and 
other phenomenologists actually seek to remove “abstraction” when discussing the world to 
uncover what is really happening—our lived experience. Merleau-Ponty, in particular, argues 
that the body is an essential component to this lived experience and our ability to understand 
others through empathy. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that we share and constantly 
create our own milieu, yet our environment does not solely define us. We work to surpass the 
social and cultural structures that envelope us, thereby constantly creating new, defining 
experiences through language, art, social interaction, and such. This type of redefinition is 
similar, in many respects, to synaptic plasticity in that our brains form new connections based on 
lived experience, and those connections influence new and perhaps innovative experiences in the 
world. The self is a rather fragile thing. Whether you subscribe to LeDoux’s synaptic self theory 
or not, few would argue that our subjective experience in the world is reliable. Shared experience 
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provides stability, which is why intersubjectivity plays an important role in embodiment 
theories.95  
 Eschewing this total reliance on synaptic activity, embodied cognition theorists typically 
view the self as much more a result of embodiment—neural events, the cognitive unconscious, 
and the phenomenological experience—than simply complex neural patterns.96 Based on 
dynamical systems theory, which emphasize the “temporal dimensions of cognition and the ways 
in which an individuals behavior emerges from interactions of brain, body and environment,”97 
embodied theories of emotion incorporate information gleaned from the entire body, not simply 
the brain. The coupling between brain, body, and world shape various trajectories of behavior, so 
instead of looking at how the world becomes represented in the mind, embodied cognitivists are 
interested in how the body provides patterns for behavior in the world, or opportunities for 
action. Just as the name implies, dynamical systems are in motion and always changing, so 
information exists only as it is dynamically embodied between the brain, body, and 
environment.98 Echoing Merleau-Ponty’s view of self, Evan Thompson argues, 
Self and other enact each other reciprocally through empathy. One’s 
consciousness of oneself as a bodily subject in the world presupposes a certain 
empathetic understanding of self and other. Human subjectivity emerges from 
developmental processes of enculturation and is configured by the distributed 
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cognitive web of symbolic culture. Human subjectivity is from the outset 
intersubjectivity. No mind is an island.99  
 
Also employing an enactive, embodied approach to cognition and emotion, Raymond Gibbs 
echoes a similar phenomenological understanding of perceived experience:  
Perception is not something that only occurs through specific sensory apparatus 
(e.g. eyeballs and the visual system) in conjunction with particular brain areas, but 
is a kinesthetic activity that includes all aspects of the body in action…Bodies are 
not culture free objects, because all aspects of embodied experience are shaped by 
cultural processes.100 
  
For Gibbs, Thompson and other followers of the dynamical systems approach to embodied 
cognition, physical properties in the world are not just objects to be perceived by our brains, but 
they are opportunities for action and response from our entire bodies. Embodied cognition is like 
a dance—bodies are in motion, acting and reacting with various partners, the cultural context of 
the dance and the physical environment. LeDoux’s process approach is more like me sitting at 
my computer, typing away with various thoughts in my mind and resources at my fingertip—a 
lot is coming together to write these words, but at the end of the day, it is a brain function. It is 
easy to see why embodied cognition is more appealing when discussing the subjective self—the 
theory is beautiful. We are in constant, dynamic motion with others and our environments, 
always in tune with our culture, becoming culture, becoming each other. Of course, all of this 
“content” is what drives most neuroscientists crazy, but embodied cognition can tell us a lot 
about how we can come to understand our emotional selves in the world.  
 Intersubjectivity is the lifeblood of embodiment theories and by incorporating various 
theories from diverse disciplines we can see why the strange bedfellows of phenomenology and 
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embodied cognition fit so well together. Studies suggest that the mirror neuron system actively 
simulates emotional behavior exhibited by others, particularly when the subjects know each 
other.101 We know that the body is responsible for much more feeling and “thought” than we 
once believed, which diverts researchers attention solely from the brain and incorporates the 
entire body into our perception of our environment, and we are beginning to understand the 
importance of culture and environment on our own constructions of self.102 Embodiment theories 
celebrate this entire dance and the complexity involved. Furthermore, they privilege the role of 
emotions within this system—emotions drive the system because they are the vehicle for 
understanding and interpretation through (re)experience. In the digital age, viewing the mind as 
brain, or brainbound,103 detrimentally narrows our thinking of these new digital environments 
and how we interact with and within those environments. It is perhaps more beneficial to 
understand the new context of our digital lives as part of the body, therefore a critical piece of 
cognition, not simply a world to be acted within and upon.  
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Chapter 2 
Emotions Put the “New” in “New Media” 
 
 Looking at emotion through an embodied lens expands the description of emotion to 
include the environment that both stimulates and often perpetuates our emotional lives. Our 
bodies—sense modalities such as vision, olfaction, audition and neural systems—all work 
together to encode information and therefore reactivate when stimulated. Using the terms 
“embodied cognition” or “embodied emotion” take into account this entire feedback system, as 
well as the importance of cultural context and social and cultural emotional histories. 
Embodiment theories of emotion are incredibly inclusive, and when discussing the role of new 
media in our emotional lives, they are plastic enough to carry the digital burden.  
 Digital media mediate…digitally. This sounds simple enough. Yet new media systems 
are so thoroughly complex and ubiquitous that separating the machine from the body is an 
exercise in futility. These new media are smart media—they cull personal information constantly 
and shape the environment to fit individual lifestyles. More than just bulky CPUs, new media 
today infiltrate our lives almost seamlessly as complex algorithms predict our next moves. 
Whether programs purchase stocks to fit a trader’s buying habits, or Google intuitively 
prescribing search requests, our digital needs are often met before they are fully expressed. We 
live in an age of fulfilled anticipation where answers arrive before the question is finished. It is 
difficult to predict the consequences of an algorithm—we have relatively dependable predictions, 
at best, but the intricate algorithms that drive our financial markets, our search engines, cutting 
edge x-ray machines and countless other tools function so rapidly because they lack human 
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interference.104 Anyone witnessing the crushing blows to the stock market on the May 6, 2010 
“flash crash” can attest to that (or anyone watching the market tank from 2008 and on for that 
matter).  To understand how emotions work in a new media environment, we must look at them 
within the feedback system of simulation, culture, and intersubjectivity—or the body, the 
environment, and the “other.” Enactive theorists who work within the scope of embodiment 
theories tend to reject computational metaphors for the brain. The brain/body dynamic, they 
argue, is far more complex than the input/output functions of the “smartest” computers. In many 
ways, they are correct. The relationship between our perceiving bodies and our environment is 
outrageously complex and still a hotly debated mystery. Yet separating computers and the digital 
media they transmit from the loop of embodiment theories seems rather shortsighted as digital 
media continues to proliferate. They are what Andy Clark calls our “extended brains,”105 and it 
should be pretty clear by now that they are as mysterious and self-functioning to the average user 
as the body is to a scientist. Clark forwards the theory of extended cognition, which defines the 
supersized mind as an “extended brain” where the brain is more than neurons firing within the 
confines of our skull. According to this view, the brain is a network of feedback and feed-
forward loops that incorporates the body and the environment to the extent that the mind itself 
leaches into the body and world.106 Clark essentially explodes dynamical systems theory beyond 
a mind/body interacting with the environment and argues that the mediation between body and 
environment is so completely integrated to our cognitive selves that the distinction is 
superfluous. Clark’s hypothesis of organism centered cognition privileges the organism, but 
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argues that cognitive function is not simply brain or body bound but reliant on environmental 
tools to function.107 While never discussing emotion definitively, Clark works to bridge the gap 
between general embodiment theories and our ever-expanding digital lives by incorporating 
neural plasticity and complex digital environments that can “carry the load” of our extended 
brains. His theory helps set the stage for various tangents of embodiment theories of new media 
because it is both inclusive and practical. In recent years others have joined Clark in conflating 
media theory with embodiment theories, namely Francisco Valera’s (highly embodied) theory of 
autopoiesis, which describes systems that self-create—much like a biological cell. In this section, 
I will briefly outline their theories of embodiment and new media, which will lay the 
groundwork for my framework of emotions in digital space.  
 First, the “new media” component of this feedback model deserves some explanation.  
While embodied cognition recognizes cultural influences and works from (re)experiences of 
emotions from our emotional repertoire, embodiment in regards to new media is slightly 
different. The term “new media” has undergone a modification over the past few years as we 
have seen the hardware of the computer evolve into seamless functions where the machine itself 
seems to disappear with our own thinking and actions—think of the early adopters of Bluetooth 
technology. Mark Hansen proposes an updated (and slightly overwhelming) definition of new 
media, and his description of what media has become in the twenty-first century sets the stage 
for how we can begin to understand the role of emotions in a contemporary digital landscape.  
 New media today, according to Hansen, has become both singular and plural—meaning it 
is both the physical technology and the cascade of experiences that extends far beyond the 
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machinery.108 The coupling of the body and the technological experience dramatically increases 
our connectivity, which makes our new media actually “new.” While thinkers such as Malcolm 
Gladwell argue that the Internet and other forms of new media fail to live up to their oft-
described “revolutionary” status, Hansen makes the critical point that for the first time content is 
completely separated from the vehicle of transport. Our use of digital technology is so far 
removed from the series of 0s and 1s that we can barely comprehend the underlying structures 
that keep digital media alive. Unlike the skilled telegraphers of the nineteenth century who 
translated Morse code into short, alphanumeric messages, computers function far “below” the 
content that we glean from them. Technologies—the telegraph, the printing press, paper and 
ink—have always allowed for a certain amount of “cognitive distribution,” where memory is 
translated to media, as Hansen and Clark describe, to extend our minds. This type of distribution 
underscores our technologically bound existence and allows for a sharp increase in human 
knowledge and capital. Culture proliferates in the presence of networking technologies and 
through these increased and extended interactions the media (in the plural sense of the word) and 
the body become mutually dependent as we build new social and cultural structures around these 
forms of communication.  
 An interesting, and perhaps unlikely, example of this dependence comes from the website 
4chan.org, which is currently the largest English-speaking image board website. Since 2004, 
4chan, and “moot”—founder Christopher Poole’s online identity—host the most influential, and 
often puerile, meme generator on the web. 4chan users, specifically self-identifying “/b/tards” 
that post to the site’s miscellaneous /b/ board, overwhelmingly default to the “anonymous” 
moniker when posting. With millions of anonymous posts uploaded, and with shockingly 
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minimal oversight or memory storage for that matter, the /b/ board becomes what some call the 
Internet’s “id”—a dynamic, visual, and textual kaleidoscope of everything impulsive, contrary, 
and buried beneath a overwhelmingly identity-centered media world. Users on the /b/ board 
generate memes that cycle far beyond the inside jokes (typically called “lutz”) within the boards. 
With “anonymous” being the most popular identity tag on the site, a group of users began 
hacking websites under the name “Anonymous” by using the veil of 4chan to organize and 
conceal their identity. Various “Anonymous” groups operate under the meme, and they have 
hacked everything from epilepsy websites (with seizure inducing videos) to PayPal and 
MasterCard (in a show of solidarity for Wikileaks founder Julian Assange).  
 4chan is larger than its parts. Much like the collective intelligence of a group surpasses 
individual intelligences, the memes that 4chan instigates bring down more than established 
websites, but also established ideas and assumptions about how collective action and the Internet 
works. The site incorporates and influences pop culture, counterculture, politics, and economics 
with a particularly ironic, juvenile and anarchical tone. In a world of Facebooks and Twitters, 
4chan works because of its culture of anonymity where the millions of users (more than 200 
million page views per month109) converge to form one highly functioning, multivocal “body” 
that (at times) wages attacks, or tricks (called “bait and switches”) depending on their mood. 
According to Chris Poole, the popularity of 4chan relies on the “anonymous” moniker, which 
allows for users to be wrong without consequence. In a world where your high school identity 
can rear its ugly head when you attempt to enter the workforce decades later, 4chan is ephemeral, 
anonymous, brutally honest, and a haven for mistakes. When we think of the body and new 
media becoming both singular and plural, and when we think of the body and the media working 
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in symphony, 4chan shows us the reach of these two phenomena in real time. No one user is the 
master of 4chan and the “Anonymous” meme. The symbiotic relationship between the body and 
media suddenly removes any user from the master position. We program and choose our media 
(most of the time), but once our choice is made the relationship becomes necessarily reciprocal 
due to the social and cultural environment that arises from those media choices. Even in the 
(literally) anonymous world of 4chan, the users submit to the language and the actions of the 
group. Their bodies adapt to the culture just as much as the site adapts to the users. Working in 
concert, 4chan becomes much more than a medium for manga fans and teenage boys looking for 
porn, it becomes a living hive of activity whose actions are becoming increasingly consequential.  
 4chan is a website where you can choose to engage your time and energy, and for those 
who choose not too, it is still pretty likely memes perpetuated by the site affect you in some 
fashion. Even with the influence of 4chan, the message board only activates one small piece of 
the new media puzzle. Most of the media we engage throughout our daily lives seems 
inconsequential because it is so ubiquitous. Media today, as Hansen explains, is no longer for 
storage or production, but for “experiencing the here and now of connective presence.”110 
Whether we talk about the anonymous posts of 4chan users, or the physical postcards scanned on 
the PostSecret blog, these short pieces of text rely on the phenomenal experience of users, and 
users rely on them to shape their environment. While the connections are definitely more 
important than the content,111 the collective action trumps even the connections. The ability of 
memes to engage beyond their connectivity is part of what makes new media new.  
                                                
    110 Hansen, New Media, 180. 
 
    111 Ibid., 181. 
  67 
 So, new media in the twenty-first century is original for two broad reasons: the traditional 
relationship between the machine and the medium is disrupted (or, dare we say, inconsequential), 
and collective actions override both distributed content and connections (whether strong or 
weak) thereby influencing our socio-cultural environment. The environmental influence is 
particularly important when we apply embodiment theories to digital culture because 
environmental factors shape our emotional engagement with the world and therefore our 
understanding of self and other. The mutual dependency, or hybridity, between new media and 
our bodies (and when I say “bodies” I mean our physical bodies and our minds) is a popular 
premise in many new media theories. Three general themes typically emerge in most media 
theories that use embodied cognition as their gateway to the body/media hybrid: (1) embodiment 
itself—meaning the intricate feedback between our bodies, our environment, and 
machines/media; (2) the importance of the arts both as a function of embodied feedback and in 
creating understandable metaphors to assist our understanding of this heightened digital 
engagement; and (3) quasi-utopian futures based on heightened connectivity. Emotions play an 
interesting, yet varied role in each theme, and they typically adopt the more ambiguous moniker 
of “affect”—referring (most commonly) to short-term neurological arousals, not a more ordinary 
understanding of long-term “emotional” arousals.112 “Affect” is not the only nebulous term used 
in new media theories—most theories are steeped in phenomenological and second-order 
systems jargon that make our current relationship with media seem far removed from our rather 
mundane, daily interactions. In the “to-the-people” spirit of Rosalind Picard, this chapter will 
clarify some of these theories in the context of emotion without getting bogged down by overly 
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complex emergence theories, which do little to illuminate our daily interactions with digital 
media.   
 The plural nature of the term “new media” includes not just the mediating technology, 
but the thriving network that those technologies create. New media today are always online, 
perpetually connecting both minds and other media indiscriminately. Our plural understanding of 
new media is perhaps more intuitive than the historical, singular version, which is why the name 
is more common than “posthuman,” a term made famous by N. Katherine Hayles. Describing 
essentially the same phenomenon, Hayles argues for the importance of embodiment as a 
mediator between technology and discourse,113 where information and the body work together to 
create the posthuman subject:  
Emergence replaces teleology; reflexive epistemology replaces objectivism, 
distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment replaces a body seen 
as a support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans and 
intelligent machines replaces the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to 
control nature.114  
 
The posthuman subject progresses in real time, and Hayles believes that we should humbly 
accept our inevitable hybridity as a natural phenomenon instead of fearing a mechanistic 
takeover. Embodiment, according to Hayles, is a necessary condition for information—a key 
truth that first, second, and third wave cybernetic theory failed to acknowledge. She defines 
embodiment as “contextual, enmeshed within the specifics of place, time, physiology, and 
culture, which together compose enactment…Embodiment is elsewhere.”115 To clarify, 
embodiment is not equivalent to the body, but a process that works with the body to engage and 
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create our cultural environment. This process allows technologies to work with us, or become us, 
through heightened feedback processes (i.e. daily interactions within the environment).  
 The concept of embodiment expands in Hansen’s view to include the “affective body.” 
For Hansen, affectivity is “the capacity of the body to experience itself as ‘more than itself’ and 
thus deploy sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the new.”116 Such 
a view incorporates a version of Damasio’s theory of an as-if-body-loop, which describes the 
rapid simulation of emotion within the body. The plurality of new media depends on the 
affective body to “give body” to digital data by experiencing that data within the body. Virtual 
reality is then a body-brain achievement, according to Hansen, where “the source of the virtual is 
thus not technological, but rather a biologically grounded adaptation to newly acquired 
technological extensions provided by new media.”117 Recalling embodiment theories of emotion, 
studies suggest that the body (re)experiences actions as though the subject is performing these 
actions within their environment. Proponents of embodiment theories argue that perception and 
illusion are thus experienced identically within the brain.118 Hansen sees the trick of affectivity 
as an opening to conflate virtual environments and our bodies, hence pushing the concept of 
embodiment further from a balanced feedback system to a feedback system that is more 
autopoietic in nature—more self-fashioning. In his 2006 book Bodies in Code, Hansen argues 
that embodiment is “actively produced with flexible new media artifacts,” consequently new 
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media art pieces can enhance embodiment by purposefully tapping into our affective response.119 
Furthermore, new media artifacts may be analog, according to Hansen, but display digital 
characteristics. He cites Mark Danielewski’s postmodern novel House of Leaves as a “body in 
code” where the text creates a virtual world through the reader’s imagination.  
 Both Hayles and Hansen see embodiment as a necessary process for new media because 
the practice of decoding virtuality takes place within an extended, cognitive feedback loop 
between the mind/body/environment. To further explain the critical role of embodiment, both 
theorists cite Francisco Valera’s interpretation of autopoiesis, which applies the “self-fashioning” 
of mechanical systems to biology. For Valera and his seminal “enactive approach” to 
consciousness, the mind can only be understood through its interactions with the outside 
world.120 According to Hayles, autopoiesis turned the traditional (first wave) cybernetic 
paradigm “inside out.” Where first wave cybernetics saw the user outside of the system, although 
potentially able to become a conduit within the system, second wave cybernetics saw systems as 
being “informationally closed.” In this autopoietic view, “no information crosses the boundary 
separating the system from the environment.” She continues, “We do not see a world ‘out there’ 
that exists apart from us. Rather we see only what our systemic organization allows us to see. 
The environment merely triggers changes determined by the system’s own structural 
properties.”121 Valera uses the example of cells to illustrate how autopoeisis works organically—
cells are built of the very same proteins and enzymes that they create. This view of information 
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inspires current new media theories because the biological system (our bodies) hosts the 
information—not the clunky CPU. Therefore, the body becomes indispensable when discussing 
information. In a sense, the body is the information and embodiment represents the journey. 
 Hansen and Hayles generally consent with this view, as they both use it to ground their 
respective, yet quite similar, theories of “new media” and “posthuman.” Although, they both 
seem to agree that autopoeisis is perhaps too body-centric, an argument that is also forwarded by 
Andy Clark in his description of extended cognition. Clark argues that information encoded in 
the environment, notes on a page, images, music, is cognition. For example, the act of writing is 
part of the cognitive process of “working,” not an artifact of “work” that merely reflects a brain 
function.122 In this view, the pencil is as “neurological” as a neuron because each are conduits of 
information—the pencil allows the brain to “spread the load.”123  This, according to Clark, is 
what balances out the body-centric enactive approach. Brain function is not bound within the 
skull, but distributed within the environment as various types of technologies perform our habits, 
thoughts, and memories. Again, each of these views has embodiment at their core. The feedback 
loop between body-mind-environment-technology fundamentally alters our experiences with 
new media artifacts. Hansen and Hayles apply their new media hybrid approach to the arts to 
further explicate the embodiment process, either by example or through metaphor.  
 The novel House of Leaves is an interesting text to cite in embodiment theories of new 
media because it is not digital, although it displays digital features. Postmodern to its core, the 
book is a twisted thriller about a house that is bigger on the inside than on the outside—an 
apparent metaphor for information. Danielewski pushes the boundaries of novel by printing text 
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backwards, blacking out text, toying with shape and size on the page and creating multiple 
frames within the story.124 The paranoia that overtakes the narrator, Johnny Truant, creeps into 
the reader’s psyche and becomes affective. The story overwhelms the reader narratively and 
artistically and the countless citations create a maze-like hypertext that mimics both the endless 
maze within the home and the endless maze of digital information.125 Hansen argues that House 
of Leaves is a “body in code” for each reader as they embody the text. As the characters in the 
novel futilely attempt to capture the impossible—a house bigger on the inside than on the 
outside—a metaphor for the digital begins to emerge. According to Hansen, the house cannot be 
documented (the mazes that appear within the house are pitch black, always shifting and 
seemingly endless); much like digital information cannot be documented unless it is embodied. 
The affective response brings information to life and makes it meaningful. The various levels of 
narration create what N. Katherine Hayles dubs a “remediated narrator,” which she describes as 
“a literary invention foregrounding a proliferation of inscription technologies that evacuate 
consciousness as the source of production and recover in its place a mediated subjectivity that 
cannot be conceived as an independent entity.”126 For the remediated narrator, consciousness is 
irrelevant without “technologies of inscription”—photography, film, text, drawings, and even 
tattoos.127 These technologies are not simply copies of thoughts, but “noisy channels of 
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communication” where information is constantly being negotiated, rewritten, and/or forgotten.128 
(The remediated narrator mirrors what Clark generally describes as extended cognition, although 
he does not apply it to fiction.) House of Leaves is such a fascinating metaphor for the digital 
because it is not digital. And while the novel reminds us of the power of print in a digital world, 
the book would not exist in its unique form if not for digital influences. The creation of the novel 
indirectly depends on the influence of digital life while critiquing the fallibility of all forms of 
transcription—even the brain.  
 The dizzying levels of transcription that Danielewski explores in the novel makes for an 
intriguing metaphor for digital media and an example of digital affective practices at work. 
Digital arts garner similar embodied relationships between the work and the user, and these 
works demonstrate embodiment and new media in action. Hayles believes that new media 
literature is an essential component to understanding ourselves as embodied creatures living 
within and through embodied worlds and words.129 She explains,  
Literary texts do more than explore the cultural implications of scientific theories 
and technological artifacts. Embedding ideas and artifacts in the situated 
specificities of narrative, the literary texts give these ideas and artifacts a local 
habitation and a name through discursive formulations whose effects are specific 
to that textual body.130  
 
She calls this feedback between contemporary literature, technologies that produce that 
literature, and readers who produce and are produced by these works “informatics.”131 Including 
House of Leaves, Hayles cites other literary new media works, such as Shelley Jackson’s 
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Patchwork Girl, which allows the reader to create the narrative of a Frankenstein monster 
through hypertext. By choosing various narrative pathways, the reader becomes a writer of the 
text and through this interaction the text becomes embodied as the narrative becomes 
increasingly dependent on the reader’s choices.  
 While literature provides a compelling view into embodiment theories of new media, new 
media artworks are perhaps more ubiquitous for the everyday consumer. Works such as Mark 
Hansen and Ben Rubin’s Listening Post interact more robustly with the fluctuation of the 
Internet. Hansen began with a simple question: What do 100,000 people chatting on the Internet 
sound like?132 The multi-media installation harvests text fragments from digital public spaces, 
such as blog posts and message boards, and displays them across a grid of small electronic 
screens. The text streams through the small screens (about two hundred in all) and is also read by 
a voice synthesizer. The result is an immersive, multi-media experience that works in real-time 
with the dynamics of the web. An art piece like Listening Post is said to create “chatter into 
chant” and through these tones—these algorithms—create an affective response in the 
consumer.133 New media works of literature and art attempt to reframe our ubiquitous digital 
interactions to typify our emotional interactions with these media, therefore illuminating the 
entire embodiment process that new media works ignite.  A rough summation of new media 
embodiment theories describes works that exemplify the potential of body/technology feedback 
through a slightly altered interpretation of autopoiesis that allows for the closed system of the 
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body to both house, interpret and produce information, while simultaneously pairing with digital 
technologies to distribute some of the cognitive load. 
 It is difficult to ascertain whether the body or the machine bears more of the digital 
burden in these views. While it seems as though the body is responsible for much of the work—
being the only medium of the phenomenal experience—the technologies must be a seamless 
match to garner an emotional response. The only reason Listening Post, Patchwork Girl, or even 
House of Leaves “works” is because the piece encompasses the consumer. If Listening Post lost 
its Internet feed, or Patchwork Girl failed to link properly, or the reader of House of Leaves gives 
up, then the technology failed. The much-touted relationship—the embodied experience—is lost. 
When we spread the cognitive load there is more room for error, and there is also a question of 
what constitutes error in the first place. Is a reader who quits reading House of Leaves the 
ultimate embodied consumer because they were led to a critical affective state by the novel? Or 
has the novel failed? Are glitches as organic as naturally occurring mutations and should we 
embrace them as such? These questions complicate the feedback system that new media 
embodiment theories rely on to survive.  
 The final theme that pervades new media embodiment theories is quasi-utopian futures 
based on heightened connectivity. Embodiment theories of emotion typically profess utopian 
futures based on a keener understanding of empathy. For neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, 
revealing an innate empathetic response to others suggests that we are hardwired for 
compassion—for the good.134 Studies show that children as young as six months gravitate 
towards objects that show empathy and cooperation, and while historians that study empathy 
note that empathy would be largely absent from a utopian world, many still argue that spreading 
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scientific knowledge of empathy to the broader public would benefit society.135  New media 
embodiment theories concur with many of these optimistic viewpoints when “new media” or the 
“posthuman” is described as occurring in the here and now, but also with the potential to bring us 
closer to a more organic relationship with each other and our environments. Technologies create 
extended memories and knowledge while enhancing connectivity. If affect drives our connection 
with these technologies and each other, then we can capitalize on the innate empathy in each of 
us and build a better world. When Mark Hansen discusses “affect,” he is describing this 
emotional connection to others as a gateway to “collective individuation” where the subject can 
tap into commonality with others beyond identity.136 According to Hansen, the embodied life is 
“an ongoing materialization of the human on the cusp between the individual and the 
preindividual, the actual and the potential—we see the coming community without 
presuppositions and without subjects…collective individuation…singularity beyond identity.”137 
“Collective individuation” is not a Facebook group rallying around a suicide threat; it is more 
like an identity soup where we are both singular and plural—others and ourselves. This type of 
“transindividuation” can only be facilitated by new media artworks that tap into our primordial 
selves (the identity soup), not simply through ubiquitous media, such as social networking (how 
pedestrian!). Nonetheless, Hansen sees the “transindividual” as a positive result of new media 
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technologies and one that can push us “beyond commodification.”138 Collectivity awaits us as the 
ultimate prize as we create and engage in embodied feedback. (It’s interesting to note that 
4chan.org illustrates Hansen’s description of “transindividuation” almost perfectly, though it is 
difficult to argue that the collective action 4chan incites is “good.”) N. Katherine Hayles argues 
that forging partnerships with machines can bring us closer to nature, and while she never 
explicitly cites empathy in her future vision, the mutual, emotional connection seems to be the 
bedrock of her posthuman model.   
 Embodiment theories point to quasi-utopian futures because they have nowhere else to 
go. The process of body/environment interaction that embodiment describes is founded on a 
process that proponents argue is as natural and perfected as the cell. When new media 
technologies enter the picture, our relationship became symbiotic and helped us reconnect with 
our more native human to human relationships because new media was a conduit for affect—the 
thread that binds us all together. Boiling our interactions with new media technologies down to 
affect, which is seen as a good, civilization building, bodily response, casts a positive and 
purposeful light on where our increasingly technologized lives are going. If the relationship were 
seen as negative, as disconnecting, embodiment theories would simply not apply.  
 These protracted descriptions of embodiment rest on the theory that external inputs work 
with the brain to rapidly create and recreate bodily states of emotion where the body is seen as a 
theater of introspection that clarifies the subjective state and the status of the feedback 
operation.139 A sort of grand illusion comes into play when discussing embodiment theories and 
new media because the simple act of simulation so often discussed on the cognitive end (you 
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play tennis = I think I play tennis) contorts to describe intricate (re)creations of digital patterning 
within the body. The process works quickly and becomes almost mysterious as a result—much 
like the synapse where LeDoux argues our “selves” reside. When we see a space we want to fill 
it. When we identify a fast response, we want to attribute its urgency to something critically 
important. I see embodiment theories of media in the context of this exciting, yet opaque frontier.    
 It is easy to imagine a cyborg when discussing body/media hybridity, which, in many 
cases, is perfectly accurate. We are becoming more and more cyborgish as artificial limbs 
connect directly to our nervous system, pacemakers keep our hearts pumping, and GPS chips 
track our children. Embodiment includes these complex and fascinating relationships, but it also 
encompasses a broader relationship between technologies and the body that can sometimes be 
frustrating and slightly unstable. Affectivity, a nebulous term on its own, becomes even more 
convoluted when coupled with virtuality because both rely on the subjective experience. 
Generally speaking, affectivity is the subjective experience and therefore largely unanalyzable. 
Embodiment theories are malleable, therefore convenient. This can be both a blessing and a 
curse when composing a theoretical framework for emotions in digital space because the science 
is simply not conclusive.140 In many ways, the theory outweighs the evidence and focuses too 
intently on the “mental” aspects of embodiment, which ignores the far more interesting role of 
culture in the feedback process.   
  
 
 
                                                
    140 Jean Decety, “To What Extent is the Experience of Empathy Mediated by Shared Neural 
Circuits,” Emotion Review 2, no. 3, (July 2010), http://emr.sagepub.com.proxy.library.vcu.edu/ 
content/2/3/204.full.pdf+html (accessed February 28, 2011), 206. 
  79 
 
Chapter 3 
A Framework for Digital Emotions 
 
   
 
 First, two statements from young, Egyptian protesters during the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution:  
Well, Facebook and Twitter is what started this revolution. So, ah, it’s the most 
important thing or element we have here. Most of youth in Egypt have Facebook 
accounts so it’s the easiest way to get to them. You just write what your political 
views [sic], write what you feel, share videos, show corruption. And it worked; it 
works. When people see it, when people get all of these images around them it 
helps them become aware politically. –protester from the “Facebook flat” in 
Cairo141   
 
We will start speaking about a joke that Mubarak when he dies he met Abdel 
Nasser and said that both of them ask of him [sic] how did you die? Poison? Or 
Assassination?  He said “Facebook.” -Islam Lodfi, protest organizer142 
 
As the world watched the events in Egypt unfold over January and February, the power of social 
networking was unmistakably apparent. Contrary to Malcolm Gladwell’s assertion that “the 
revolution will not be tweeted,” the revolution was tweeted through mobile phones and updated 
on social networking sites. And, perhaps for the first time, protesters praise the power of social 
media, not simply pundits on cable news, or tech enthusiasts from Silicon Valley. Even after the 
Egyptian government imposed an Internet blackout throughout Cairo and other large cities, the 
protesters continued to find connections and keep the momentum going in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. 
Based on interviews and news articles, it is pretty clear that many protesters do not have 
                                                
    141 The New York Times, “Cairo’s Facebook Flat,” The New York Times website, video file, 
http://video.nytimes.com/video/2011/02/08/world/middleeast/1248069622796/cairo-s-facebook-
flat.html?scp=1&sq=facebook%20flat%20cairo&st=cse (accessed February 28, 2011). 
 
    142 The New York Times, “A Night in Tahrir Square,” The New York Times website, (accessed 
February 28, 2011). 
  80 
Facebook or Twitter accounts. A group of students and young professionals marched to Tahrir 
Square and encouraged people from poor and working class neighborhoods to join them and the 
crowds continued to swell. Yet, social media ignited the action that led to the days of protests 
and the eventual resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. The connections made through social 
media created a shared emotional purpose, and the actions inspired by the collective emotion 
seem to have led to a real, honest to god, revolution. It is easy to get lost in cognitive jargon, 
philosophical theories, and obscure installation pieces when discussing the impact of new media 
on our emotional lives. The language of embodiment theories reduces the impact of the 
body/environment feedback process to unanalyzable minutia that seems to purge any possibility 
of real life applications. We can watch events, like the Egyptian revolution, unfold and we can 
note the powerful emotive force of social media, but it becomes difficult to make the connection 
between these events and the theories that could potentially explicate them. This is a problem. 
Current theories that link new media and emotion, or affect, fail to reach into our daily lives. 
Rosalind Picard notes this explanatory gap in her plea to remove emotion research from the lab 
and place it into the real world,143 and I believe it is necessary to approach embodiment theories 
of emotion and new media in the same spirit. Creating a framework for digital emotions allows 
for new research to shape our understanding of emotions in digital space, while also opening the 
door for practical applications of embodiment theories on our increasingly networked lives.  
 Mark Hansen, N. Katherine Hayles and other scholars that employ embodiment theories 
to describe new media do so because of the striking parallels between grounded cognition (or 
embodiment theories of emotion), phenomenological theories, and the construction of digital 
networks. The relationship between technologies, our bodies, and our cultural environment 
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describes a self-perpetuating process of heightened connectivity because with each new 
technology conforming to our bodies, and with our bodies conforming to these new technologies, 
our environment reflects and extends those changes. This dance between human and machine is 
more beautiful than the drum of inputs and outputs—a mind-numbing noise that convinces 
people like Malcolm Gladwell that a real revolution could never be “tweeted.” If we continue to 
separate media from people, we will continue to argue that revolutions can never be “tweeted,” 
because we will always privilege human action over technological connectivity (or “weak” 
connections). Despite all of the jargon of embodiment theories, they show us that by viewing 
people and technologies as part of a process that occurs within our environment and our bodies, 
we can understand new media as human potential, not simply tools. In the previous section I 
discussed three common themes in embodiment theories of new media: a common understanding 
of embodiment, the importance of culture, and the declaration of quasi-utopian futures based on 
the embodiment process. Digital emotions mimic these features, but with a few key updates, or 
shifts in perspective, to make them more accessible to a variety of media and users. It is then 
worth discussing what Mark Hansen and N. Katherine Hayles contribute to the discussion of 
emotions in new media, and what they have missed.  
 The use of the term “embodiment” becomes slightly problematic when transitioning from 
cognitive science to media due to the introduction of technology. Where proponents of 
embodiment theories of emotion cite mirror neurons, and/or “as-if-body-loops” to describe the 
body’s process of (re)experience, as well as the role of culture on our emotional repertoire, 
Hansen, Hayles and others expand the description of embodiment to include a body/media 
hybrid where the body absorbs properties of the technology to incur the (re)experience. New 
media theories of embodiment rely more on emergence and systems theory than advances in the 
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mirror neuron system, or “as-if-body-loops” because there is more theoretical wiggle room. 
Emergence and systems theories allow for arguments of “transindividuation” that even a 
phenomenological neuroscientist would subdue.  As disconcerting as many of these theoretical 
leaps are for some scientists, embodiment theories are still our best bet when attempting to 
describe and understand how emotions work in digital spaces due to the concept of 
(re)experience and/or simulation and the conflation of bodies and technologies. Studies suggest 
that our bodies (re)experience the action and emotion of others, and we know that technologies 
work because they are able to simulate, well, just about everything. Our bodies seem to be doing 
what digital technology does best: creating meaningful experiences directly based on our 
environment. While there are countless studies left to be conducted, and even more interpretation 
to be debated, the analogous function of our minds and current technology suggests that the role 
of technology as a medium for simulation could mirror our own cognitive process. The 
conflation of the body and the machine could then broaden our emotional intelligence by 
heightening connections, therefore (re)experiences. The key word here is could. We don’t know 
for sure. Researchers can barely agree on a common definition of “emotion” let alone how 
emotions increase our relationships with technologies. The relationship between simulation and 
feedback is critical to understanding digital emotions, but so is the cultural component that is 
integral to the feedback process. Hansen and Hayles overly rely on hotly debated science and 
consequently privilege the body/technology interaction. If embodiment theories are going to be 
useful in a framework for digital emotions, acknowledging the scientific debate concerning 
embodiment theories is the responsible thing to do. This allows for the framework to engage the 
theory conscientiously, while remaining malleable. Furthermore, the role of culture in the 
feedback process deserves a broader scope than select new media artworks. We have to combine 
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what science suggests with what we feel we know phenomenologically. This is where culture 
steps in—we can look around, and this simple act has merit.  
 From a cultural perspective, embodiment theories highlight the importance of our 
emotional repertoire in shaping our emotional behaviors. The arts substantially contribute to the 
emotional repertoire of individuals across the globe, although, when discussing embodiment 
from a new media perspective, the focus tends to discount popular culture. Mark Hansen looks to 
gallery-focused installation pieces by renowned artist Robert Lazzrini and video artist Bill Viola 
that beautifully inspire affective responses by design, and N. Katherine Hayles explores works of 
new media literature that reveal the body/technology hybrid that she so meticulously describes. 
Often, the pieces described present the complexities of the quasi-utopian futures that their 
respective theories explicate. The arts typically expose fundamental truths, or the cumbersome 
miscellany of the human experience by tapping into our emotions.  Yet contemporary art has 
moved far beyond the confines of a gallery space, or even spontaneous, artistic eruptions. New 
media art pieces are bleeding into our everyday lives, which is why it is important to focus on 
new media artworks that live and breath online, not simply in galleries or studios. It is equally 
important to expand the current arts-based model for digitally induced affect to other forms of 
media beyond new media artworks and pieces of literature. Popular culture is often dismissed as 
“pop” culture, i.e. youth culture, and consequently overlooked when modeling these weighty 
media theories. House of Leaves, a novel praised by both Hansen and Hayles for its digital 
intimacy and affective power, is by no means a “pop culture” novel in the traditional sense. 
While Mark Danielewski’s anti-hero, Johnny Truant encapsulates the coolness and anxiety of a 
hip, urban punk, the snippets of hot sex and drug use fail to entice the average reader to navigate 
the mental commitment of a network of historical allusions that would exhaust a seasoned 
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academic. When Hayles cites the book as “complex literature as rock performance”144 she is 
talking about dedicated readers who celebrated the referential complexities of the book—she is 
talking about a new generation of readers. The dedicated fans of House of Leaves are individuals 
who embrace the “grammatically and etymologically challenging, philosophically probing and 
culturally hyper-contemporary novels” of David Foster Wallace145 and other literary giants of the 
late twentieth century. This subculture of readers is looking for a literary challenge within the 
celebrated avant-garde of contemporary literature. Despite describing the landscape of twentieth 
century pop culture, House of Leaves is far from it as a novel. So when we talk about widening 
the scope of new media affective models, we have to delve into the messy, neon world of 
popular culture because this is where the bulk of our emotional experiences derive. Our 
emotional repertoires, while individually constructed, pull from countless shared cultural 
environments, and most of these environments are not critically acclaimed. Twenty-first century 
culture is what Lawrence Lessig dubs “re-write” culture, and it is a fast-moving, chaotic mash-up 
of high, low, camp, and kitsch.146 Not just for kids, re-write culture appeals to a broad 
demographic because it weaves together the old and the new. While installation pieces, such as 
Listening Post, and novels like House of Leaves, represent a model for some new media theories, 
they are only a small piece of a much larger, richer culture from which we interact. A framework 
for emotions in digital space has to account for “high” art and popular culture simultaneously 
while highlighting the current feedback environment.  
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 New media embodiment theories focus on select pieces of art and literature because those 
works are often deliberately constructed to illustrate the feedback process that so intimately links 
digital environments and our bodies. Whether discussing posthumanity or a new philosophy for 
new media, the arts occupy a liminal space between our present and the possible future where we 
can both reflect on our current technological predicament and glimpse into potential tomorrows. 
A silver lining is often attached to embodiment theories because they rely on a shared affective 
experience, which suggests that people are brought together to execute a common purpose. 
Facilitated by digital technologies, this intimate interaction would then lead to empathetic society 
and consequently a better world. Yet, championing “transindividuation” is a risky endeavor 
when one assumes that a shared purpose leads to positive action. 4chan.org exemplifies the 
description of “transindividuation” and the results are often cruel and catastrophic. “Trolls” on 
4chan’s /b/ board began harassing the family of Mitchell Henderson, a 7th grader who took his 
own life in the Spring of 2006, after they found amusement in his MySpace profile. Mitchell’s 
profile was hacked, his parents received prank calls for over a year after his death, and the “an 
hero” meme (as it came to be called) now describes a person who commits suicide for a “stupid” 
reason.147 Mitchell Henderson, of course, did not commit suicide because he lost his iPod—the 
concocted impetus for the meme—but after the trolls on 4chan took hold of the story, it didn’t 
matter. On the other hand, the twenty-first century has seen social networking sites facilitate 
revolutions and consol the suicidal. Emotionally connecting large groups of people with the hope 
of cultivating empathy is a noble gesture, and one that has merit in our digital world, yet it is 
important to recognize that digital environments are neutral when it comes to emotion—our own 
desires drive the connections—and if a group of particularly narcissistic, puerile, techies come 
                                                
    147 Schwartz, “Malwebolence,” 25.; Urban Dictionary, “An Hero,” Urban Dictionary Website, 
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  86 
together as one unit and barrage a grieving family, it is thanks to the shared community that 
digital technology makes possible. Empathy can backfire when an individual recognizes the 
possible negative impact of their actions and continues wholeheartedly. The hive mind of 4chan 
relishes the emotional turmoil caused by their actions. Empathy can be masochistic. So, what do 
we make of the future of heightened empathy in digital space? We have to wait and see. Most of 
our digital interactions are rather mundane, and 4chan is definitely the exception, not the rule. 
Still, declarations are often disproved before they make it to print (think Gladwell), so 
frameworks seem to be our best bet when discussing the impact of emotions in digital space. We 
should take a cue from our brains and be plastic. 
 Embodiment theories, culture, and digital futures are each critical gateways into our 
understanding of emotion in digital space, but so far they have only been addressed in a very 
limited cultural scope through an even more limited lens of cognitive science. An accessible, 
inclusive framework for understanding emotions in digital space does not exist, and this absence 
in the midst of such dramatic changes to our communicative tools is disconcerting. We are only 
going to continue emoting in digital space, and as our emotions lead to actions with 
consequences we should be aware of these changes in both the technology and ourselves. Many 
questions arise from this problem: What does it mean to emote in digital space? Could this new 
environment and our interaction with (or our becoming) change who we are? (A twenty-first 
century human with a new emotional life? A new communal paradigm scenario?) What is lost or 
gained when we emote in digital space? How can we talk about emotions in digital space in a 
way that makes sense to the millions of people who are engaging in digital communication? The 
answers to these questions are vital to understanding shifting norms and behaviors as technology 
becomes more ubiquitous. Furthermore, the changing popular culture provides a good barometer 
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for the future of emotions in digital space. Matching our understanding of science with the 
popular culture gives a more realistic understanding of the world and our ability to change it (or 
be changed by it). Right now, we are living an old conception of self that is no longer relevant in 
the twenty-first century. The theories that we have to work with are incredibly opaque and the 
science is truly in its infancy. It is  a precarious place to build a foundation for anything, let alone 
fickle emotions.  
  
 The science of emotions and the construction of self continue to rage on, luckily for us, as 
new technologies widen the view into our bodies and minds. What embodiment theories of 
emotions share with many other emotion theories, such as appraisal theories and cognitive 
theories, is the understanding that what we call “self” is plastic. We are changeable; sometimes 
consciously and many time unconsciously we shape to fit our world. Children born in the past 
fifteen years are growing up in a digital world that is radically different from our own childhood, 
and this world is changing the way their brains are wired. Heavy media multitaskers are more 
sensitive to distracting stimuli, and they use procedural memory (habit memory) more so than 
declarative memory (typically used in critical thinking).148 Our “status update” world is rewriting 
our brains to react to short bursts of information constantly, instead of sustained, in-depth 
communication. Emotions lie at the heart of this shift between extended communication and 
short bursts of information because truncated communication, whether textual or visual, requires 
heightened emotive power to convey a state of being and inspire a response or behavior. Digital 
emotions are the embodied feedback of these short communiqués. With this framework of digital 
emotions, I suggest that emotional experiences that are facilitated by digital space and/or digital 
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technologies are unique because of the intimate feedback that occurs between digital 
environments and our bodies. This feedback alters emotional experiences based on interactions 
with media, the community of users, and/or the aesthetic experience. Working separately, in 
tandem, or all at once, the media, users and experience both expand and limit our emotional 
repertoire through the ubiquity of emotion generating media and the redundancy of the media. 
The impact of such a broad range of emotional experiences in new, hybrid environments point to 
a shift in our understanding of the twenty-first century human by complicating our traditional 
understanding of community, empathy, and identity via face-to-face interactions.  
 The foundation of the framework of emotions in digital space begins with a general 
description of digital emotions. Digital emotions describe the feedback process that occurs 
between digital technologies and our bodies with respect to short, networked inscriptions of 
emotion and the (re)experience of those inscriptions within the body and through digital space. 
In short, digital emotions are a process of digitally mediated inscription and (re)experience. 
Unlike the general description of affect in regards to embodiment theories of new media, we can 
see digital emotions in action because the process describes more than short-term neurological 
arousals. Digital emotions include the entire, distributed cognitive load—what Andy Clark 
describes as our “extended brain”—therefore digital emotions are analyzable. The environmental 
piece of the feedback process is specifically digital, meaning it is connective, ubiquitous, and 
mediated by digital networks. (Where Hansen and Hayles see House of Leaves as a “digital” text 
due to its digital features in an analog state, the affective text and layout in the novel would not 
qualify as a “digital emotion.”) Emotions fuel the process of digital emotions and become the 
process as well—this is why digital emotions are both the inscription and (re)experience, which 
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makes them highly plastic and unstable. Digital emotions express five basic characteristics that 
can be applied to a variety of media environments: 
1.  They describe a process of feedback that link short, emotive inscriptions in digital           
environments to users and their (re)experiences of those inscriptions.   
2.  This feedback process includes, but is not limited to, the inscriber, the medium, and the 
receiver and the emotive experience fuels the initial connectivity and any further connectivity.  
3.  The emotional value of the process varies depending on the media, the community of users, 
and the aesthetic experience of the digital emotion.   
4. Digital emotions influence our emotional repertoire by normalizing our paradigm scenarios. 
5. They are highly malleable based on changes in technologies and their ability both expand and 
contract emotional experiences in real time.  
 Clearly, the feedback process that digital emotions describes is based on a combination of 
embodiment theories of emotion and more general embodiment theories of new media. Like 
embodiment theories of emotion, the process of digital emotions recognizes the importance of 
(re)experience and/or simulation to conjure emotional understanding. Whether this 
(re)experience is perpetuated by the mirror neuron system or a broader system of “as-if-body-
loops,” only time and more research will tell. Nonetheless, the brain’s ability to quickly recreate 
a perceived emotive behavior or emotionally stimulating experience is widely cited in scientific 
studies. The burgeoning, hybrid subfield of neurophenomenology is particularly helpful when 
discussing digital emotions because the perception of the inscription drives the possibility for 
further connectivity. Furthermore, the subjective experience expands to include perceived digital 
communities where the subject, or user, may become univocal. Digital emotions may display a 
perceived “transindividual” based on the speed and ubiquity of the feedback process. 
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Phenomenological theories, illuminated by neuroscience, help to explain this illusion. 
Embodiment theories of new media, as we have seen, adopt many of the characteristics of 
embodiment theories of emotion. Digital emotions mimic the three common themes cited in the 
most prominent new media theories: the use of embodiment to explain the relationship between 
man and technology, the importance of culture on this relationship, and the projection of better 
futures based on this heightened connectivity. Yet, the framework of digital emotions allows for 
varied levels of interaction based on the balance of inputs by each part of the feedback process 
(the media, the community of users, and the aesthetic experience). In other works, the framework 
allows for strong and weak emotive connections based on these short inscriptions.  
 The sum of the framework suggests that digital emotions, because they are based on 
short, quick, and plentiful inscriptions of emotion, influence our emotional repertoire because 
they increase the number of our emotional experiences, while manipulating the value of those 
interactions. This shift in communication has in fact created a uniform paradigm scenario for the 
twenty-first century, networked user, therefore normalizing our emotional experiences and 
reactions. Digital emotions are more influential because of their global reach; they are magnified 
because of this reach and limited because of their short inscription status. The connectivity of the 
media dictates their flux and redundancy; therefore, they are highly autonomic and plastic. The 
spontaneity, ubiquity and collective force of digital emotions is changing how we understand 
emotions, how we react to emotive inscriptions, and how we understand ourselves and each 
other—for better or worse.  
 If digital emotions are changing our paradigm scenarios, our ongoing subjective 
experience encoded by our culture, memories, and narratives, the consequences of this shift have 
broad implications. A single emotional inscription now influences countless (re)experiences in 
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real time, across cultures, geographies, and societies. As the emotion becomes continuously 
remediated within the network, the collective action inspired by the network of emotive 
experiences overrides the content of the emotion inscription, and even the connections 
 
 
Figure 1. The feedback process of a digital emotion 
 
themselves. Embodiment theories of emotion care little about the content of an emotion 
anyway—cognitive theorists such as Martha Nussbaum are more interested in specific emotions, 
such as joy and anger—but embodiment theories see these distinctions as culturally specific. The 
specific connections, in a hyper connective world, are also lost in translation because they are 
almost impossible to track. The best we can do is surmise a low or high connectivity for a digital 
emotion, and even that distinction is highly subjective (I will give it a go in Part Two 
nonetheless). What is left is the action or behavior that results and in turn drives further feedback 
in the process of digital emotions (see Figure 1). Focusing on the emotive action, or the 
consequence of the (re)experience is what drives the digital emotion and pulls more users into 
the shared experience. It also balances out the feedback process so that the 
environmental/cultural component of the processes is equivalent to the body/technology 
component. The action stabilizes the feedback process with a singular function, but destabilizes 
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the collective force of the digital emotion because the networked actions of the group, much like 
an algorithm, are difficult to predict. This is where “transindividuation” becomes problematic—
we don’t know if a post on a social media site will incite heckling or sympathy. Furthermore, 
digital emotions are magnified and limited in these spaces. The result of this anomaly is what I 
call a “reality gap” where the original emotive experience is eclipsed by countless 
(re)experiences of the inscription. The digital emotion is limited by the media and magnified by 
the connections, and this flux and redundancy erases the original context of the digital emotion 
and places context within the body and emotional repertoire of the user. The experience becomes 
both singular and plural (much like the definition of “new media”), but what makes this different 
from, say reading a popular novel, is that the experience is quickly turned around (through the 
feedback of digital emotions) and shot back into the network through links, and such. What is the 
ultimate consequence of these contextually opaque (re)experiences? It may seem as though it is a 
cheapened emotion—a used emotion that is nothing more than hollow text floating around 
cyberspace—but this is where digital emotions require their own description and framework. 
These “emotions” are different from the rush of a first kiss, or anger at a loved one, but they are 
emotions that have an impact on the way we express our world and ourselves. The more we 
transition to networked, digital communication, the more traditional face-to-face emotive 
experiences will translate to digital technologies. These moments are then recorded, documented, 
and distributed—they are fleeting and permanent in a single breath. Accepting the framework of 
digital emotions also means accepting the fact that digital emotions exist simultaneously and on 
par with “normal” emotions. Otherwise, we cheapen an increasingly influential medium of 
communication.   
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 Understanding the role and consequences of digital emotions is difficult in a vacuum. The 
second part of this research project focuses on applying the framework to the various parts of the 
feedback process: the technology, the community, and the aesthetic experience. The body 
participates in each of these stages, and popular culture is present throughout as well. Each of 
these factors, when viewed through embodiment theories contributes to our updated paradigm 
scenarios and the spontaneous, ubiquitous and collective force of digital emotions. The 
framework proposed does not seek to add to the already complex tangle of emotion theories, or 
media theories for that matter, but instead applies the possibilities of a select group of those 
theories, the most integrated and promising, to our digitally emotive lives. The moniker “digital 
emotions” allows for a discussion of this process in a language that is (hopefully) straightforward 
and sensible in the context of current science and our popular culture.  
 The most intriguing applications to the framework correspond to the three major aspects 
of the feedback process: technology, community, and aesthetics. Part Two will explore various 
applications of the framework on digital environments that exemplify these aspects. Chapter four 
explores affective computing and the current and future status of emotive technologies. Chapter 
five explores the vast array of networked communities, such as social networking and gaming. 
The final chapter explores the impact aesthetic experiences when coupled with digital 
emotions—a phenomena I call digital community artworks. Digital community artworks inhabit 
a small segment of our current digital environment, but keeping with the spirit of embodiment 
theories of new media, I predict that they will continue to inspire and influence more common 
forms of communication.  
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Chapter Four 
Technology: Affective Computing 
  
 
 
 The question is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions, but whether machines 
can be intelligent without any emotions.    
                –Marvin Minsky149 
 
 The impact of digital environments and new media technologies on our emotional lives is 
complicated and widely contested. In the midst of these theoretical debates, a small group of 
engineers and scientists work diligently to develop affective technologies that relate to, arise 
from, or influence emotion.150 Most notable are the researchers and engineers in the Affective 
Computing Group at MIT’s Media Lab, lead by affective computing pioneer, Rosalind Picard. 
The group boasts over twenty current projects and fifty-five former projects (some of which are 
still ongoing)151 that challenge our assumptions of the perhaps awkward marriage of emotions 
and computers. According to the group’s website, its research “develops new technologies and 
theories that advance basic understanding of affect and its role in human experience. We aim to 
restore a proper balance between emotion and cognition in the design of technologies for 
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addressing human needs.”152 One of its current projects is the iCalm device (short for Interactive 
Continuous Autonomic Logging and Monitoring), which logs and communicates personal 
autonomic behavior. Typical of many of projects at the Affective Computing Group, the iCalm 
engineers developed this low-power, low-cost, wearable device to help adults, infants, and 
children track autonomic and affective states that could lead to harmful behaviors. For example, 
individuals overcoming addiction could wear an iCalm device to track their stress levels and 
preempt a desire to smoke, drink, or gamble. The device could be programmed to anticipate 
these biological changes and alert support for the patient. The creators of iCalm claim that “help 
might be customized for better managing that affective state and its ceases, perhaps even at a 
moment well timed to the triggering event.”153 iCalm could also help patients with psychosis or 
other emotional disorders—going as far as alerting their doctor and altering medication. As with 
many projects undertaken at the MIT Media Lab, iCalm also works to help children living with 
autism spectrum disorder. The technology can detect extreme states of autonomic arousal that are 
“unseen” to other individuals. Children with autism could then receive emotional support from 
their caregivers before the expression of any extreme behavior.  
 iCalm and similar wearable technologies utilize biofeedback to indicate emotional 
arousal, and coupled with a software program, suggest behaviors for the user—this human-
computer interaction (HCI) is considered a reflexive relationship. Alternative functions of 
affective computing can facilitate human-to-human interaction and computer expression of 
emotion. The latter application often receives the most attention due to the science fiction aura 
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Communicating and Logging Autonomic Activity.” IEEE Transactions on Information 
Technology in Biomedicine14, no.2 (March 2010): 215. 
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that surrounds “emotive” machines and the perhaps misleading term “affective computing.” 
Computers that “express” emotion do so to facilitate more effective HCI, not simply to compete 
with humans as emotive beings. Programs are being developed that can adjust the computer’s 
interface based on biometric feedback. For example, if a user is working through a help session 
online, a sensor may indicate that her heart rate is increasing and her palms are becoming sweaty. 
The computer will then note that she may be frustrated and try to approach the fix from a 
different perspective, with a more soothing voice, color scheme, music, or even terminate the 
session. Taking iCalm technology one step further, mobile phone technologies are being 
developed to send users  text or voice messages to intervene if wearable sensors detect signs of 
stress or anxiety. This type of mobile technology is being used to help soldiers with PTSD 
recognize signs that lead to attacks while providing connections to external support systems.154 
These technologies “act” like humans in that they appear to provide empathetic support while 
mediating behavior and can be considered HCI or computer mediated communicators (CMC) 
based on their function.  
 The broad scope of affective computing raises many questions that trump base fears of 
increasingly human-like computers. While Picard and other proponents of affective computing 
argue that computers should adapt to us, not the other way around, it is reasonable to suggest that 
affective computing is a two-way street. The framework of digital emotions implicitly argues 
that digital environments are influencing our emotional lives whether or not new media is 
affectively engineered. Digital emotions describe a process of feedback that link short, emotive 
inscriptions in digital environments to users and their (re)experiences of those inscriptions, and 
they are highly malleable based on changes in technologies. While affective computing only 
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claims a small share of new media technologies, the use of emotionally driven products and 
services is already gaining momentum. So, how do these new technologies and HCI relationships 
influence the process of digital emotions? What can we learn from a purely computational 
perspective of emotions? And what is missing? Understanding emotions from a technological 
point of view can help illuminate the entire feedback process of digital emotions while furthering 
the affective computing debate.  
  This chapter explores the evolution of artificial intelligence with a focus on affective 
computing and discusses the role of digital emotions from the perspective of “smart” technology. 
The various applications of affective computing question our understanding of emotions and how 
we interact with digital technologies. Despite the debate surround affective technologies, the 
research is robust and moving from the lab into our daily lives—whether we choose to question 
their influence or not. Based on the framework of digital emotions, I hope to show that affective 
technologies not only influence non-affective technologies, but also have the potential to 
influence our emotional lives in profound ways.  
 
How Artificial Intelligence became Affective 
 
 In 1950, Alan Turing’s essay “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” appeared in the 
philosophy journal Mind (the same journal that published “What is an Emotion?” by William 
James sixty-six years earlier) and ignited the modern artificial intelligence (AI) movement. The 
essay describes what came to be known as the “Turing Test,” which evaluates a machine’s 
ability to simulate human intelligence—a key element of AI. While still debated today, the 
Turing Test presupposes two debatable factors: humans always exhibit intelligent behavior and 
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intelligent behavior is always human.155 The human brain, while incredibly plastic, is also 
incredibly fallible, and our behaviors reflect that fallibility quite often. Intelligence is also 
(thankfully) not bestowed solely on humans. Emergent systems “behave” intelligently as they 
create complex systems from a network of simple interactions. (Proponents of affective 
computing argue that affective technologies can exhibit emergent behaviors as they “get to 
know” our emotions.)156 Furthermore, we have also seen incredibly success stories in the field of 
AI over the past two decades—namely Deep Blue’s victory over world chess champion Garry 
Kasparov in the spring of 1997, and Watson’s victory over Ken Jennings, the undefeated 
Jeopardy! champion in 2011. Developed by IBM, both Deep Blue and Watson mastered 
supremely intelligent behavior to out perform our best examples of human intelligence in the 
worlds of chess and trivia. The success of Watson, perhaps more than Deep Blue, challenges our 
assumptions about intelligent machines because we can readily see the potential impact of 
Watson-esque technology in our lives. Watson is able to synthesize queries in natural language—
a highly complex quilt of idioms, innuendo, slang, and metaphor—and the high rate of accuracy 
makes a typical web search seem sluggish and inefficient. As IBM explains, Jeopardy! “demands 
that the computer deeply analyze the question to figure out exactly what is being asked, deeply 
analyze the available content to extract precise answers, and quickly compute a reliable 
confidence in light of whatever supporting or refuting information it finds.”157 The key term in 
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this description is “reliable confidence.” Right now, web searches, while often intuitive, do not 
supply one definitive answer. Watson shows us a glimpse into a world where search choices 
become obsolete. This is all fascinating and exciting for proponents of AI and the general public 
(perhaps more entertaining within popular culture at the moment), but viewed from the 
perspective of a digital emotion enthusiast, the implications of Watson-esque technology 
(specifically the DeepQA technology that Watson employs) are exciting. Retrieving data on 
emotion is a messy and rather unreliable process that typically depends on biological and 
physiological reactions that suggest congruent emotions. For example, facial recognition 
technology, such as FaceSense, tracks intricate facial movements, gestures, and other nonverbal 
cues to determine user’s emotional and mental states. The only other means by which affective 
states can be assessed is self-reporting—the subjective experience (a factor that many affective 
technologies, such as FaceSense bypass). This method is useful, but also poses some inherent 
problems: sometimes people just don’t know what they feel. DeepQA technology can greatly 
assist affective technologies in interpreting human subject reports by assessing emotions through 
the inherent complexities of language. Coupled with biological and physiological reactions, 
human language technology could be an important key in the field’s future because users could 
express their emotional experiences in their own words.  
 With the disassembly of Deep Blue in the late nineties, and the entertainment value of 
Watson being its most salient feature at the moment, these technologies currently seem irrelevant 
to our daily lives, yet AI is all around us. The reason why we may not notice is because it works 
so well—it’s so…human. Pandora Radio creates an individualized music library based on a 
single artist selection, Google Goggles links users to information about their world through the 
camera in their smart phones, banks often know that an account has been highjacked before the 
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victim has a chance to notice missing funds, and cars can parallel park themselves (how 
brilliant!). Our digital environments are deceivingly expansive with endless choices, but also 
incredibly narrow as technologies work to create individualized digital experiences. This 
individualization is a guiding principle for affective computing engineers because they 
understand that personalized experiences are calming.158  It is no surprise, then, that computers 
are preloaded with soothing landscape photographs to decorate the desktop, or that users often 
replace these landscapes with photographs of loved ones. Affective computing is a growing 
segment of AI research, and the growth of simple affective technologies, such as emoticons 
(“emotion” + “icons”), and like and dislike buttons on a variety of media (Pandora Radio, Digg, 
Facebook, etc.) show that our opinions, and our ability to create comfort zones in ubiquitous 
digital spaces, is growing. We are living in an increasingly customizable world thanks to 
advancements in AI, and we barely seem to notice.  
 Much AI technology today works behind the scenes, so to speak, not only to create 
comforting, customizable experiences, but also to work more quickly and efficiently than 
humans (even lawyers are being replaced by the computer159). Affective computing attempts to 
make the encroachment more amiable by creating computational adaptations that reflect human 
needs—our emotional needs. It is not that we want computers to emote per se—no one is looking 
to engage with an angry computer—but that we want computers to be empathetic and responsive 
to our needs. This should come as no surprise given that empathy, according to embodiment 
theories of emotion, drives much of our communication and understanding of one another. If 
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computers could empathize with our situation, human-computer interaction would become 
increasingly influential. ELIZA, one of the earliest examples of natural language processing 
software, engaged in therapeutic consultations in the mid-sixties with startling results. With no 
emotional compass, the program comforted some patients with canned responses to their 
statements. For example, if a patient stated that they needed help to deal with unhappiness, 
ELIZA would ask, “What would it mean to you if you got some help?” This type of questioning 
relaxed some participants, even after they were informed that ELIZA was a computer.160 
Employing a rather simple algorithm by today’s standards, ELIZA appeared to empathize with 
participants, and empathy was enough to make the session a success. In the mid-nineties, 
Rosalind Picard recognized what popular culture is now experiencing: computers need emotional 
intelligence if they want to function seamlessly with humans. Her seminal book, Affective 
Computing, lays a framework for “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately 
influences emotion.”161 Picard argues that our relationships with computers are inherently social 
in nature and that we infer emotion even when there is little evidence to support such an 
assumption.162 Weaving the theories of Damasio, LeDoux, and Laird into her framework, Picard 
understands that an “emotional” computer is an evolutionary computer—a machine that can 
adapt to human emotions by being flexible and rational. Computers with emotional intelligence 
are plastic, and plastic computers can exhibit emergent behaviors that get to know their users. 
Picard outlines five components of a system to “have” emotions (and by “having” emotions, 
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Picard means “express” emotions): emergent emotions and emotional behavior, fast primary 
emotions, cognitively generated emotions (she notes that this is not necessarily sufficient for 
emotions, but important), emotional experience (cognitive awareness, physiological awareness, 
subjective feelings), and body-mind interactions.163 Based on these requirements, we can see 
how technologies such as iCalm play a role in affective computing. These wearable technologies 
read biological outputs and “decide,” based on the individual’s context, health history, and such. 
to seek help for the user, to suggest medication, or suggest a more beneficial behavior. The key 
factor for affective computing is that the technology would learn the best response based on a 
variety of contexts and your emotional response to their suggestions. In a way, affective 
computers build their own paradigm scenarios based narrowly on their interactions with you—
the user. So, an HCI relationship in Birmingham, Alabama may be very different from one in 
Taipei, Taiwan, even though each user may have purchased the same machine. 
 Even with highly customizable applications, computers still require a certain level of 
fallibility and quirkiness—the redundant responses of ELIZA would only last but so long. 
During an interview with Brian Christian, author of The Most Human Human: What Talking with 
Computer Teaches Us About What It Means to be Alive, The Daily Show host Jon Stewart 
questioned the evolution of artificial intelligence: 
STEWART: So the idea that a computer can accomplish the simple tasks with a 
certain amount of grace and not a robotic sense is what’s more impressive now 
about the computer?  
CHRISTIAN: Well, what we’re learning is that these seemingly everyday things 
that we take for granted...as turns out is more computationally complex than 
playing grandmaster chess or factoring huge numbers. 
STEWART: Here’s when I think computer will be human, when they’re walking 
down the street and they trip and they look up and go “I meant to do that.”  
CHRISTIAN: Ya. 
                                                
    163 Ibid., 68. 
  104 
STEWART: Cause that’s the thing that, when they evolve a sense of neurosis, 
when they, when they walk up to Alex Trabec and go “I wonder if he thinks I’m 
an asshole,” like that… 
CHRISTIAN: Well, that’s something called “Theory of Mind,” which is one of 
the big characteristics of human intelligence—that a system like Watson only 
understands the world as it is…but even if you think about something as simple as 
gossip…that we have to hold not only the way the world is but each individual 
perspective, or each individual perspective on every other perspective. 
STEWART: …So some of our most base aspects…it’s so interesting…until a 
computer is like “that MacBook Pro is a whore”…164 
 
What Christian is explicating, and what Stewart so humorously points out, is that even the most 
“intelligent” computers lack perspective, or the phenomenological experience that currently 
makes HCI human centered. When Stewart comments that computers will exhibit human 
characteristics when they experience embarrassment, or social anxiety, he is noting the intrinsic 
fragility of human ego and experience. When Christian discusses the mental agility of shifting 
perspectives, he is essentially explicating the function of our ability to (re)experience human 
emotion. The title of Christian’s book, The Most Human Human, derives from the Loebner Prize, 
a yearly reward offered to a program that can pass the Turing Test (or Hugh Loebner’s version of 
the Turing Test—the program had to fool ten judges during three hours of unrestricted 
conversation). An equivalent award goes to the participant that acted the most “human” in the 
mix of man and machine. An early winner of this rather odd contest was Charles Platt, a 
contributor to Wired magazine. In a 1995 article describing the experience of being “The Most 
Human Human,” Platt relates some his performance anxieties: 
The first question appears on my screen. My judge laboriously types: “What is the 
difference between cryonics and cryogenics?” 
There is no way I can give a human-sounding answer to a question as dry as this. 
To seem human, I need to show emotion—but if my emotions are excessive 
compared with the question, the effect will be false. It’s a trap: the degree to 
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which I can seem human is limited by the humanness of the judge who is 
interrogating me.  
This is exasperating. But wait; irritability is a human response, so maybe I should 
play it up. I tell my judge to not ask such boring questions…the judge makes a 
tetchy response…and within minutes, we’re having a flame war. 
…My new judge asks me, “What is the purpose of cryonics?” 
“To be frozen after I die so I can be revived in a future where people are so highly 
evolved they no longer ask stupid questions.” 
…despite my worst fears, when all the votes were in, I was rated the ‘most human 
human’ of all. By being moody, irritable, and obnoxious, I came out way ahead of 
the other four confederates, who were mild-mannered and much more polite.165 
 
In a moment of clarity, Platt recognizes that the gaping hole in computing is emotion. 
Computers, no matter how frustrating at times, are serial pleasers—they are command-based 
technologies. The core simulative activities that we perpetually produce to remain engaged in the 
world is what seemingly sets us apart from computers. If computers could close this gap, 
affective computing would enter a watershed moment in our digital landscape. Stewart and Platt, 
in two very different contexts, arrive a similar conclusion: computers have to emote if they are to 
be anything like humans.  
 
 AI is transforming our lives, despite the lack of fanfare. The influence of affective 
computing is buried within this velvet revolution, and perhaps rightly so. Affective computing is 
successful when it inconspicuously integrates into our lives. Picard argues, “the individual’s 
personal computer will respond best if it is also able to perceive context—sense if you’re 
climbing, if the room temperature change, or if you just read a news story about a tragic 
bombing. In other words, an affective computer will be effective if it is also a perceptual 
computer.”166 Understood as perceptive computation, some affective computing can be thought 
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of as a shadow that simultaneously engages one’s environment while illuminating and 
influencing emotional behavior along the way. Perceptive computers imply affection, just as 
individuals that perceive and create context imply an emotional investment in a particular 
situation. Our ability to perceive and create context (therefore create a network of emotive 
paradigm scenarios) makes us distinctly human. If computers can simulate this ability, then 
affective HCI will integrate seamlessly with human-to-human communication. So, when your 
PC, after a few years of getting to know your reactions to web content, suggests that the new 
MacBook Pro is, in fact, a whore, and you readily agree, perhaps affective computing is on the 
right track.  
  
Problems with Affective Computing 
 
 Although proponents of affective computing tout the advancements in computer 
engineering that contribute to affective technologies, critics argue that affective computing 
requires “suspension of disbelief” when entertaining ideas of emotive “bots.”167 Frances Dyson, 
an affective computing skeptic, wonders if wearable emotion indicators could induce a “social 
and biological autism” where individuals are so overly cognizant of being monitored that their 
natural reactions are stunted, or misrepresented.168 This “acquired autism” is a “condition that is 
both generated and remediated with a technologically driven psycho-social environment.”169 
Other arguments suggest that our knowledge of emotion is so limited that engineering a 
computer to respond to emotions is a stretch, and we should instead create tools for developing 
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affective HCI relationships, not solutions170 (for example, focusing on personalization and 
aesthetics to facilitate more meaningful HCI interactions instead of trying to develop emotional 
reciprocity between users and their machines.) The instability of emotion theory poses other 
problems for affective computing. Experiments with physiological responses are often highly 
contrived, whereas our emotional responses in the real world are much more natural and subtle. 
Also, an individual’s physiological responses can be surprisingly diverse.171 Picard notes this 
problem when she argues for emotion research to move out of the lab into the real world.172 Yet 
even emotional responses in natural environments run into problems, such as the possibility of 
Dyson’s “acquired autism” and, again, the range of emotions expressed by individuals based on 
their personalities. This all assumes that researchers are interpreting data in the same fashion, 
which is another detriment to affective science. Responding to user’s “affective states” is quite 
tricky—sometimes there is no reason why some people do what they do (at least no measurable 
reason). Noam Tractinsky makes a valid point in the context of biofeedback: “Is my blood 
pressure rising because I’m frustrated with the computer, or because I recalled a fight I had 
yesterday?”173 Computers could feasibly recreate situational context, but for the technology to 
know the context of your thoughts is another story all together.  
 Using Affective Tutoring Systems (ATSs) as an example of current affective computing 
engineering, we can see how some of these criticisms play out. ATSs are a more recent subset of 
Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS), which have been around for decades. Typically using facial 
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recognition software, gesture recognition software, and sometimes biofeedback (body 
temperature, heart rate, and such), ATSs gather information from student users and tailor tutoring 
sessions to meet the user’s needs. Proponents claim that affective tutoring systems can 
supplement face-to-face tutoring when qualified teachers are unavailable, and they can work to 
enhance student’s motivation and success with new learning material. These tutoring systems are 
great examples of HCI technology—the user only interacts with the computer based on their 
emotive state. (Unlike CMC, there is no human on the other end, such as email tutoring, or web 
chats). Even though some ATS researchers claim that the technology can stimulate collaborative 
learning,174 most of the science (at the moment) focuses on the relationship between one user and 
one computer.  
 Eve, the tutoring avatar featured in the ATS Easy with Eve, does not look like a typical 
elementary school math teacher. With her vibrant, dyed hair, cargo pants, cool sneakers and 
tight-fitting shirt, Eve looks like a hip, urban deejay, but Eve is an “affect-sensitive animated 
tutor,” who was developed to appeal to primary school students (apparently very trendy primary 
school students) and to interact affectively with the students based on facial cues and gestures. 
Her creators claim that “Eve displays a comprehensive range of emotions through facial 
expressions; she is also able to deliver teaching content through realistic lip-synching and 
gestures.”175 Eve’s responses are dependent on facial recognition cues gleaned from the student 
user in real time. The ATS keeps a running history of each interaction (student to Eve and Eve to 
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student) and Eve’s recommended reactions are weighted and delivered based on this constantly 
updated history. The process goes something like this: after the student responds to a question 
the system initiates a data file reflecting the student’s current affective state, then the history is 
updated classifying the response with the facial feedback, the system then generates a set of 
weighted responses for Eve and a response is chosen based on the history and Eve’s pre-set 
responses. Finally Eve responds to the student, her response is logged in the history and the next 
question is generated.176 The key to Eve’s success is modeling student behavior based on non-
verbal cues thereby responding optimally to student’s needs. For example, if a student is 
confused by a question, Eve can register this confusion and attempt to clarify the question, or 
provide clues to the answer. If Eve’s senses disengagement, she can try to approach the topic 
from a different perspective to spark interest in the student. Studies show that affective agents, 
such as Eve, need to be vivid and expressive to convey an emotional investment in the user; they 
also need to be highly accurate to build trust and confidence.177  
 Easy with Eve has a very specific approach to tutoring for a certain age group, 
demographic (middle-class New Zealanders), and subject matter. Other affective tutoring 
systems are engineered to utilize multiple emotional “agents” that represent various moving parts 
in the system, such as the actual tutoring, the curriculum, the emotion being exhibited by the 
user, and the avatar’s emotional behavior.178 Still, other systems use mirroring techniques 
(instead of reactive techniques) to help users understand their emotions. MAUI, short for multi-
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modal affective user interface, can simulate a user’s facial expressions in real time while 
supplying a description of their emotions based on the physiological cues.179 The system can also 
animate text only chat—a function that mimics another type of facial recognition software, 
EmotiChat. (EmotiChat inserts emoticons to text-only outputs based on emotional facial cues. 
The programs can also trigger music, soothing photos, etc. based on facial cues to help create a 
more relaxed and effective tutoring environment.)180 If all of this facial recognition software 
seems too invasive for some users, researchers are taking a cue from security technology and 
implementing keystroke engineering to gauge a user’s affective state.181 While ATSs are 
approached from various perspectives—from helping user’s understand their own emotions to 
providing empathetic feedback to adjusting pedagogical strategies—they all make the argument 
that students will benefit from digital interactions where avatars (of some sort) appear to 
understand their emotional state and react empathetically. ATS engineers believe that this type of 
interaction will motivate students to work harder since there is an emotional investment in the 
learning process.182  
 Affective tutoring systems rely on our own natural tendencies to anthropomorphize 
technologies and create social situations with machines. They harness student’s emotions and 
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customize their pedagogical approach, and sometimes curriculum, to meet the needs of the 
student. The ability of ATSs to recognize (in most cases) six facial cues for emotion and respond 
with empathy is an important aspect of the system. ATS engineers recognize the importance of 
simulation to build relationships, and the fact that many ATS avatars can effectively respond to a 
user’s behavior is a huge leap forward from more basic input/output tutoring software. Yet, 
simulation and resultant empathy rely heavily on environmental context; furthermore, facial cues 
are not consistent across cultures.183 Unlike some affective technologies, ATSs are not perceptive 
in that they cannot infer a user’s surroundings and make judgments based on external factors. For 
example, if a student were engaging with Easy with Eve, and they received a text message from 
their friend, the student may display an emotion that has nothing to do with math problem 
presented. Eve has no way of knowing that the student’s reaction is not directed toward the 
system, and while the system may recognize a distraction, there is no way of knowing its value. 
Currently, ATSs perhaps rely too heavily on facial recognition and ignore the importance of 
environmental context. Facial cues are heavily dependent on social context and individual 
emotional repertories. Once ATSs can harness the social and cultural context of the user, while 
“learning” the user’s responses to various environmental situations both in and outside of a 
tutoring environment, then the system could begin to build an emotional repertoire for the 
student and react accordingly.  
 In spite of the literal and figurative learning curve of ATSs, we judge each other’s 
emotions all of the time, and it’s a hit and miss endeavor.184 Fast emotional appraisal—the kind 
that Damasio describes as “as-if-body-loops” and Iacoboni and Ramachandran attribute to mirror 
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neurons—works so well because humans share the same hardware. We recreate experiences 
because we can imagine experiencing them with our bodies. Computers do not have this luxury, 
so they must process our emotional behavior and respond in much more laborious fashion.  
 It is safe to say that critics, and perhaps some users, would like to see computers and 
other new media be effective, not affective,185 and while these criticisms are legitimate, they are 
not lost on affective computing engineers. In fact the debate surrounding affective computing as 
a worthwhile, or even feasible, endeavor came and went in a flurry of articles around 2003 and 
2004, most notably in a special section on Affective Computing in Interacting with Computers. 
The terminology surrounding affective computing is perhaps its own worst enemy—leading 
skeptics to believe that engineers are building computers to rival human emotion, or to replace 
humans in some emotive capacity. While some affective computing projects dabble in these 
areas, this is hardly the broader goal of affective computing. Affective computing may be better 
dubbed “computing with affect” or “affected computing”186 to avoid these criticisms, but such a 
change this late in the game is unlikely. Currently, affective computing engineers either use 
technology to alleviate emotional burdens in the real world, or to facilitate more communicative 
HCI. Of the twenty plus projects that the Affective Computing Group highlights in its current 
research, over half focus on helping children with autism spectrum disorder and/or their 
caregivers. The other half of the projects range from working to help soldiers with PTSD (the 
iCalm technology and other mobile computing technologies) to helping with other health 
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disorders that could benefit from a digital companion.187 Other affective computing research 
focuses heavily on tutoring programs for students with various types of learning disabilities (as 
Easy with Eve demonstrates), improving our daily, digitally communicative activities,188 and 
expanding our artistic tools with affective science.189 There are ethical debates to be had about 
affective computing, namely that it may not be the best idea to have computers “respond to our 
changing moods and whims,”190 but affective computing engineers are more rational than not 
when developing these technologies, and many concerns are thoughtfully addressed within the 
literature.  
 
Understanding Affective Computing Through the Lens of Digital Emotions 
 
 It is reasonable to suggest that affective computing is the new frontier of artificial 
intelligence. Understood in conjunction with embodiment theories of new media, which already 
hypothesize embodied digital media, affective computing essentially tightens the feedback 
process between technology and body because both agents are “affective.” The goal of digital 
emotions is to provide a framework for understanding and discussing various digital medias that 
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convey emotion based on the two major aspects of embodiment theories: (re)experience as the 
source of social and cultural understanding, and cultural context as the foundation for emotional 
experiences and learned emotional behavior. Viewed through the framework of digital emotions, 
the following points reference some of the popular themes in affective computing with the goal 
of illuminating some of its strengths and weakness.  
 1. Humans engage in social relationships with technology whether or not the technology 
is engineered to be “affective.” ELIZA’s responses to the human subjects in “therapy” were not 
programmed to be affective, but the participants in the study projected a sense of affinity, 
understanding, and empathy on the program. Even in studies where human subjects “know 
better” than to interact with computers as though they are humans, they trend towards more 
natural, social, emotional interactions.191 In our daily lives we consistently project emotion onto 
many types of text, with or without overt emotional cues. For example, we often infer emotion in 
email messages whether or not the message included emotional words or cues.192 For short, 
digital messages that intend to convey emotion, we use emoticons (“emotion” “icons”) and/or 
Internet slang, such as LOL (laughing out loud), to punctuate statements. A simple emoticon or 
textual abbreviation can deliver an emotional punch—a smiley face at the end of a statement can 
often indicate how literal the statement is intended to be understood. (After texting your dinner 
date that you’ll be late, which response would you rather receive: “whatever.” or “whatever ”?) 
These brief inscriptions are at the heart of digital emotions, and they don’t need affective 
technologies to interpret them. They are also much more effective in CMC interactions. For HCI 
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interactions, projecting emotions onto technologies that happen to also be affective could mimic 
typical CMC interaction because the user anticipates an affective response.  
 The process of digital emotions also highlights the importance of culture in both 
producing and interpreting emotions. These cultural influences dictate the ways in which we 
interact with others and with technologies, specifically how we anthropomorphize technologies 
to communicate. With this in mind, some researchers argue that affective computing should be 
understood as an interaction to help users “understand, reflect on and experience their emotions 
in new ways.”193 Approached as an interaction rather than solely an interpretation, systems are 
sensitive to fluxes in culturally influenced communication while relying on actual lived 
experience over objective, physiological measurements.194 Understood in this fashion, we can 
place affective computing on a continuum of strong and weak connections in digital space, 
instead of carving out an entirely new framework or set of guidelines for affective computing 
verses “non” affective computing.  
 2. Affective computing focuses on addressing human needs, not simply endowing 
computers with emotion to empower technology. Noam Tractinsky identifies three broad areas 
of affective computing: systems that detect or recognize users’ emotions, systems that influence 
the users’ emotional state or support users’ in managing their emotions, and systems that 
integrate both.195 In each of these areas, affective computing is a user support technology that 
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“directly couples users and the context or situation of use,”196 where the computer depends on a 
human user to initiate the emotional relationship. As the process of digital emotions shows, the 
feedback is largely embodied, not solely computational. The “digital load” is expanded, 
furthering our extended cognition into new media technologies in a dynamic fashion (not simply 
for extended storage, but extended interactions, as noted in the previous point).  
 The value of digital emotions is dependent on the media, the community of users, and the 
aesthetic experience of the digital emotion; digital emotions also rely on the value of the 
experience to fuel further experiences. Affective technologies afford us the opportunity for 
prolonged, digital interactions that can steadily increase in value over time thereby increasing our 
dependence on salient HCI relationships. This may make more sense if applied to a personal 
object that holds intrinsic value, such as a personal computer. Whether I am uploading photos of 
my daughter (a large picture of her greets me every morning on my virtual desktop), 
downloading new music, performing web searches, Skyping with my in-laws, or writing my 
dissertation, my laptop encompasses my new media world. When it is on the fritz, I treat it like a 
sick pet. I wrap it comfortably in foam and present it teary-eyed to the always-aloof “Mac 
Genius” at the local Apple Store and I pray for speedy recovery. Our relationship is clearly one 
sided. As noted in the previous point, we anthropomorphize our relationships with technologies 
and project emotion onto them and the media they mediate whether or not any sort of affect is 
insinuated or reciprocated. But if my laptop were to assess my mood first thing in the morning 
and select the perfect song to start my day, or upload a picture onto my desktop that would bring 
me some mental clarity, its interactive value as a mediator of emotions would strengthen. If we 
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think of humans as the “on” switch for affective computing, their role as emotional facilitators, 
rather than emotional agents, becomes clearer.   
 3. Affective computing is at its most effective when it can perceive our emotions, react 
with empathy, and increase our own emotional awareness. Perception is a key factor in creating a 
context for affective technologies to react to our behavior, and one of the first features that 
Picard argues must be present in affective technologies. Without a contextual repertoire that 
correlates to your own emotional repertoire, affective technologies would never “learn” how to 
appropriately respond to your behaviors. While computers cannot “have” empathy, they can 
arguably express empathy, and this expression is a key factor in affective HCI. While the 
problems with biofeedback and self-reports are well documented, technologies are moving 
toward being able to perceive their environments. This perception will never rival human 
perception, but it is a big step for affective computing because a computer with a sense of the 
shared environment can infer your perceptions, therefore your emotion—especially if it contains 
data detailing a users’ habits and typical responses in various contexts. Imagine if smart phones 
could sense a user entering a stressful situation—say walking into the doctor’s office. 
Historically, the phone received feedback from a wearable device that traced increased heart rate 
and other responses that are triggered by stress. The computer “knows” that the user dislikes the 
doctor’s office. The phone could then send a text message, picture message, or even connect the 
user with a loved one to calm her anxiety. (This example is based on technologies that are 
already in development.) In a situation such as this, digital emotions can help illuminate the 
feedback process when initiated by the technology.  
 Our ability to (re)experience observed action is already being implemented in robotics. 
Mimicking a human neural network, researchers are creating robotic models that utilize a similar 
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simulation mechanism as our mirror neuron network. As described by Lindsey Oberman the 
overall implication of his particular project argues:  
The human mirror neuron system may be activated as a result of the human 
interaction anthropomorphizing these robots. Indeed, by activating the human 
mirror neuron system humanoid robots could potentially tap into the powerful 
social motivation system inherent in human life, which could lead to more 
enjoyable and longer lasting human-robot interactions.197  
 
Most new media embodiment theories rely on the body to interpret the situation; digital emotions 
allow for the technology to assume a more perceptual role in the feedback process. If we look at 
potential paradigm scenarios that reflect HCI relationships, not simply individual histories, then 
the role of digital emotions in our lives becomes that much more important.  
 4. Affective computing relies heavily on design and aesthetics to facilitate a more 
meaningful, customizable experience for users. Computer customization and affective computing 
work closely together since studies show that personalizing digital space creates a more calming 
computing environment. This analogy may seem peculiar, but I think it’s helpful—Malcolm 
Gladwell argues that human happiness is tied to having choices that reflect your tastes. 
Therefore, you can embrace your personal likes and dislikes in a diverse environment that is 
designed to meet your needs. Using spaghetti sauce as his primary case study, Gladwell cites the 
history of expanded food product choices in the 1980s. His story begins with a man named 
Howard Moskowitz who, after years of pouring over test data, recognized that people’s tastes are 
incredibly diverse. Moskowitz argued that there is no “perfect Pepsi,” no perfect spaghetti sauce, 
no perfect mustard, but a spectrum of perfect tastes for different people. Consumers were happier 
when they could purchase products that met their specific likes and dislikes, whether that be 
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extra chunky spaghetti sauce or zesty pickles.198 In many ways, affective computing approaches 
customization with the same logic. Trying to find a perfect interface that appeals to all users is a 
waste of time; instead, affective computers can get to know their users and apply interfaces, or 
responses that meet the needs of the individual. This includes choosing not to use an affective 
program at all.199  
 In a study conducted in 2004, sixty participants were asked to evaluate twelve different 
“skins” for Microsoft’s Media Player. Users were asked to rate the skins by personal preference 
and usability, aesthetics and symbolism. (Skins typically only change the interface of digital 
space instead of the actual function, but some skins can obscure usability.) The results obeyed 
Moskowitz’s food preference paradigm: user’s exhibited a wide variety of tastes—of the twelve 
different skins, eleven out of the twelve were chosen at least once. Noam Tractinsky, the 
designer of the experiment, argues that personalization is the key to increasing this value because 
“certain aesthetic impressions are indeed being formed immediately and thus are strongly related 
to information processing at the visceral (reaction) level. To a large extent they set the tone for 
the rest of the interaction.”200 According to Tractinsky, users need to be able to tailor their digital 
experiences to meet their affective needs,201 and designers should “capitalize on interactive 
technologies that let users tailor applications...Our challenge would be to improve the ease, the 
flexibility and the creativity by which users can satisfy their own diverse needs and programmers 
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can achieve their goals.”202 The growth of personal blogs and blogs for business and classroom 
use is taking a cue from this line of thinking. Companies such as Tumblr provide hundreds of 
truly beautiful “themes” (much like skins) to choose from, and allow for individually-designed 
themes to be uploaded. (Tumblr, known for their contemporary design catalog moved their 
operations to Richmond, VA to tap into the graphic design talent in the city.203) The choices that 
Tumblr provides its users contribute to the company’s success in the blog world and logically 
follow from the findings of Tractinsky’s small experiment and the years of food research 
conducted by Moskowitz. Computing is perhaps at its most affective when it provides tools to 
create customizable, comforting experiences for the user that reflects their tastes and interests.   
 Understood through the lens of digital emotions, these choices have infinite potential 
because they are only defined as needed, within the user’s environment, and limited because they 
increasingly rely on (and perpetuate) habit through familiarity. Digital emotions both expand and 
limit our emotional experience in the world by normalizing our paradigm scenarios and with 
customizable experiences that could potentially obscure digital chance encounters, our 
experiences may be detrimentally narrowed. For example, upon purchasing a new computer, a 
user could transfer all of her preferences from her old computer and never encounter any new 
designs or themes that may impact her habits.  (This is different from the “acquired autism” that 
causes Frances Dyson concern—he worries that we will intentionally stunt our emotional 
experiences to avoid being recorded or judged.)  
 5. Computers with emotional intelligence should exhibit a certain level of fallibility and 
natural language to communicate affectively. While we naturally exhibit social behavior in HCI, 
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an ongoing relationship with affective technologies requires the technology to understand the 
intricacies and subtleties of human language. With this understanding comes the dynamic 
relationship of emotional interaction that I describe, but also a larger margin of error, or 
“unpredictably.” Watson’s Jeopardy! success relied on the computer’s ability to navigate not 
only the trivia presented, but the more implicitly natural language game that Jeopardy’s 
contestants must engage. When Watson missed the final question on day two of his winning 
streak, (“It’s largest airport is named for a World War II hero; its second largest for a World War 
II battle;” the category was U.S. cities), IBM engineers explained that the question confused the 
super computer because of the complexity of inputs.204 Watson incorrectly answered “Toronto” 
(there are U.S. cities named Toronto), and a sigh of relief seemed to wash over viewers. 
Watson’s brief failure made the computer just a little human, but it also made the humans just a 
bit more human as well. Computers that engage in natural language will always be fallible 
because our vernacular is dynamic and incredibly complex. This is refreshing and leads to 
serendipitous moments, humorous moments, and linguistic variety in general. 
 Rosalind Picard describes affective computers working through a sort of adolescence as 
they get to know user’s habits and preferences.205 In this way, affective computers are plastic 
technologies that evolve based on their mistakes—their features are emergent based on countless 
HCI interactions. A computer that communicates in natural language, with all of the hiccups that 
come along with it, allows for stronger digital emotions because users will not have to adjust 
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their natural, verbal communication for the computer. This tightens the feedback that drives 
digital emotions. Furthermore, fallibility could protect users from a cycle of habitual behavior in 
certain contexts.  
 Placed in the context of digital emotions, and therefore embodiment theories that rely on 
environmental context and the process of (re)experience, we can see the potential of affective 
computing: technologies that are reliable, yet sometimes fallible, customizable, perceptive, and 
focused on addressing our emotional needs in a variety of ways. Yet, while proponents of 
affective computing maintain that computers should adapt to us, we are adapting to them in a 
reciprocal fashion. Various tactics and examples of affective computing illustrate the framework 
of digital emotions by highlighting the feedback process from a computational perspective. 
Instead of the computer being a lame duck in the feedback process—merely facilitating all of the 
action being recreated in the body—some affective computing programs mimic human 
engagement with the world through the user’s body and react accordingly. Other programs help 
users understand their emotions by clarifying reactions to certain environmental triggers.206 
These reactions then create an emotional repertoire for the computer that simulates the user’s 
emotional repertoire, or, perhaps more interestingly, can shape the user’s emotional repertoire 
based on potentially long-term HCI relationships.   
 
 The future of affective computing awaits us all. When these technologies hit the streets 
and begin their integration into our lives, the many features (and problems) will surface. 
Affective technologies ignite a difficult debate because they lack the ubiquity of non-affective 
technologies, so it is hard to gauge their impact on our lives, yet studies show that their potential 
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could be not only novel, but useful to many users who could benefit from further emotional 
mediation (such as children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, soldiers crippled by PTSD, or a 
typical, self-proclaimed neo-Luddite). Based on our emotional experiences with non-affective 
technologies, and based on the framework of digital emotions, it is reasonable to suggest that 
affective technologies will become the norm. The embodied feedback of digital emotions 
proposes that emoting with and through new media technologies will ultimately change our 
emotional paradigm scenarios and therefore our behaviors and identities. With affective 
computing entering our digital worlds, we could reasonably see this emotional shift occur more 
intensely with affective “agents” present through the feedback process. Nonetheless, I do not 
anticipate HCI relationships, no matter how affective, out-emoting human-to-human 
relationships facilitated by new media, but they don’t have to—affective computing simply is not 
in the business of competing with the emotional acrobatics that humans display. Even the 
silliness of the Loebner Prize can attest to that.   
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Chapter 5 
Community 
 
 Twitter, the short message service founded by urban enthusiast Jack Dorsey, began with 
the simple desire to connect socially disconnected urbanites. In rare interview with Dorsey, 
David Kirkpatrick of Vanity Fair notes that, “The short text alert, for him, was a way to add a 
missing human element to the digital picture of a pulsing, populated city…He claims his 
inventions all aim at the same goal: a society that works more efficiently and humanely.”207 
Dorsey believes that real time data democratizes information and unites seemingly disparate 
individuals, especially when that information can be conveyed easily and simply. Twitter users 
have a maximum of 140 characters to transmit a message to a network of followers. These text-
based “tweets” or photo “twitpics” can be “retweeted” by anyone receiving the original message 
in the network. Tweets rely on creative textual truncation and abbreviations, and their social 
force entirely depends upon the network’s reaction to the message. Since Twitter was founded in 
2006, the service has become a fixture in modern communication. It is not that everyone is 
tweeting, they are not,208 or that the tweets themselves are all critical to our lives, they are 
typically mundane, but that the ease and urgency of the service lends itself to those critical 
moments when real time information is the vital impetus for social action. The 2011 youth led 
uprising in Egypt was spread through short tweets and status updates on Facebook, victims of the 
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2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan used Twitter to convey critical information, and the 
“Green Revolution” beginning the summer of 2009 in Iran is also dubbed the “Twitter 
Revolution” because protesters relied heavily on the service to organize. Yes, pop stars are 
popular on Twitter, yes, we wade through banal twitpics of cats and equally boring self-portraits, 
and these things are silly, but it is not Twitter’s fault. It is just a service. Twitter puts all of our 
little quips online and puts us in touch with one another. In the midst of unrest in the Middle 
East, natural disasters in the Pacific, civil disobedience in Eastern Europe, and fundraising efforts 
in America, Twitter not only connects people, it ignites action based on short bursts of emotion.  
 And Twitter isn’t alone. Status updates on Facebook and other social networking services 
rely on short bursts of information to convey emotion-laden thoughts and inspire action. Digital 
truncated communication is by far the most ubiquitous form of computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) with longer text-based communication, such as blogging, being replaced 
by short message culture.209 When it comes to how emotions exist and survive in CMC, the story 
is a little different from human-computer interaction (HCI). The rise of affective computing, and 
its inevitably influential future, gives us a glimpse into the ways in which our relationships with 
computers will manipulate our emotional lives. Affective computing, as the current research 
shows, mainly works to assist and promote positive emotional behaviors, so the relationship 
between the user and the technology is markedly one sided. The user’s emotions are the star of 
the show and influence the feedback process, while the technology, utilizing its own “affective” 
response system, perpetuates the emotional conversation. Much like the short-term neurological 
arousals that affect often describes, this “conversation” may occur unbeknownst to the user. 
Affective computing technologies show us the potential of digital emotions when technologies 
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“emote.” In these HCI relationships, the framework of digital emotions is a useful tool to help 
engineers and users understand both the impact and limitations of affective technologies. Digital 
emotions clarify this foreseeable future by framing affective computing in cultural contexts that 
create and contribute to paradigm scenarios, and also by reinforcing the consequences of 
simulation in our emotional lives. This is HCI, and HCI is rather straightforward, even when 
machines are instilled with “emotions.” CMC is different. Technologies such as Twitter and 
Facebook are services that mediate massive amounts of information, therefore they are 
incredibly widespread, easy to use, and ultimately reflexive of our daily lives. Digital emotions 
work differently in CMC because the network dictates the simulative impact of emotional 
communication. The medium is the amplifier and the users’ role diminishes in the feedback 
process. This may seem counterintuitive considering that affective computing focuses on the user 
much more intimately and the technology also boasts affective responses. Yet CMC multiplies 
affective responses exponentially, and the user becomes a spark that ignites a feedback process 
much, much larger than him or herself. The process of digital emotions highlights the importance 
of each moving part of the CMC process—the inscriber, the technology, and the network of 
receivers—and shows the power of (re)experience and paradigm scenarios in an era of real time, 
ubiquitous communication. The community, however loosely defined, that arises from these 
short bursts of communication is changing the way we emote in digital space while normalizing 
our paradigm scenarios, therefore our individual emotional repertoires.  
 Like affective computing, these social and cultural shifts come with their own set of 
problems, many of which have yet to be seen. They also raise a lot of questions: Is normalizing 
our emotional repertoires a bad thing? Do complex emotions necessarily command complex 
modes of communication? Does the process of digital emotions clarify or complicate the vast, 
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unpredictable computer mediated networks that even their creators can barely wrap their heads 
around? This chapter attempts to answer these questions by applying the framework of digital 
emotions to two distinct and relatively new manifestations of CMC: status 
updating/microblogging and online, massive multi-player games. The power of social 
networking and the ever-present status update is familiar to most of us, but the intricate sub-
culture of multi-player gaming is a world unto itself. A comprehensive analysis of the gaming 
world is beyond the scope of this research, but one specific area of gaming sheds some 
interesting light on the potential of gaming communities while showcasing the importance of 
emotions in those communities. Renowned game designer, Jane McGonigal, creates games that 
tap into our emotions, and therefore social connections. McGonigal believes that games can 
improve our lives in very real ways by spreading empathy, creating communities, and pooling 
ingenuity to build a better world.210 By creating games that tackle real world problems, 
McGonigal connects the talent of twenty-first century gamers with the challenging reality of 
their social world. Coupled with the role of emotions in social networking, “gaming for change” 
expands the spectrum of digital emotions in our networked world. Digital communities, it turns 
out, are just physical communities amplified, and that could be good thing.  
 
Social Networking 
 
 Social networking, or social media, is nothing new. We have used tools since the 
beginning of time to communicate with each other, and the medium of the Internet and the 
services of social networking sites continue a long tradition of social communication. Even 
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narrowed down to Internet culture, social media boasts a traceable history from the MUDS and 
MOOs, chatrooms and bulletin boards of the 1990s to the rise of Friendster, MySpace and 
Facebook of the 2000s. What is new, and what Mark Hansen so pointedly argues, is the way in 
which contemporary digital media blurs the line between the technology, the service, and the 
user.211 As I detailed in chapter two, “new media” can be described as a biological and 
technological hybrid as the user comes to embody ubiquitous digital landscapes. And, as N. 
Katherine Hayles argues, we are already posthuman. The ubiquity of new media permeates our 
lives so completely that the concept of “cyberspace” as an ulterior location, no matter how 
“real,” no longer holds in the twenty-first century. When Twitter users glance through a series of 
tweets on their mobile device, they are not entering a cyber world separate from their current 
reality. The feeds exist within their everyday, real world functions as an ongoing, “ambient 
awareness” of a larger, albeit weaker, social life.212 Furthermore, academic research and 
commentary on social media is frustratingly dated on arrival. Even the revered Pew Internet and 
American Life project, which is constantly publishing data and research on our various 
interactions with digital media, cannot keep up with the pace of social media adoption and 
adaptation. And it is not for a lack of trying. Pew publishes research at a lightening fast rate—
they turned around data on social networking for the November 2010 mid-term elections in less 
than two months(!).213 But with thousands of new users signing on to services like Facebook and 
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Twitter everyday,214 even the most tenacious researchers find their numbers unfortunately out of 
date. The social networking that describes the Internet juggernauts of Facebook, Twitter, etc. is 
then both familiar, which explains the incredible rate of adoption, but different in its relatively 
seamless integration with our daily lives.  
 Social networking is probably more aptly defined as twenty-first century socializing, 
which is another reason why the rate of adoption and the ease of integration has occurred so 
rapidly over the past decade—not as much “networking,” in the traditional sense of the word, 
occurs. Dating sites notwithstanding, most users of social networking sites utilize the services to 
socialize in pre-existing networks.215 We use social media to connect with people we already 
know, via either strong (best friends) or weak (best friends from third grade) ties. What perpetual 
updating does, whether on a micro-blogging service like Twitter or through status updates on 
Facebook, is provide a running commentary on people’s lives. Viewed separately, these updates 
are perhaps mundane and meaningless, but read continuously in the flux of our everyday lives, 
they become a dynamic narrative of our lives—available for our expanding social circles to 
experience. Narratives of all kinds are central to culture. Mark Poster explains: 
We might say that in modern society, individuals are expected to narrate their 
own lives, connecting their stories more or less to preexisting narratives, such as 
the idea of progress. Modern society imposes on individuals the task of taking 
account of themselves, of forming or directing their lives, of intermittently taking 
stock of where they are at a given point in life’s journey, and, at base, knowing 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
    214 Robert Johnson, “Scaling Facebook to 500 Million Users and Beyond,” Facebook Note, 
July 21, 2010 http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/scaling-facebook-to-500-
million-users-and-beyond/409881258919 (accessed April 1, 2011); Jason Kincaid, “Twitter has 
105,779,710 Registered Users, Adding 300k Per Day,” Tech Crunch, April 14, 2010 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/14/twitter-has-105779710-registered-users-adding-300k-a-day/ 
(accessed April 1, 2011). 
 
    215 danah boyd, “Social Media is Here to Stay…Now What?,” (talk, Microsoft Research 
Technology Fest, Redmond, Washington, February 26, 2009).  
  130 
their own story…The digitization of narrative enables an extreme separation in 
space between narrator and listener, as well as an instantaneity of transmission of 
the narrative and response to it, and requires a globally networked machine 
mediation that envelopes the narrative.216 
 
In an era of constant self narration, we might worry that a generation of narcissists is inevitably 
on the rise, yet this generation, or culture rather, of status updaters know a great deal about 
themselves. Clive Thompson, of the New York Times, interviewed many avid Twitterers, Flickers 
and Facebook users and they often described an unexpected side-effect of all of this short 
message, self-narration: it became rather philosophical.  
The act of stopping several times a day to observe what you’re feeling or thinking 
can become, after weeks and weeks, a short of philosophical act. It’s like the 
Greek dictum ‘know thyself,’ or the therapeutic concept of mindfulness. Having 
an audience can make the self-reflection even more acute, since, as my 
interviewees noted, they’re trying to describe their activities in a way that is not 
only accurate but also interesting to others: the status update as literary form. 217 
 
As of December 2008, Pew researchers found that eleven percent of online American adults use 
a short message service that allows them to post updates and view updates from others. The 
numbers double for eighteen to thirty-four year olds, and the study mainly focused on micro-
blogging sites like Twitter.218 And that was in 2008, when services like Twitter were beginning 
to gain popularity. When Mark Zuckerberg, mastermind of Facebook, decided to change the 
profile-based site with a “news feed” that automatically updated friends with any changes to 
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status or info, there was user revolt.219 This was in 2006, when most social networking users 
were straddling between MySpace and Facebook, waiting to see which site would ultimately 
prevail. Both sites privileged the user’s profile before Zuckerberg’s change, with MySpace 
allowing much more control over the aesthetic of individual pages. When Facebook began 
privileging status updates and profile changes two interesting things happened: 1. users became 
more aware of their “friends” lives, both through their updates and their “likes,” and 2. The 
individual profile became secondary to the update.220 Facebook, by far the most popular social 
networking site in the world, can thank its success to this shift from individual pages to perpetual 
updates. (MySpace is shrinking by the day.221) With almost ninety percent of teens and young 
adults interacting on social networking sites, I think it’s safe to say that we are living in the age 
of the status-update.    
 In the realm of emotions, social networking and status updating provide an interesting 
and incredibly relevant application for how truncated, networked communication mediates 
emotion. As our communication becomes more informative (no matter how mundane) and more 
truncated (Twitter allows 140 characters, Facebook status updates allow 420 characters), we are 
forced to convey our emotions differently. Short bursts of information must express emotion, and 
this emotion must be perceived and (re)experienced by the receivers to perpetuate the 
communicative relationship. These status updates are conveyed in real-time, and they speak to 
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what danah boyd describes as an “imagined audience” where networked broadcasters /users 
negotiate the various possible followers of their updates without every really knowing who is 
reading.222 The emotional feedback generated in the network relies on the user’s ability to gauge 
their audience, which makes digital emoting a deliberative act. Users often submit updates that 
will garner attention, and many of these updates are emotion laden as a result. Being an avid 
status update follower, I find that updates fall between two general categories: static or dynamic. 
Users employ both depending on the context of their situation, and sometimes static updates 
serendipitously become dynamic. (And sometimes dynamic updates become memes, but that is a 
different beast all together.) Understanding how emotions work within each type of update can 
help us understand the power of the status update, and how it is changing our relationships.  
 Static updates are informative statements posted by a user that relay contextual, perhaps 
mundane information. They typically garner either no response from followers and/or friends, or, 
at least in the world of Facebook, receive “likes.” Facebook allows users to comment on status 
updates and/or click a “like” button that publishes an agreement with the update. For example, 
showing support for a sports team by posting a status update on Facebook often garners many 
“likes” from friends who are also fans. The post does not direct users to perform any action, nor 
does it necessarily inspire users to redirect the message--they can simply agree. The like button is 
a virtual nod of head that is documented for others to see. When posting updates that relay 
emotion-laden information, the like button can take on a more important role. The list of 
“friends” that agree with a statement convey a sense of solidarity and empathy. Furthermore, 
users can typically gauge the “like” response to static updates based on their imagined audience. 
For example, when I post static updates about a long night of research, I can typically expect to 
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receive some “likes” from my academic peers. When I post an update about my daughter, “likes” 
appear from other mothers. Static updates engage digital emotions in a straightforward feedback 
manner that allows digital emotions to benefit the user through quick establishment of 
(re)experience by expected, imagined audiences. (The very definition of digital emotions 
describes a feedback process that link short, emotive inscriptions, such as status updates.) Even if 
the network fails to respond to a static post, the update is not lost. Digital emotions provide us 
with a framework to understand emotion as a feedback process, no matter how obvious or 
opaque.   
 Clive Thompson’s description of Twittering clarifies this point when he discovers that 
perpetual status updating creates more round characters. Our individual lives—our personalities, 
our troubles, and our daily routines—emerge through these status updates to portray a real 
person through the (supposed) digital divide. So when static updates appear to have failed in the 
sense that they did not receive any feedback from the network (through either likes or retweets, 
or @______ responses on Twitter), the update is still an important piece of the larger, emergent 
user identity. In this way, digital emotions can be applied to static feedback to help us understand 
emergent identities through social networking where the feedback process is inscriber centered, 
but absorbed perhaps unknowingly by other users. Static updates that acquire “likes” strengthen 
the feedback of digital emotions because experience of the emotional content spurred other users 
to agree with your statement, and the “likes” transmit a sense of empathy and shared experience 
for the inscriber. A mini-community is instantly created around a simple comment, furthermore, 
this micro-community is on display for others in your network to see. The digital emotion lives 
as it makes its way down the “News Feed” page, or through simple retweets. While this process 
may seem as banal as the imagined post, digital emotions tell us something else quite useful: the 
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feedback process is inherently embodied, so static updates and the various ways in which they 
are consumed by others in your network, are highly dependent on your conscious or unconscious 
engagement. In short, once the connection is made between your emotion and the network, the 
digital emotion never really goes away. The hybrid of new media perpetuates the (re)experience 
through algorithms, potential retweets and other means of copying (users can copy or link status 
updates as their own). Static updates are definitely a form of weak connectivity in social media, 
but they are the critical filler to round our digital presence, and they work to compliment 
dynamic updates. 
 Dynamic updates exist on a spectrum that necessarily depend on context. When Sarah 
Palin, a controversial Republican pundit, posts comments to her Facebook page, or Tweets, her 
status updates often appear in cable news tickers and spur political debates. Palin’s status updates 
represent an extreme dynamism in social media because they are often emotion laden and they 
inspire behaviors and actions throughout the network. With almost a half-million followers on 
Twitter, when Palin tweeted “Commonsense Conservatives & lovers of America: "Don't Retreat, 
Instead — RELOAD!" Pls see my Facebook page,”223 on March 23rd, 2010, over 100 followers 
retweeted the message.224 News pundits picked up the message and a national conversation about 
gun metaphors swept through the country. On Palin’s Facebook page, followers found a map of 
the United States featuring crosshair icons over key Democratic races for the November, 2010 
mid-term elections. And Palin’s tweet lived on. When Democratic congresswoman Gabrielle 
Gifford’s of Arizona (she represents one of Palin’s “crosshair” districts) was shot during a 
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community event, Palin’s tweet resurfaced with such force that the former governor of Alaska 
had to issue a public statement. This story does not suggest that Palin’s tweet had anything to do 
with Gifford’s shooting, but it does show the potential of dynamic status updates that employ 
emotion. Palin’s tweet stirred emotion in her followers by tapping into their nationalistic pride. 
Her followers were compelled to not only retweet her message, therefore increasing the scope of 
influence, but to keep the emotional response alive in other ways—through civic conversation, 
Facebook comments, “likes,” etc. The digital emotion, in this case, worked quickly and probably 
just as Palin, the inscriber, intended. Just as with all digital emotions, the context of the impetus 
is critical to power and sustainability of the feedback process. Palin’s tweets and status updates 
are incredibly notorious and ignite a social and cultural context unique to her following, yet they 
ripple through dozens of other social and cultural communities because of their divisiveness.  
 The social and cultural force of a Palin tweet or status update shares space on the 
dynamic status update spectrum with other celebrities, such as Justin Bieber and actor Ashton 
Kutcher. Many entertainers use status updates to connect with their fans, which gives the 
impression of intimate knowledge and exchanges. Some entertainers use social media to bring 
attention to a cause, typically by tweeting or posting updates that conjure empathy in their 
followers and inspire them to donate time, money, or attention. Performance artists and pop star 
Lady Gaga went to Twitter to inspire her fans to donate money to the Japanese tsunami relief 
effort (after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami). She called on her “monsters,” a term of 
endearment for her fan base, to purchase a rubber bracelet supporting the relief efforts. Within 
two days, her fans raised over a quarter of a million dollars.225 What Lady Gaga and other power 
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tweeters do to raise money and awareness reflects what media maven Clay Shirky calls civic 
value. Shirky argues that social media amasses “cognitive surplus,” which describes the potential 
of over a trillion hours of “free time” each year for educated, social media users to pool their 
resources and pursue activities they care about. This cognitive surplus can either have communal 
value or civic value.226 The culture and context surrounding the pooling of this spare time 
dictates the action taken. Communal value would describe the various memes generated by 
4chan, such as the Lolcat meme that posts pictures of cats performing a variety of tasks with 
often-misspelled captions. Not much is gained from the time users spend creating and sending 
Lolcat pictures, but there is undoubtedly a community built around their exchange.227 Shirky 
cites Ushahidi, a much celebrated digital service that tracks outbreaks of violence in Kenya, as 
an example of civic value. Swahili for “witness” or “testimony,” Ushahidi aggregates citizen 
reports of violence and locates them on a map in real time. Within months of Ushahidi’s launch, 
the site was found to be better at reporting acts of violence than traditional media.228 Shirky 
argues that Ushahidi’s success resulted from the cognitive surplus of a civically engaged digital 
community that pooled their knowledge to quickly and cheaply create a service that not only 
bore witness to egregious attacks on citizens, but also warned citizens about potential attacks, 
and acted as a deterrent for future attacks. The civic value of Ushahidi works due to emotionally 
engaged citizens who share their experiences with the broader community in the hopes of 
enacting change. Tracking violent outbreaks is one thing, but tracking them in real time through 
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user’s personal experiences is another enterprise entirely. These users rely on empathy and what 
Mark Hansen dubs “transindividuation” to guarantee positive action larger than any single 
individual could attain. Digital technology aggregates these status updates to create an emergent 
civic force for good. Both Lady Gaga’s Japanese tsunami bracelet and the Ushahidi service are 
examples of surplus civic value and dynamic status updating.  
 Despite the success of Sarah Palin’s tweets, Lady Gaga’s charity endeavors, and Ushahidi 
(now an open source software used in cities all over the globe), most users of social media are 
not working on the extreme end of dynamic status updating. Their emotion-laden tweets and/or 
status updates do not reach large, national network, nor do they inspire civic change on a global 
scale. Still, users find themselves participating in the feedback process, which makes them 
consumers, creators, and perpetuators of these digital emotions. For example, one in five online 
adults used Twitter or a social networking site to get involved in the 2010 mid-term elections.229 
While various campaigns and pundits flooded social media with election news, users took it 
upon themselves to shape the culture around those messages. And social media users engage in 
other dynamic status updating that creates emotional communities online—they post news 
articles, studies, interesting links, and personal information that garner a variety of responses 
from the network. Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania found that online news readers 
e-mailed articles that have emotional, positive, intellectually challenging themes more so than 
any other type of article.230 Jonah Berger, one of the leading researchers on the experiment, told 
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John Tierney of the New York Times, “Emotion in general leads to transmission, and awe is a 
quite strong emotion…If I’ve just read this story that changes the way I understand the world and 
myself, I want to talk to others about what it means. I want to proselytize and share feelings of 
awe. If you read the article and feel the same emotion, it will bring us closer together.”231 What 
Berger describes happening through email forwarding, is essentially the feedback process of 
digital emotions. While Berger and his team focused primarily on around 7, 500 articles emailed 
from the New York Times between August 2008 and February 2009, the same reasoning applies 
to articles and videos posted as status updates on Facebook and Twitter. When users supplant a 
personal update with an emotional news story or video, they are consciously igniting digital 
emotions. News articles and videos are incredibly popular status update links, and they create 
flash-communities within broad social media networks.  
 Dynamic status updates can also be personal and elicit empathy from the network without 
tapping into any broader social or civic issue. Posts by new mothers detailing baby troubles, a 
subject I have become intimately familiar with over the past few months, arouse dozens of what I 
call “empathy comments.” These empathy comments do not inspire the same kind of action of 
civic surplus value, or the same social, cultural, and political value of sharing news events or 
scientific discoveries, yet they inspire behaviors that create comfort in trying situations. Using 
myself as an example, over the past year over twelve of my Facebook friends have either become 
pregnant or had a baby (myself, my sister and three of my cousins included). From all of the 
mothers or mothers-to-be, you’ll find posts lamenting sleepless nights, troubles feeding, and 
shining moments. Moms solicit advice through status updates and find solace in similar stories. 
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The emotional feedback occurring through these empathy comments perpetuates a dynamic 
network that is driven by the (re)experience and context of  new mother culture. (And this is just 
on Facebook. I can’t even begin to explain the expansive network of mommy blogs, Q & A sites, 
and general discussion boards for moms.)  
 Status updates range from the silly and mundane to the civic minded and empathetic, and 
the spectrum grows with each new and innovative use of the platform. The era of the status 
update is an era of connection where the power of human networks far outweighs the sum of 
their individual participants. Emergent behaviors in social media transform the culture, and 
consequently transform both the users of the service and communication in general. Static and 
dynamic status updates are unique in their effect on social media behavior. Static updates still 
influence the feedback of digital emotions, although they typically foster weak connections. 
Weak connections do not dissolve into the Internet abyss; they are an important part of our 
identities because they contribute to our overall web presence. Dynamic updates inspire action 
and change behaviors through empathy. They are a strong example of the power of digital 
emotions in social media because they rely on the network to stay alive, and the network is 
nothing but users taking the time to experience snapshots of others’ lives. With the ubiquity of 
social media and the normalcy of perpetual status updates, describing a “real” life and a “digital” 
life or “digital identity” is futile and, frankly, unnecessary. Users of Facebook, Twitter and other 
social media do not reserve their online interactions for people outside of their daily interactions. 
These spaces are a mix of audiences, contexts, and social circles and the user negotiates these 
various aspects online just as they do in real life because their interactions in social media are 
just that: real life. Status updating broadens our interactions, but those digital interactions do not 
form a separate, online existence. Because status updating requires a reliable online identity 
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(unlike a message board like 4chan), the distance between digital narratives and lived actions 
dissolves into just lived action. This collapse allows for us to meaningfully emote in digital 
space.  
 Status updating and ambient awareness of other lives, no matter how emotive or 
mundane, extends our emotional repertoire by exposing us to a vast range of emotional 
snapshots, and this is the chief difference between the way we’ve always understood emotions 
and the process of digital emotions. The context of emotional experiences is shifting to real time 
feeds of hundreds of individuals working through the ups and downs of daily life. Our 
involvement with those emotion-laden updates ranges from slight awareness to modified 
behavior, empathy, or outright activism, but we experience involvement no matter what, and this 
experience, no matter how strong or weak, is normalizing our paradigm scenario. Constant 
exposure to digital emotions lays bare a spectrum of emotion that we have worked through for 
generations through our own lives, and through literature, film and other media. Today, they are 
often reduced to a few sentences and carefully selected emoticons or links that can convey the 
complex cognitive process that is an emotion.  
 Networked communities large and small, contrived and spontaneous, fuel digital 
emotions because with each new connection users embody the (re)experience of the original 
emotion thanks to the speed and ubiquity of the medium. Civic-minded social media, such as 
Ushahidi, capture the cognitive surplus of web users and create a dynamic tool for social 
awareness and change. Ushahidi’s creation was born from a need to connect people quickly and 
easily through the power of status updating and empathy. The platform works because users are 
emotionally invested in their ability to help others in their own situation—navigating a political 
system and country on the brink of collapse. But what if we could create programs that utilize 
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cognitive surplus and the cognitive power of emotion before a crisis takes place? Ushahidi was 
created when Ory Okolloh, a Kenyan blogger and political activist, became so overwhelmed 
with the individual updates coming from observers on the street that she asked for help to 
aggregate the updates. Two programmers came to rescue and Ushahidi was born.232 Game 
designer Jane McGonigal believes that gamers can apply the same type of urgency and cognitive 
power to solve problems like Okolloh’s through games that can then be applied to real world 
problems. McGonigal believes that a network of dedicated gamers can change the world by 
fusing their skills, their ingenuity, and the empathy that drives them towards what she calls the 
“epic win.” The success of these civic minded, “alternate reality games” (ARGs) depends on two 
dependents factors: the ingenuity of the community, and the power of their emotional connection 
in digital space.  
 
Massive Multi-player Games 
 
 In the summer of 2004, a brief, almost hidden URL flashed across the screen of the trailer 
announcing Halo 2, the sequel to Microsoft’s blockbuster, sci-fi video game Halo. With their 
curiosity peaked, astute viewers followed the link to www.ilovebees.com and subsequently 
began the largest, most complex alternate reality game to date.  What later came to be known as I 
Love Bees, began as a marketing ploy to generate excitement, and to bridge a narrative gap, 
between the two Halo games, although the result of the game exceed the expectations of the 
designers and over 600,000 collaborators. Over four months, participants in the I Love Bees 
game worked together both on and off line to unravel a complex series of events surrounding a 
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hacked website on beekeeping. Led by cryptic clues left on the I Love Bees website, blogs, 
emails, social media, MP3s, private phones, and almost one thousand pay phones across the 
country, these gamers collaborated on a massive scale to uncover the story behind “Melissa,” the 
mysterious AI trying to piece her intelligence back together after the spaceship she controlled 
crash landed on Earth. A small team of computer engineers and designers closely monitored the 
tens of thousands of chat entries, wiki updates, and general conversation threads as collaborators 
worked to decipher the clues. This team of engineers designed the next steps of the game based 
on the emerging group intellect of the collaboration—also known as a “hive mind”—throughout 
the course of the game. One of those engineers was Jane McGonigal. McGonigal’s chief 
responsibility for I Love Bees was to oversee the collective intelligence of the players as the lead 
community designer,233 and she makes some compelling arguments about massively scaled 
communities, collective intelligence, and the power of gaming based on her experiences. I Love 
Bees shows us the sheer force of human collaboration on a massive scale and how that 
collaboration is made possible through the power of emotion. I believe that McGonigal’s ARG 
projects explicate the current state of gaming, and provide us a glimpse into the future of global 
problem solving, which, perhaps unsurprisingly, rely heavily on our emotional connections and 
emotional intelligence to solve daunting problems.  
 McGonigal frames her work with I Love Bees within the media theories of Pierre Lévy, a 
pioneering voice on collective intelligence and cyber culture. Lévy, in his arguably utopian view 
of the future of networked computing, believes that a large-scale network of users will pool their 
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intelligence to create new ways of thinking and new ways of utilizing global, real-time 
communication to benefit society.234 Unlike the abstract identity soup of transindividuation, 
Lévy argues that massive collaboration, and the resulting emergent intelligence, ultimately leads 
to self-awareness where individual users are mutually recognized and their singular contributions 
to the network are personally fulfilling and exponentially fulfilling to the whole.235 I Love Bees 
tested Lévy’s new media vision by forcing users to work collaboratively (the game could not be 
solved by any one user alone because different clues were nationally distributed) and by playing 
to various talents, or emergent ways of thinking within the groups. For example, the game 
revealed a list of coordinates as one its early clues, and a particularly diligent group of four 
thousand gamers, dubbed “The Beekeepers,” disagreed on how to approach the coordinates. 
Users quickly realized that they could make more progress by splitting into ideological groups 
based on their individual talents to work on the coordinate problem. One group worked on a 
literal translation of the coordinates—namely that they were to physically arrive at their location, 
another group focused on the coordinates as clues to landmarks that could hold further 
information, and the final group investigated whether or not there were mathematical clues 
within the coordinates.236 Ultimately the “literal” group prevailed as the coordinates pointed to 
about one thousand pay phones across the country where the gamers physically met to receive 
messages from “Melissa.” McGonigal notes that observations and input from each of the teams 
led to their final determination, and no one particularly felt left out when the literal hypothesis 
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rang true.237 Lévy’s “collective intelligence” theory forwards the idea that as a problem solving 
pedagogy, collective intelligence is “extraordinarily inclusive” and “engages a set of players that 
is as broad and diverse as possible in order to work through problems of unprecedented scale and 
complexity.” 238 Scaling up, in essence, is what McGonigal believes will change the world. 
Working against the famous Dunbar model that claims meaningful, individual connections peak 
at about 150—a number that media theorists such as Clay Shirky abide by—McGonigal cites 
ARGs such as I Love Bees as well as flash mobs and other massively scaled communities created 
through digital networks, and argues that social networks, thanks to digital media, are 
“significantly more scaleable than was previously thought to be possible or, in some cases, even 
desirable.” 239 According to McGonigal, and as evidenced by I Love Bees, massively scaling 
digital communities leads to “the emergence of important changes in our understanding of the 
network, of the possibility of digital community, and indeed, of community itself.” 240 Gaming, 
at least the type of massive scale gaming that McGonigal helps to create, pushes the boundaries 
of perhaps dated notions of games as play, or games as insignificant wastes of time. Virtual 
gaming is not, perhaps, the trivial simulacra that Baudrillard despises, but more along the lines of 
Lévy’s virtualization, which McGonigal notes, has little to do with the imaginary. Lévy states 
that, “the virtual is by no means the opposite of the real. On the contrary, it is a fecund and 
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powerful mode of being, which expands the process of creation, opens up the future.”241 The 
complex, emergent and highly successful game I Love Bees (and other examples of ubiquitous 
play, such as flash mobs) challenges dominant notions of weak connections in digital media. 
Perhaps recent evidence from massive, multiplayer games points to a digital network that has the 
capacity for exponential strong connections if provide the right context—and the right emotional 
impetus.  
 McGonigal describes three stages of game play that emerge from massive, multi-player 
games: massively distributed content, meaningful ambiguity, and real-time responsiveness. I 
Love Bees distributed different content around the country to ensure that the game was 
collaborative, furthermore, the designers constructed purposefully ambiguous clues to promote 
creative thinking, which worked—the designers often found themselves inspired by the ingenuity 
of the gamers and built their hypotheses into the game itself. This type of responsiveness led to 
what one of the designers described as a “jazz-style” flexibility that constantly pushed the 
intellectual rigor of the game.242 With such an intellectual investment to a game created with so 
much plasticity, it comes as no surprise that the gamers found themselves emotionally tied to the 
characters, content and context of their adventure. As the gamers pieced together the story of 
“Melissa,” an AI who is trying to reconstruct her memory, they became emotionally connected to 
her isolation and quest for answers. With thousands of pre-recorded messages being phoned in 
all over the country, a real-live conversation with “Melissa” was quite unique. The New York 
Times details one of these encounters:  
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…After weeks of listening to her struggles, many players have said, they feel an 
emotional bond with the character.  
Some of the talks were surprisingly poignant. When “Melissa” asked Lenore 
Henry, a 40-year-old freelance editor in San Francisco, to sing her favorite song, 
Ms. Henry responded with a wavering rendition of “Amazing Grace.” 
“Why is that your favorite song?” “Melissa” asked. 
“Because it's sad, but it's about redemption, as well,” Ms. Henry answered. 
“It is sad,” the character said. “It's about being lost. Do you feel lost?” 
“I do,” Ms. Henry responded. “Both of my parents died. And I feel like an 
orphan.”243 
Ms. Henry’s response to “Melissa” echoes the emotional connection that research subjects 
experienced when talking to ELIZA, the 1966 computer program that elicited emotional 
responses and connections with human subjects. As with ELIZA, participants in I Love Bees 
exceeded the expectations of the game because of their emotional connection to the story, and 
their emergent emotional connection to the hive mind’s successes in the game. McGonigal 
believes the purpose of a game is to “provoke wholehearted engagement with some sort of 
challenge or obstacle,” and she continues that, “it’s a particular emotional state that causes 
positive stress and makes us more creative, optimistic and more likely to co-operate with 
others.”244 While gamers find themselves experiencing a range emotions, this heightened 
emotional state peaks during the “epic win,” where the outcome is so positive that the user does 
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not even realize it until it is experienced.245 It is not that these types of emotions, and the concept 
of the “epic win” is absent from other types of games, such as sports or gambling, but that the 
emotional investment building up to the epic win is incredibly collaborative in nature. Online 
gaming is social gaming, despite the perception of isolation. Furthermore, McGonigal and others 
have found that these emotional, social connections do not weaken as the community grows, but, 
counter to popular belief, they strengthen due to the desire to complete the mission. With users 
spending three billion hours week playing online games, the incredible problem solving potential 
of gamers could be put to use to solve real world problems—McGonigal believes that we need 
twenty-one billion hours of game play per week to achieve this goal.246 Real-world problems 
require collaboration and emotional investment, they are abstract and ambiguous, and the 
consequences are often felt in real-time. Life is a game that we keep on playing, and the games 
within the game make for shockingly good practice if we put our most astute gaming athletes to 
use.  
 The communities that arise from massive multi-player games are born from a single 
purpose: to solve the puzzle and complete the game. Their emotional connections, while perhaps 
driven or exacerbated by their own emotional repertoires (such as Ms. Henry’s connection to 
orphaned “Melissa”) arise due to their shared purpose and their desire to work together. Massive 
multi-player games provide us a glimpse into how important empathy and emotional connections 
are for socialization and problem solving. A shared sense of accomplishment, even in the face of 
apparent defeat, strengthens the commitment of the whole, and while individual expertise and 
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ingenuity are critical to the collaboration because they arise as a result of the shared feedback 
itself. Social media in the context of gaming is, quite obviously, different, but not due to an 
illusory divide between the “real” world and an “imaginary” world. While the consequences of 
epic wins and epic failures in gaming do not have any global consequences, it is not because the 
games are not “real”—just as our interactions on Facebook and other social media sites are not 
strictly “online.” In general, social networking in digital spaces is so tightly woven into our 
analog lives that the distinction between our online and offline selves is no more stark than any 
other aspect of our social lives, whether it is our lives and behaviors at work, at home, or with 
friends or family. So when we apply the framework of digital emotions to ARGs, some of the 
requirements of digital emotions are challenged while others are reinforced. Most importantly, 
the framework highlights the incredible potential of massive multi-player games by emphasizing 
the importance of emotional feedback in our socialization and constructions of self.                                               
  Immersive games rely on short, emotive descriptions to convey complex emotions, 
although these descriptions build the community much differently than status updating and 
microblogging. In ARGs, these short emotional descriptions are a combination of action and 
conversation as the “physical” involvement in the game plays out parallel to a running 
commentary/brainstorm on message boards in chatrooms. In many ways, this parallel 
collaboration within the game mimics fast and slow emotional appraisal with the behaviors of the 
individuals working to solve problems quickly and a more cognitive, problem solving 
collaboration occurring through short, textual messages. The feedback that occurs from these 
actions and conversations occurs on such a massive scale that the group perpetually out-smarts 
its smartest members. Just as McGonigal describes, the collaborators in I Love Bees were 
constantly surprised by their quick and ingenious successes and the designers worked diligently 
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to keep up with the emergent intelligence and problem solving skills of the hive mind. ARGs 
also provide an example of the malleability of digital emotions. While we often think of social 
media services, such as Facebook, as social media, ARGs provide a unique example of social 
media that relies on bigger and bigger networks to survive. The bigger the network, the better it 
becomes, and this phenomena is not as transferable to social media services like Facebook where 
personal status updating and profiling is featured. The common purpose that arises from gaming 
is quite unique and useful to complete complex tasks.   
 While different from the communities that Facebook and Twitter build, massive multi-
player games do exhibit the characteristics of digital emotions, and we can learn a great deal 
from how they manipulate the power of digital emotions in virtual worlds. First, the games that 
McGonigal describes show us the benefits of normalizing paradigm scenarios across large, 
seemingly disparate populations, second, they show us that emotional plasticity is critical to 
problem solving, and finally, how this flexibility is an aesthetic in itself. While our emotional 
repertoires will always reflect the various, individualized experiences during our lives, the more 
we experience life together, on a grand scale, the more these experiences will coincide with 
others within our digital and physical communities, thereby creating a new, massive, digitally 
induced paradigm scenario. The overwhelming feeling of an epic win as experienced by 600,000 
people who have been emotionally involved over a four month period is a significant emotional 
experience. Most of the I Love Bees collaborators never met in person, yet they shared in the 
successes and failures throughout the game. Because ARGs require a temporary suspension of 
belief to fully inhabit the alternative reality, the gamers are all on the same page, so to speak, and 
their emotional experiences work in concert to advance the group toward a solution. In this 
situation, we can see how normalized paradigm scenarios are incredibly useful to the group, 
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while the group continues to recognize the importance of diverse emotional repertoires.  If a 
group of 600,000 all experience an epic win and all of the joy, sense of accomplishment, 
fulfillment that such a win entails, then that group of people will probably more likely to seek out 
such an experience again knowing the power of the ultimate reward. McGonigal believes that 
gaming can save the world if we utilize the power of online collaboration to solve real world 
problems. I believe she’s right, but I believe she’s right because the incredible capacity and 
plasticity of our emotional connections will make it possible. The feedback process of digital 
emotions adapts to many types of connections, and the connections made in these online games 
are incredibly powerful because they are so focused. Despite the incredible scale of some ARGs, 
the emotional connections remain tightly woven because of a shared sense of purpose, but that 
also means that the entire group had to shift emotional gears when necessary. The malleability of 
the group feedback is essential to the success of the game. Finally, this flexibility is what makes 
the game beautiful. As collaborators in I Love Bees attest, the collaboration itself and the 
emotional connections that resulted exceeded the victory over the game. In the case of I Love 
Bees, the aesthetic experience was a result of the awe that such a large number of people worked 
together to solve an incredibly complex puzzle. The awe and inspiration increases the valence, or 
attractiveness, of the digital emotions. In her case study of I Love Bees, McGonigal relates a 
conversation between some of the collaborators:                                                                 
The creator of this…have definitely put some thought into the storyline, and they 
definitely consider us SOMETHING. I wouldn’t be surprised  if we ARE 
supposed to be the bees…I’d call us The Hive or HiveMind…after all, we are a 
collective…Dude, that means that WE are the bees!...You know how an 
individual bee isn’t too intelligent, but the entire hive acting a whole can display 
remarkable cohesion—becoming more than the sum of its parts, so to speak? And 
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you know how an individual silicon computer chip can’t do a darn thing, but if 
you put enough of them together in the right way, whoa, you get the Internet?247 
 
They players exhibited an incredibly amount of self-awareness early in the game, yet they played 
with intensity nonetheless. Their emotional connections to the game and to each other, even 
through play, were not compromised, but perhaps strengthened by the shared experience.  
 Perpetual status updating and massive multi-player online games are two examples of 
digital emotions at work in our networked popular culture. The emotional investment and 
connection that arises through these diverse communities shows the importance of understanding 
emotions in digital contexts as significant to our daily lives and our collaborative futures. 
Although status updating may foster weak ties, those weak ties are not a result of virtuality, but 
of the construction of the media platforms. The success of I Love Bees strongly suggests that 
strong ties are possible on grand scales when there is a shared sense of purpose and a shared 
emotional connection driving the collaboration. Furthermore, these diverse communities both 
create and reinforce social and emotional ties because of the power of real time communication, 
which is perhaps the single strongest force in perpetuating the feedback of digital emotions. Real 
time communication allows these digital communities to integrate into our daily lives seamlessly 
and blurs the distinction between a virtual life and a “real” life. Communities online are vast, and 
the good ones proactively understand the power of emotional connections to building community 
and utilize those connections to their fullest advantage to keep the network alive. This has 
nothing to do with surrendering identity to become a part of a hive mind, or mindless scrolling 
through status updates, but instead these communities have the potential to reinforce your own 
individuality while introducing you to a vast array of emotional experiences. Within the popular 
culture, our emotional experiences in digital space are vast and varied, yet they are incredibly 
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intimate and real. The simulation that we experience when we embody emotion is simulation 
whether or not we are interacting digitally or face to face—a face that is reinforced by the 
countless lab experiments that test our emotional response.  
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Chapter 6 
Aesthetics 
 
 The first movement of Jonathan Harris and Sep Kamvar’s new media artwork We Feel 
Fine bursts onto the computer screen in a stunning, chaotic swarm of colored dots. Each dot 
represents an emotion conveyed online over the past few minutes, along with any other notable 
information digitally attached to the inscription—the name of the inscriber, their location, the 
weather outside their door, their gender, age, and any visuals that the user linked to their original 
emotive text. The dots react to the movement of the mouse making the digital space interactive 
and seemingly sensitive to touch. Once the mouse hovers for a moment over a dot, the entire 
emotion laden transcription appears on the screen. Suddenly, the user obtains keyhole access to 
someone’s inner world amid a galaxy of emotion specks. Whether the inscription reads, “I feel 
like things will begin to change and the darkness of the last 8 years is being washed away,” or “I 
feel alright,”248 the diversity and simplicity of the emotions is magnetic. Madness, the title of the 
opening movement, is one of six distinct movements that uniquely display, shape, and organize 
over thirteen million expressions of emotion that flow through the website.249 The beauty of We 
Feel Fine compliments the fascinating and unprecedented collection of emotions from around 
the web, while providing a glimpse into the public, yet private, emotional lives of web users all 
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over the globe. The artwork manages to do what no technology has done before: take the 
emotional temperature of the pulsing, social network.  
 As the network expands, the focus on aesthetics to differentiate digital spaces, to attract 
users, and to inspire affective experiences has expanded as well. For example, immersive data 
visualization is now a rather commonplace, yet highly effective (and affective), communicative 
tool for online news.250 The ever-popular TED Talks increasingly embrace visually stimulating 
presentations to wow the audience, such as David McCandless’s compelling presentation on the 
importance of communicative, beautiful, and inspiring data visualizations.251 From a 
technological perspective, new media platforms, such as the iPad, have changed the way web 
designers approach information since the touchscreen on the iPad lends itself to more fluid 
gestures than a conventional mouse. The lack of a separate keyboard on touchscreen devices also 
privileges image over text, which influences the design of popular websites as they adjust to a 
touchscreen platform.  Despite these intuitive and creative advances, the vast majority of digital 
space is unfortunately rather mundane and uninspiring. Social media sites typically convey a 
rather homogenous aesthetic that benefit the status update culture they perpetuate—a scrolling, 
mostly-text based aesthetic prevalent on Facebook and Twitter as well as many messaging 
boards. (Perhaps counterintuitively, MySpace, a social media site where users could easily 
customize their profile page, gave way to the homogeny and functionality of Facebook.). While 
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many social media services (and websites in general) facilitate aesthetic experiences for the user, 
few underscore the importance of the aesthetic experience in transmitting information and 
facilitating communication more affectively.    
 Large-scale data visualizations and image heavy web applications are not the only digital 
spaces making inroads on the aesthetic front; however, they may be the most recognizable. 
Massive multi-player games display shockingly beautiful and realistic interfaces for gamers to 
traverse, explore, and conquer, yet users are typically required to submit to the aesthetic 
experience provided to them.252 Of course, submitting to a pre-designed aesthetic does not negate 
the process of digital emotions in these spaces. The goal of the spatial design simply exists for a 
particular purpose—the landscape of the game itself. If we imagine the digitally affective value 
of the aesthetic experience as a spectrum, ARGs would fall somewhere in the middle, although 
with new technologies making gaming more and more immersive, this location will surely shift. 
Affective computing, while still transitioning from the lab to the streets, falls toward the weaker 
end of the spectrum as many of these technologies currently focus on functionality rather than 
aesthetics. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suggest that affective computing will only embrace 
the power of the phenomenal, aesthetic experience as functionality becomes normalized and user 
efficacy can be fine-tuned. The aesthetic experience that contextualizes digital emotions is more 
than a flashy accessory affixed to the process. The use of vivid images, spectacular data 
visualizations, and/or original art amplifies the phenomenological experience of the user by 
casting a wide net into the mind’s emotion-laden memories. Since users are more likely to share 
emotion-laden information in the network, the process of digital emotions is heightened when a 
richer context (that speaks to users’ paradigm scenarios) compliments the text. Furthermore, 
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these heightened experiences add to the emotional repertoire of the user and, if they multiply 
over time, increasingly populate a user’s emotional repertoire with decidedly digital emotions. 
With the emerging world of affective computing, the robust social networks, or the innovative 
landscapes of ARGs, our emotional experiences depend on the relationship between the 
technology, the network, and the aesthetic experience. While the technology facilitates the 
interactions, and the community drives the feedback, the cognitive reach of the aesthetic 
experience makes the entire process memorable, therefore transformative.  
 Beautiful images and conversations abound on the web, yet images, or even conventional 
notions of beauty, do not solely define aesthetic experiences. In The Other Side of Language, 
Gemma Fiumara argues that listening is a critical aesthetic that is perhaps lost in the Western 
tradition. The aesthetics of listening drives what art historian Grant Kester dubs “dialogical art,” 
which focuses on the “creative facilitation of dialogue and exchange.”253 Dialogical artworks 
highlight the dynamic, generative process of conversation that comes to embody the artwork. 
Using Kester’s dialogical approach to community artworks, as well as an inclusive description of 
aesthetics, this chapter explores the impact of dialogical community artworks in digital space—
pieces I call digital community artworks—and their role in the process of digital emotions. 
Digital community artworks describe websites that collect and aesthetically arrange instances of 
human emotion with the goal (either implicit or explicit) of building community through 
empathy. The short, emotive inscriptions that fuel the feedback of digital emotions give way to 
the overall aesthetic of the artwork and create a new context for the inscription. Unlike many of 
social networking sites discussed in chapter five, digital community artworks impose a new 
context on the emotion by juxtaposing the emotion and/or emotional experience with other 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 8. 
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emotion inscriptions. The result is an unprecedented collection of human emotions that, through 
mass assembly, appear to present a singular, feeling subject: the emotional network. Digital 
community artworks, although limited, typify the future of digital media and our emotional lives 
as they redefine our understanding of “community” art and the depths of emoting in digital 
space. By combining emotional, aesthetic, and digital experience, they really define what “new 
media” continues to become—an immersive, highly affective experience with intrinsic value and 
increasingly relevant consequences.  
 This chapter explores in depth two digital community artworks that represent the range of 
emotive, digital community art online: We Feel Fine and PostSecret. Both websites integrate a 
unique aesthetic experience with the process of digital emotions while providing us a glimpse 
into the possible future of digital communication where digital emotions have more reach. The 
chapter begins with a short history of affective, collective art, both off and online, and ends with 
my own quasi-utopian view of the future for digital community artworks and digital emotions in 
general. Using digital community artworks as my primary example, I hope to show the 
importance of aesthetics in pushing the limits of technology, in creating community, and in 
forging new and more salient memories (i.e. emotional repertoires). Digital community artworks 
are not the culmination of all affective new media technologies, yet they portend the power of 
empathy on a massive scale and the impact of mass empathy on identity.  
 
(Digital) Community Artworks 
 
 Digital media lends itself to participatory art due to an already established, massive 
network of users, yet participatory art has a long and robust history. The term “participatory art” 
  158 
is perhaps a misnomer though, since the value of art is inextricably tied to some level of 
participation from the viewer. Art critic and theorist Boris Groys’ argues that contemporary art 
tends toward collaborative, participatory practices where universally accessible art events are 
created in the “here and now, beyond education, professionalization, and specialization.” 254 
According to Rudolf Frieling, participatory art “is an open invitation: the viewer’s refusal to 
participate, or the participation of only a small number of people, counts as much as total 
physical engagement,” he continues, “watching others participate—what is called ‘lurking’ in the 
online context—is an inherent part of the experience.”255 Expanding the scope of participation to 
include those who watch from those who interact brings participatory art into the digital age 
where the popular “90-9-1” social rule applies. (The rule claims that out of 100 web users, only 
one percent contribute content, nine percent comment or add to that content, and ninety percent 
“lurk,” or observe without contributing.)256 Frieling applies this rule to interactive art both on and 
offline, yet online works complicate the context of reception. In the space of a gallery, the work 
is readily designated as “art,” according to Frieling, but occurring elsewhere “the project 
becomes more closely associated with community work even invisible as art, vanishing all 
together into the fabric of real life.”257 Artists have worked to overcome, or embrace, this 
distinction long before Web 2.0. Kester believes that artists who embrace participatory art are 
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“context providers” as opposed to “content providers.”258 Viewed from this perspective, 
participatory artists carve out space in the “real” world and provide a dynamic location for 
communication and interaction. As artists create a context for dialogic exchange, and as that 
context, or location (however loosely defined) becomes populated by the community, the 
artwork, as Frieling explains, often dissolves into the action of the group. What we then have is 
not necessarily an artwork with a defined frame, or beginning and end, but a spark that ignites a 
collaborative artistic process that is inherently unique to that particular time and place.  
 Whether we call this type of art participatory, conversational, community based, or 
dialogical, the similarities override the differences. The context and audience defines the work as 
the art is able to “catalyze emancipatory insights through dialogue.”259 As artist Peter Dunn 
explains, these “emancipatory insights” describe the “empathetic identification” that occurs 
when individuals participate in dialogic artworks.260 Artists utilize the power of empathy to 
breakdown barriers between individual participants and to destabilize identity. For example, 
Cleve Jones, the creator of the NAMES Project AIDS Memorial Quilt, embraced the power that 
such a destabilization could evoke. During the AIDS crisis of the 1980s, Jones recognized the 
disconnect between mainstream society and communities hit hardest by the epidemic, so he 
began what later became known as the AIDS Quilt to, in many ways, democratize and lay bare 
the devastation of AIDS. The largest community art project to date, the AIDS Quilt is a living 
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memorial with over 40,000 three foot by six foot panels, weighing over fifty four tons.261 In 
many ways, the quilt represents an analog version of digital emotions where each panel provides 
a glimpse into a vibrant life lost, but the impact of the entire piece takes on a power much larger 
than the individual parts. The sheer magnitude of the quilt reinforces the devastation of the AIDS 
epidemic, while also reminding us of the tragic impact of our collective negligence during the  
 
 
                    Figure 2. The AIDS Quilt, LIFE Magazine 
 
early 1980s. The quilt is a living memorial that integrates folk art, memory, empathy, and 
community. The empathetic recognition of the AIDS crisis allows participants to see each other 
as “co-participants in the transformation of both self and society.”262 Participatory art is then 
inherently dialogical and reliant on empathy to spur and sustain interaction, whether or not the 
interaction is active or passive. As understood by embodiment theories, empathy is the rapid 
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(re)experience of emotion where one individual simulates the emotive behaviors of another. And 
while these bodily experiences may never reach consciousness, they are critical to our 
understanding of self and other.  
 Participatory art, then, exhibits four key factors that distinguish it from other types of 
artistic endeavors: (1) it provides context within real-world environments, (2) it is dialogic, 
meaning it facilitates some sort of interaction, (3) it is dynamic and plastic, (4) it relies on 
empathy to spur both creative and social transformation. These components are incredibly 
inclusive and encompass a wide array of on and offline participatory artworks—from John 
Cage’s famous piece 4’33, which explores the nuance of silence, to Alan Kaprow’s 
“Happenings,” which break down the barrier between artist and audience, to more recent works 
by Adrian Piper, George Legrady (Pockets Full of Memories), and Aaron Koblin (The Sheep 
Market). The shift to digital platforms poses both problems and opportunities for artists and 
potential participants. Groys argues that participatory art must move beyond specialization to 
promote interaction, consequently he views the hyper-evolution of digital technologies as a 
barrier to entry.263 (Groys also argues that “in the case of virtual communication and 
participation…the body of the person using the computer is of no consequence,”—a position that 
ignores the intimate, embodied feedback that occurs when we interact in digital spaces.) Brian 
Massumi notes that interacting with a work of art does not make it interactive. He explains,  
It is not enough to champion interactivity. You have to have ways of evaluating 
what modes of experience it produces, what forms of life those modes of 
experience might develop into, and what regimes of power might arise from those 
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developments. The power element is always there, at least on the horizon. You 
have to strategize around it.264 
 
Massumi attempts to differentiate between the increasingly immersive and affective worlds of 
digital games and interactive art. Yet, the line between gaming and interactive art online is 
constantly being blurred, with ARGs such as I Love Bees embracing the power of narrative, 
interaction, and collaboration. I Love Bees achieved many of the goals that participatory artists 
seek to achieve in their work by tapping into the emotional power of gamers and using empathy 
to spur innovation. Yet, Massumi warns against this “gaming paradigm,” and other media 
theorists, such as Lev Manovich agree. Manovich believes that we look at much of this dynamic, 
interactive, “artistic” content on the web and fail to ask fundamental questions: Is this content 
being driven by the consumer electronics industry? Social media companies? Is the mass 
production of cultural objects progress? Are these programs just relying on cultural templates?265 
Manovich’s concerns are legitimate—I Love Bees was a marketing ploy for Halo 2—but those 
concerns should not negate the emergent power of certain games and commissioned pieces. The 
four factors of participatory art do not require a lack of corporate sponsorship to be affective. 
Corporations frequently sponsor athletes, dancers, and musicians and we rarely question the 
legitimacy of cyclists competing in the Tour de France, the many performances by the Rockettes, 
or any artist signed to a major label. The requirements for participatory art must remain broad 
and inclusive because the possibilities for such art will always be beyond our current 
understanding as technologies and culture co-evolve. Furthermore, this evolution should not be 
seen as a barrier to entry, but an opportunity to exploit technological innovation for the good of 
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the network. We should question the motives and value of participatory art, but we should not 
dismiss works based on an individualistic, purist paradigm. These questions should seek to 
enhance the conversation surrounding the art and embrace the participatory community, no 
matter how “pop.” Approaching digital community art from this perspective allows us to 
understand these types of new media pieces as inhabitants of popular culture while maintaining 
the aesthetic characteristics of more traditional participatory artworks.  
 Digital community artworks mimic many of the more salient and community-minded 
features of massive multi-player games, but they do not share the same goal. The most prominent 
difference between what Massumi dubs a “gaming paradigm” and digital community artworks is 
the concept of the epic win. As with many participatory artworks, the success of a digital 
community artwork resides in the dialogic process—active listening, self-awareness through 
empathy, and, ultimately, creative transformation. These artworks are never finished because 
they are always being accessed, engaged, and refreshed. Arjen Mulder claims that “interactive art 
is the art of the age of globalization. Everything and everyone is continually involved in the 
exchange…Interactive art addresses the situation itself, tries to grasp it at the moment it is taking 
place, presentationally, as consciously lived experience, instead of the language of yesterday or 
after tomorrow.”266 Digital community artworks tap into this aesthetic of the now because they 
live on the web and come alive through the network. Even when some digital community 
artworks come to an end, such as Miranda July and Harrell Fletcher’s famous art project 
Learning To Love You More, the archive of the community artwork allows the piece to live on 
not just as an archive, but also as a living document that continues to encourage participation. 
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Learning To Love You More began in 2002 and officially ended in 2009, although contributors 
continue to complete the “assignments” given on the site and post them on the web. During the 
project’s active years, July and Harrell posted assignments to the website and encouraged anyone 
to contribute their completed projects. The projects ranged from the reflective “Make a flier of 
your day” to the poignant “Take a picture of your parents kissing.”267 Participants (ranging from 
elementary school classes to inspired individuals) sent in their completed assignments to be 
posted on the website. The result is a chronicle of personal, whimsical, and powerful artistic 
snapshots of users lives and/or their interpretation of the world around them. The whimsy of 
Learning To Love You More makes it accessible and appealing to a wide variety of users that are 
perhaps seeking a creative and pleasurable interaction on the web. The magazine/website Found 
shares the creative imagination of Learning To Love You More by inviting users to submit found  
 
                   Figure 3. Learning To Love You More, Assignment #39, screenshot 
 
                                                
    267 Miranda July and Harrell Fletcher, Learning To Love You More, http://www.learningto 
loveyoumore.com/index.php (accessed April 11, 2011). 
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notes, invitations, letters, and such. that provide a glimpse into a stranger’s life. The result is a 
collection of offbeat, funny, and at times heartfelt messages that float through our lives. Found 
brings these analog messages into the digital world thereby giving these bits of text a second life 
within the expanse of the network. Users can comment on the artifacts, but comments or no 
comments, it is impossible to flip through the scribbled notes and not imagine the story behind 
each.  Unlike many digital community artworks, Found is folk art by accident. The inscribers 
 
               Figure 4. Found, “Finds of the Day,” October 16, 2009 
 
never intended for their scribbles to find another context, another life, outside of the original, 
intended purpose of the communication. Yet, these messages bring our perhaps mundane, 
unintentional emotional lives to the surface, and the result is, well, humorous—what a relief.  
 Other digital community artworks, such as Dear God and The Dear God Project attract 
users that seek a combination of solace, prayer and community. Bill Tikos, creator of the now 
defunct Dear God, described the site as a 
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global project for people around the world to share their innermost hopes and 
fears through prayer. It doesn’t matter what your version of God is…Jesus, Allah, 
Buddha or simply a spiritual universal energy… praying to a higher power 
soothes and heals. It is believed that people who pray are healthier, happier and 
more resilient. Share your prayers here and help us create hope one prayer at a 
time. Simply send us your personal letter to your God and/or a picture that sums 
up your message visually. (Dear God will source a picture if you don’t have one).  
 
This mission statement was followed by a short disclaimer that reads: “This website is totally 
independent and non-denominational. We are not a religious or spiritual/new-age organization. 
We have no affiliation or relationship to any church or religious or spiritual group or 
organization.”268 Dear God published an array of narratives (or prayers) that range from one 
sentence to multiple paragraphs. These narratives were more detailed than many of the short, 
emotive descriptions that appear on other digital community artworks, such as We Feel Fine or 
PostSecret. Dear God allows for a broader emotional context, yet categorizes the prayers by 
subject. One prayer may find itself under the title bar “sex,” while another may find itself under 
“confessions,” “joy,” or “stress.” These categories break down the context of each prayer as they 
are juxtaposed with similar emotions and situations. The overall aesthetic of Dear God is hip, 
and the photographs are typically provocative. While many prayer sites exist online, Dear God 
combines the prayers with a kitschy design and provocative images, which places the website in 
the realm of digital community art. Working through the various prayers and images in Dear 
God, the user cannot help but question the role of emotions and how the emotions are affected by 
the images and overall organization of the site. The complex interplay of images, narrative text, 
emotion, and user feedback inspires questions that push our understanding of online 
communication and artistic community. For example, what if the image that Dear God provides 
distorts the narrative’s context? Or is completely antithetical? The overall aesthetic and purpose 
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of Dear God garnered a fair amount of press269 but never took off, and the site was closed in 
2009. On the heels of Dear God’s exit came The Dear God Project, a decidedly more faith-based 
 
      
     Figure 5. Dear God, opening page 
 
 
initiative created by Josh Stephens. Stephens keeps his name and identity from the site but he 
discusses his purpose for creating and maintaining the site on his personal blog: “I love 
God…The Dear God Project is a mission of mine. Sometimes I like to refer to it as my Noah 
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mission…”270 The Dear God Project began in 2009 with many of the same kitschy submissions 
that Tikos’s site fielded, yet over the past three years the “prayers” have become much more 
faith-based and emotionally driven. The more recent prayers are also juxtaposed with provactive 
 
 
       Figure 6. The Dear God Project, individual prayer screenshot 
 
images, which begs the same complicated questions concerning context that Dear God inspired. 
What is the impact of these sites when the images seem contrived to, perhaps, sensationalize the 
prayer? What role do the comments play in the feedback process? And exactly what kind of 
context is the site creating with all of these private prayers/confessions?  
 Learning To Love You More, Found, Dear God, and The Dear God Project blur the line 
between dialogical websites (such as message boards) and net.art or web art in general. The 
attention to aesthetic detail and the focus on emotive texts differentiates them from the thousands 
of message boards and comment fields online, yet they feel more pedestrian than large-scale, 
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highly acclaimed web-based community art, such as Aaron Koblin’s The Sheep Market.271 
Consequently, defining Internet art introduces a number of problems, especially when the neon 
world of pop culture and the general, sometimes vulgar, population at large is not only invited 
but also encouraged to participate. The startlingly low barrier of entry in these projects may 
make the term “art” seem forced, or even a mischaracterization all together, yet these distinctions 
burden traditional forms of participatory art as well. They just so happened to be magnified in 
the wild id of digital space.  
 Where Kester describes dialogic artworks as “context providers,” I believe digital 
community artworks are context amplifiers. They cull the short bursts of emotion that drive 
digital emotions and display them on an unprecedented scale. In fact, the display itself becomes 
larger than the sum of its parts. As McGonigal argues, it is possible to scale up community 
interactions, and digital community artworks do just that by creating new layers of context for 
these emotional transcriptions while still retaining their original raison d'être. Similarly to the 
dialogical encounters Kester explores, digital community artworks seek to retain individual 
identity, even when the inscriber is anonymous. As Kester explains, “identity is only partially 
transformed. These partial transformations can no doubt accumulate over time, and the aggregate 
effect may be to radically transform subjectivity or identity.”272 Of course, this bit-by-bit 
transformation lies at the heart of digital emotions. Only through these small, but sustained 
interactions do we come to accept the emotive power of digital exchange and all the while these 
experiences are populating our emotional repertoires and shifting our paradigm scenarios. Digital 
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community artworks make visual what digital emotions do in various technologies and through 
various social media online and they suggest that valuable emotional exchange does not require 
dialogue in the traditional sense, but can be created, sustained, and highly effective through 
short, emotive transcriptions. With the scale and dynamism of digital community artworks, a 
little emotion goes a long way.  
 
PostSecret 
 
 Beginning in the winter of 2004, artist Frank Warren created and released original 
artworks into the world to be serendipitously stumbled upon by unassuming individuals. Almost 
like Found with a conscience, the messages (sometimes in a bottle) intrigued the community 
with their artistic flair and cryptic, yet hopeful, messages.273 The final movement of the project 
asked individuals to post a secret:  
 
                                    Figure 7. Original PostSecret postcard 
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The response was overwhelming, and PostSecret was born. Over a half million secrets later, the 
PostSecret community art project thrives in multiple media (books, blogs and a traveling show) 
and has become one of the most notable blogs on the Internet.274 (PostSecret is also the largest 
advertisement-free blog in the world, with over 430 million hits.) Contributors to PostSecret 
simply mail a postcard with their secret (Warren kindly asks that the secret be truthful) and a 
small visual to Warren’s home in Maryland. Some secrets make it on the weekly blog update, 
some make it into the books, some go on the road, and others are never displayed. Warren 
believes that the medium of the postcard is deliberate, yet accessible, for almost everyone, and he 
regards the artwork as an important aspect of the secret. He explains: 
The art is important. Sometimes the pictures add another level to the meaning, 
making it humorous, or very personal and homey. I think of each postcard as a 
living work of art. I find inspiration in that they are coming from everyday people. 
The artwork is special and moving. Perhaps courage is more creating art that can 
really change lives. For me, many times, it’s the non-verbal art that conveys the 
deepest sentiments of the secret—the part of the secret that is so uncomfortable, 
they can’t put it into words.275  
 
Over the years, PostSecret has become a fixture of fleeting emotional transcription on the web. 
The postcards inspire collective action, such as the Please Don’t Jump Facebook page and 
suicide prevention rallies detailed earlier, as well as a thriving online community that shares 
personal struggles and words of encouragement through the PostSecret online forums. Users 
embrace the power of empathy within the community and show support for many of the 
anonymous participants in the project. While some secrets divulge humorous instances (one 
                                                
    274 PostSecret won “Weblog of the Year” in 2006 and 2007.  
 
    275 Harper Collins Publishers, “Author Interview with Frank Warren,” Harper Collin’s 
Authors, http://www.harpercollins.com/author/authorExtra.aspx?authorID=30756&displayType 
=interview (accessed April 17, 2011).  
 
  172 
secret reads, “My prison pen pal (who I’ve never met) writes all the time about how we’ll go 
camping together when he gets out. I’m not so sure. Maybe ”),276 most describe considerably 
darker emotions and circumstances. These secrets often depict a sense of loneliness, anticipation, 
anxiety or despair, much like the suicide secret that sparked the Please Don’t Jump community. 
PostSecret exemplifies the potential power of digital community art where users seek out 
empathetic experiences to contribute positively to the community, even if this contribution is not 
directly reflected on the site. The medium of the postcard, although seemingly nostalgic, 
accurately reflects our short-text, status update culture. With only a few words or sentences, 
contributors must reduce their secret into an emotive package that successfully conveys the 
emotion and context. Not unlike a traditional postcard that documents geographic locations 
during one’s travels, PostSecret documents an emotional location on a grand map of human 
thought and feeling. The postcards exist in a world of tactile treasures and fleeting digital noise 
simultaneously, and the success of the project is a testament to how we can negotiate our 
emotional lives in an increasingly hybrid world of analog and digital culture where space is 
negotiable and correspondence is scaled up.  
 We can better understand the potential impact of a digital community artwork like 
PostSecret through the framework of digital emotions. Instead of seeing the project as a quirky 
collection of secrets on display, viewed through the lens of digital emotions, the success and 
influence of PostSecret suggests a way forward when discussing emotions in digital space. Two 
specific phenomena emerge from the artwork: the power of explicit empathy as a condition for 
entry into the community and the power of images to support short, emotive transcriptions. 
These features of PostSecret provide a glimpse into a digital landscape where emotions can 
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strengthen the emotive power of the network despite the network’s growth. The resultant 
intimacy has the potential to transform emotional norms in the culture because secrets, in most 
cases, reflect the undesirable or shameful thoughts and actions of those who keep them. In an era 
of status updating and an increasingly collaborative and communicative network, a space such a 
PostSecret can lay bare common, yet concealed,  thoughts, fears, and experiences.  
 Sissela Bok, in Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, claims that “we 
experience as secret the spaces from which we feel shut out,”277 which makes a space like 
PostSecret a wonderful paradox in an increasingly public digital culture. Sharing anonymous 
secrets with the network allows individuals to take control over their secret through artistic 
expression, physical release (posting the secret) and public sharing. Secrets help shape our 
identity because the very act of keeping secrets presupposes an identity that is being negotiated 
in a larger social world. Confessing secrets, either openly, selectively, or anonymously, is a 
universal urge in nearly all humans,278 and, as Bok notes, “institutional practices of self-
revelation may bring solace, alleviation of guilt, group acceptance, personal growth, even self-
transcendence.”279 It turns out that secrets are effective communicators and in their silence, their 
whispers, or their outright confession, they are inherently dialectical.  As Luise White explains,  
Keeping a secret requires negotiating a social world at least as much as lying 
does. Keeping a secret isn’t something a self does, it’s something that continually 
has to be reconstituted and renegotiated through changing political and discursive 
practices—and these changes don’t necessarily have to be over time, they can be 
at the same time. This means that secrets aren’t a single thing; their meaning, and 
their value both as spoken and unspoken assertions, change and are negotiated 
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and renegotiated regularly. Secrets and secrecy are social acts, constantly aware 
of audiences and publics.280 
 
The service that PostSecret provides is perhaps not revolutionary in the context of secrets as 
social acts, yet the scope that the project boasts, and the virality of certain secrets fundamentally 
alters the history of secret negotiation and revelation. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
web itself has fundamentally altered secrecy. For the first time, secrets, like little magnets from 
all over the world that never knew other magnets, are pulled together and what was once alone is 
now normalized, or at least alive in a population that may have not existed otherwise. Just as 
White argues, secrecy is a social act that is constantly being negotiated based on environmental 
context, so something kept secret in your small hometown may not be secret in the bustling city. 
In the context of the digital network, the variety of the bustling city explodes and secrets 
coalesce to form communities. PostSecret differentiates itself from anonymous message boards 
like 4chan or Group Hug281 and carves out a place for a community based solely on empathetic 
connections for all types of secrets, despite their context. The secret is thus remediated and 
amplified by thousands of users that actively seek the (re)experience. Even outside the space of 
PostSecret, divulging of secrets begets secrets. One contributor writes,  
I’ve had a PostSecrect card in my bag for weeks. I kept meaning to send it in but 
just never seemed to get around to it. So I stuck it to the wall of a public restroom. 
I had a feeling or relief wash over me—it was wonderful to know the next person 
to use the bathroom would know my secret, and a tiny part of my burden was 
gone. Just out of curiosity I went back in there at the end of the day. To my 
delight there were at least ten other secrets on the wall, all on pink Post-it notes, 
ranging from someone who had helped her elderly neighbor take an overdose 
                                                
    280 Luise White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History,” History and Theory 39, no. 4 
(December 2000): 22.  
 
    281 Group Hug (www.grouphug.us), founded by Jeff Veit and James Dogopoulos, is a 
confession website that follows many of the same aesthetic principles of status update, social 
media platforms. The confessions are never edited and most are submitted anonymously. 
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when Parkinson’s had got too much to cope with, right down to the lady who 
can’t walk past cans of fizzy drink without shaking them up. What a wonderful 
feeling! P.S. I’m the fizzy drink lady.282  
 
Within the space of PostSecret, secrets spur comments, conversations, and more secrets. The 
PostSecret community forums chose secrets from the Sunday posting and carry on rather in 
depth discussions. In response to a secret that claims, “In crowds I pretend to text people in order 
to feel less alone,” community members in the forum readily confirmed the behavior as normal. 
One contributor writes, “I'll do this...I'll just look through my phone at pictures or read old texts 
sometimes...I hate being alone :/”283 Many of the posts confirmed these feelings, yet one member 
notes, “[Sometimes] When I'm alone, I look for other alone people to strike up a conversation 
with. I disregard you if you're buried in your phone.”284 The secret takes on a dual role as both an 
artifact representing one individual’s experience while providing a context for others to share 
their own experiences. Once published, the network populates the secret with similar emotions—
filling in the blanks of the text to fit familiar narratives. This act of populating the secret is a 
conscious, empathetic action based in (re)experience.  
 Empathetic identification yields permission to participate in the artwork and furthers the 
lifespan of each secret, while the images on each postcard reinforce the emotive power of the 
text by creating a further glimpse into the context of each secret. The images presented 
participate in a unique PostSecret culture that relies on the juxtaposition of text and image to 
                                                
    282 Frank Warren, A Lifetime of Secrets, (New York: Harper Collins, 2007). 
 
    283 10:55 [pseud.], comment on “In Crowds I pretend…,” PostSecret Community, comment 
posted April 10, 2011, http://www.postsecretcommunity.com/chat/viewtopic.php?t=338487 
(accessed April 19, 2011).  
 
    284 Parliament [pseud.], comment on “In Crowds I pretend…,” PostSecret Community, 
comment posted April 10, 2011, http://www.postsecretcommunity.com/chat/viewtopic.php?t 
=338487 (accessed April 19, 2011).  
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relay highly affective information. These images share common themes, such as text or other 
marks distorting photographs, hand drawn representations of a secret, or a representation or 
photograph of an artifact that relates to the secret. The contributors to PostSecret are typically 
not artists by trade, yet Warren considers them all artists in the context of the project. In the spirit 
of the AIDS Quilt, the pastiche of postcards is a folk art project larger than the sum of its parts. 
The images that accompany many of the secrets amplify the emotive experience by further 
mining reciprocal memories in our individual emotional repertoires. The image is always bound 
up with the body as it is up to the body to understand the image as a representation of a certain 
time and place. As W.J.T Mitchell argues, “We experience the image as a double moment of 
appearing and recognition, the simultaneous noticing of a material object and an apparition, a 
form or a deformation. An image is always both there and not there, appearing in or on as a 
material object yet also ghostly, spectral, and evanescent.”285 Digital media, according to 
Mitchell, owes its success to the power of the image. Without the ones and zeros adding up to 
familiar and inspiring images, “it is unlikely that the digital revolution would have gained any 
traction at all.”286 Mitchell underscores the importance of images in the midst of what was 
initially a text-based medium. The connective power of the network thrives on images, even in 
our status update culture. In many ways, the images accompanying the secrets are as much a part 
of the secret as the explanatory text. The image grounds the secret and provides context while 
creating a phenomenal, aesthetic experience for the user.  
                                                
    285 W.J.T Mitchell, “Image,” in Critical Terms for Media Studies, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell and 
Mark Hansen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 39. 
 
    286 Ibid., 44. 
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 Few contemporary images embrace the ghostly duplicity like the final images of the 
Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. Covering the front page of almost every major newspaper 
throughout the world and relived countless times through video and sound, the smoking towers 
signify not only the tragedy of 9/11, but also a turning point in modern history. The “9/11 secret” 
utilized this highly affective image and became one of the most viral PostSecret entries to date. 
(Frank Warren cited the secret during an interview in 2009 as the one secret that “made his blood 
run cold.”287) Even though the image is blurry and not directly indicative of a cityscape, the 
smoke cloud enveloping the top World Trade Center is unmistakable, and the burnt top edge of 
the image implies a second death within the context of 9/11.  
 
                                 Figure 8. The “9/11 secret”  
 
 
The text of the secret reinforces this reading as the secret indicates that the inscriber experienced 
a unique death on September 11, 2001—the death of his or her identity as they began a new life 
after the attacks. This secret is not typical of PostSecret, but its curiosity demonstrates the range 
of submissions. Furthermore, the 9/11 secret is a good example of how the new, imposed context 
                                                
    287 Allison Levy, “Creator of PostSecret brings even to campus,” The Dartmouth, April 20, 
2009 http://thedartmouth.com/2009/04/20/arts/postsecret (accessed April 18, 2011).  
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that PostSecret facilitates can overshadow the original inscription. The circumstance of the 
inscriber, most would agree, is not common, but the unity and common empathy surrounding the 
9/11 attacks is pervasive in American culture. The result of this rather odd juxtaposition 
reinforces the power of the image and the second life that the secret takes on in the digital realm.  
It comes as no surprise, then, that the 9/11 secret became viral after the initial posting on 
PostSecret, appearing on dozens of blogs and websites.  
 The empathetic commitment and affective power of the image makes PostSecret a 
fascinating example of not only digital community art, but the influence of aesthetically charged 
emotions on the web. Individuals that participate in the artwork submit their secrets to a highly 
emotive network of users and while the submissions are anonymous, the community built around 
their revelation is vibrant and ready to help. PostSecret shows us the power of embodiment in 
digital contexts, and the power of art, no matter how simple, to convey emotion. Furthermore, 
the collection of secrets continues to lay bare many social, cultural and economic problems, such 
as homophobia, anorexia, xenophobia, debt, and many other common, yet concealed social, 
cultural and economic problems. Just as all secrets are necessarily negotiated in a social world, 
the secrets that arrive in Warren’s mailbox want a second act. They arrive in the hopes of being 
part of this empathetic community, and the users who created them can now participate in the 
artwork as both a participatory artist and as a viewer—perhaps the most powerful position within 
this feedback system.   
 PostSecret is an intentional community artwork. The participants spend time finding the 
balance between text and image and work to materialize their secret within the limited 
parameters of a standard postcard. The PostSecret community activates the secrets through 
discussion and perpetuates the secrets in other digital spaces, such as the PostSecret Archive and 
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other blogs and forums not officially affiliated with the project. Yet not all digital community 
artworks function in this way. We Feel Fine is an artwork that garners participation unbeknownst 
to the user, and its methods raise compelling questions for the role of digital community artworks 
online and the function of emotions on the web.  
 
We Feel Fine 
 
 Jonathan Harris began We Feel Fine with Sepandar (Sep) Kamvar, a fellow computer 
scientist and professor of computational mathematics, in 2006. While We Feel Fine is perhaps 
the most emotive piece in Harris’s portfolio, his other works speak to the vastness and beauty of 
data and making that data more human—or at least more beneficial to humans. His projects fine-
tune the art of narration through mass collection and, in many ways, quiet the noise of the web  
 
                 Figure 9. Lovelines, “Pictures,” screenshot      
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while making it stunningly beautiful. Lovelines, also created in collaboration with Kamvar, 
collects emotions on the continuum between love and hate from online journals and displays the 
results on a crisp white screen. The program pulls images from the blogs associated with the text 
as well, thereby creating a pastiche of emotion-laden photographs. Other projects, such as I Want 
You To Want Me, explore user profiles on online dating sites and organize the data based on 
users’ desires, turn-ons, and such. The result is an interactive display of floating balloons each 
representing hundreds of online daters. Harris has also taken on the news by aggregating the top 
stories from over twenty thousand online news sources into a single cosmos-inspired 
constellation of information organized by keywords, images, and quotations. (The displays are so 
beautiful that you sometimes forget that you’re looking at real news.) Universe, I Want You To 
Want Me, Lovelines and We Feel Fine only represent a portion of Harris’s portfolio—they keep 
company with other digital projects that, as Harris describes, “reimagine how we relate to our 
machines and to each other.”288 Although his sites unwittingly collect participants, he cites 
increasing empathy as his primary motivator for culling vast amounts of personal and emotional  
information.289 He also recognizes the importance of compelling aesthetics in facilitating 
empathetic feedback. In an interview in Wired magazine, Harris explains: 
Besides my interest in storytelling for its own sake, I also feel a strong 
responsibility to help shape what the web can be. I believe in technology, but I 
think we need to make it more human. I believe that the internet is becoming a 
planetary meta-organism, but that it is up to us to guide its evolution, and to shape 
it into a space we actually want to inhabit—one that can understand and honour 
both the individual human and the human collective, just like real life does. 
                                                
    288 Jonathan Harris, “27,” The Work of Jonathan Harris, http://www.number27.org/index.html 
(accessed April 18, 2011).  
 
    289 Behance Team, “Jonathan Harris: We Feel Fine,” The 99 Percent, 2008 
http://the99percent.com/articles/5604/Jonathan-Harris-We-Feel-Fine (accessed April 19, 2011).  
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Over the past several years, the web has witnessed an astounding aesthetic 
homogenization, with leading websites converging towards an increasingly 
uniform "aesthetic of the web". A quick look at sites like Google, Craigslist, 
Facebook, Twitter, Flickr and Amazon reveals basically the same aesthetic 
solutions to very different problems. Aesthetic homogeneity makes (some) sense 
when building tools like web search or shopping. But when building digital 
homes that increasingly house our lives, this aesthetic homogeneity crushes 
human individuality, and makes us all look the same. This is a problem I feel it's 
important to solve, and what I will be working on next.290 
 
Harris echoes the rationale behind affective computing: digital technologies should exemplify 
the very best of what it means to be human. In other words, digital spaces should be affective,  
 
 
              Figure 10. Universe, “Superstars,” screenshot 
 
                                                
    290 Maria Popova, “The sum of all emotions: Jonathan Harris Q &A,” Wired.co.uk, December 
2, 2009 http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2009-12/02/the-sum-of-all-emotions-jonathan-
harris-qa.aspx (accessed April 19, 2011).  
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they should be visually engaging and challenge our assumptions of the network, therefore each 
other. Artworks such as We Feel Fine embrace the basic principles of our status update culture, 
yet they amplify them by scaling up the level of participation beyond the scope of actionable 
human interaction to the level of algorithm. The result is a meta-view of the emotive network 
(thanks to a humble but smart piece of software) that consequently became the largest database 
of human emotion in existence. 
 The scope and scale of Harris’s projects embraces the scope and scale of our networked 
lives. His art represents the enormity of digital culture while reminding us that beauty and design 
make the vastness comprehensible and digestible. His works underscore what Kamvar notes as 
the most interesting shift over the past few decades—not the shift in technology, but the “cultural 
shift…where people now feel comfortable sharing their whole lives online.”291 In the context of 
digital community artworks these projects, specifically We Feel Fine, complicate the framework. 
Digital community artworks are dialogical, therefore participatory, but when these emotions are 
culled together through a web crawler that scans Facebook, Twitter, and numerous other social 
media programs for text following the words “I feel…,” who is participating? Where is the 
conversation? And what it is about? And, perhaps most importantly, does the focus on aesthetics 
overshadow the original, emotional inscription completely? Is it possible in an attempt to make 
emotion-laden data accessible and affective that Harris and Kamvar made it kitsch and 
alienating? These are important questions to engage because if we are to look at a wide variety of 
spaces through the framework of digital emotions, we have to understand where they fall on the 
spectrum in order to grapple with their potential influence. Where digital community artworks 
like PostSecret engage the network as active participants, We Feel Fine shifts the emotional 
                                                
    291 Sep Kamvar, “An Almanac of Internet Emotion.”   
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burden to the receiver, thereby removing any aesthetic or contextual responsibility from the 
inscriber. They become a piece of data in a network of emotions that seeks to convey 
information much broader than any individual emotion. We Feel Fine, indirectly, utilizes the I 
Love Bees model of participation where users relinquish individual recognition so long as they 
are contributing to an epic revelation. (While also knowing that the only way to achieve this epic 
revelation, or win, is through this active submission.) It’s a hive mind mentality in many 
respects, but with perhaps more altruistic motivations. The following analysis of We Feel Fine 
attempts to frame the artwork within the parameters of digital community art, and within the 
parameters of digital emotions. By viewing We Feel Fine through the compound lens of 
community art and digital emotions, the potential of the piece becomes apparent and provides a 
sneak peak into some possible futures of emotions on the web.  
 The six movements that comprise We Feel Fine organize and distribute data about 
emotion in various ways. The opening screen begins with Madness, which invites the user into a 
galaxy of 1,500 colored specks that reveal the text of the emotion when prompted by the curser. 
Each colored speck corresponds to the tone of the feeling (red is angry, yellow is happy, and 
such.), and, upon inspection, reveals the text of the emotion and any images corresponding to the 
text. Harris and Kamvar explain, “The tiny colorful particles represent a bird’s eye view of 
humanity—like standing atop a skyscraper and looking down at the street...from the skyscraper, 
the notion of individuality is hard to recognize.”292 Once you single out a speck and delve into 
the emotion, it consumes the screen and becomes the center of the universe, so to speak. While 
the opening movement provides us a view of the many, it still allows access to the individual. 
                                                
    292 Jonathan Harris and Sep Kamvar, “We Feel Fine and Searching the Emotional Web” 
(paper presented at WSDM’11, Hong Kong, China, February 9-12, 2011), 4.  
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Both the macro view of human emotion (the data) harmonizes with the mirco-view (the 
individual emotions and personal narratives). 
 
                Figure 11. We Feel Fine, “Madness,” screenshot 
 
 
 Murmurs, the second movement, pushes the chaotic scatter of specks to the top of the 
screen as each one falls slowly south. A narrative of emotions results as the user begins to read 
the emotions one after the other. The third movement, Montage, organizes any image data 
collection by the crawler into an image-only grid. The quilt of images, like the colorful particles 
in Madness, allows users to explore the micro data when a single image is clicked. Mobs focuses 
on a macro view of the emotions by organizing them into frequency of occurrence with the  
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               Figure 12. We Feel Fine, “Montage,” screenshot 
 
 
express option of sorting them by age, location, date, weather and gender. Metrics takes the data 
from Mobs and averages them based on previous data. Lastly, Mounds organizes common 
emotions in mounds for a graph-like display of the most common emotions being reported at the 
time. Each movement relies on the same data collected from the blogs, but displays each piece of 
data in such a way that the user becomes gradually exposed to the larger, intended context of the 
emotion. The site moves the user full circle—from the indistinguishable individual among many, 
through individuation, to the combination of the whole. The overall aesthetic immerses users into 
a neon world where emotions rule, while providing glimpses back into the “real world” (or “real” 
digital world) where the emotions are linked back to a context and a narrative.  
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 The site, for the average web user, is only the front matter of a much larger database of 
emotion. Kamvar explains, 
The statistics on the We Feel Fine website are relatively superficial. Due to the 
real-time constraints of the web browser, the online statistics are based only on 
the most recent 2,000 feelings. Our database, however, consists of over 12 million 
feelings (and growing all the time)….We wrote custom software and set aside a 
dedicated server to run offline statistical analysis on our database, producing far 
deeper and more interesting statistical findings than could ever be computed in 
real-time.   
 
For instance, we were able to identify the main reasons why people feel a given 
way, how given feelings fluctuate over the course of a typical lifetime, how 
geography affects emotion, how weather affects emotion, how the news affects 
emotion, how people go from feeling one thing to feeling another, and many other 
insights too.293 
 
The larger data set inspired the book version of We Feel Fine, where Harris and Kamvar were 
able to delve deeper into the data. Researchers at Stanford and the University of Pennsylvania 
also used the data to conduct research on the relationship between happiness and age.294 While 
providing such an unprecedented data set of emotions is useful to researchers, this is not the 
primary goal of the site. Harris and Kamvar conducted their own small study to measure the 
site’s affect on typical users. Ten males and ten females, ranging in age from eighteen to sixty-
one, were told to spend fifteen minutes exploring the movements. Expecting to receive feedback 
concerning the usability and aesthetics of the site, Harris and Kamvar were surprised to find that 
the users wanted to discuss the emotional effects of the data itself. Two patterns emerged from 
these exit interviews: increased emotional self-awareness and an increased sense of connection to 
                                                
    293 Popova, “The sum of all emotions: Jonathan Harris Q &A.” 
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others.295 Almost every user (without being prompted) began discussing how they felt as they 
explored the site further. One user explained:  
Now, I just want to give a little personal note here. I am sitting here in the 
afternoon reading these really deep esoteric statements by people from who 
knows where and I’m really enjoying myself right now. It feels surreal, sitting 
here talking to somebody who I have just met and will not see again and seeing 
the emotions of people who I do not know or will not meet. I feel pretty good.296 
 
Harris and Kamvar note that bloggers who write about We Feel Fine display similar sentiments. 
They often discuss how they feel after touring the site, whether describing their overall feeling 
from reading through the collection of emotions, or relating personally to one or more of the 
emotions. On the subject of empathy and feeling connected to others, some participants 
responded to the emotion as though it were a person, while others confessed that they felt 
“connected” to the inscriber of the emotion and to the larger world around them after working 
their way through the site. “It is comforting if you are feeling down to search by ‘sad’ or ‘sorry,’ 
and see millions of others who share your sentiment. You feel less alone and the world seems 
smaller.” Another user explains, “I feel that witnessing everyone’s feelings of failure and success 
gives me a keen sense of belonging in the world.”297 The empathetic reactions to the data and the 
visual displays responded to emotions on both the macro and micro level. Users found 
themselves empathizing with individuals and with the overall zeitgeist of the emotion collection 
enterprise—they simply felt more emotionally aware in general. The results of this informal 
study suggest that the framework of digital emotions can successfully apply to a digital 
community artwork where the inscriber does not knowingly participate in the artwork. The 
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responses from the study participants, and from bloggers who write about their We Feel Fine 
experiences, show an affective engagement with the emotion data in every level that the piece 
explores, which also suggests that digital emotions can elicit empathetic responses to emotion-
laden text and/or images when that data is dramatically scaled up. The aesthetic experience that 
We Feel Fine provides delivers the data in such a way that users become immersed in the various 
permutations of emotions that are alive in the network. The aesthetic experience, instead of 
obscuring the data, rather activates the imagination and inspires users to explore, create, or relate 
to the emotions presented. The context of the emotions shifts within the artwork and allows the 
emotions to take shape in digital space as either inscriptions existing outside of the movement, or 
as a piece to a larger emotional picture of the network.  
 Every few minutes, the We Feel Fine software searches the web for new emotions. As a 
result, the emotions on the site are constantly refreshing and exhibit a variation of what N. 
Katherine Hayles calls “flickering signifiers.” An effect of information technologies, flickering 
signifiers describe the “unexpected metamorphoses, attenuations, and dispersions” that occur 
when simple command changes enact arbitrarily constructed code and result in rippling 
consequences within the network.298 Hayles contrasts the concept of flickering signifiers with the 
materiality of print culture where a print book correlates to the physical body. In contrast, the 
virtual world is subject to coding and randomness. Hayles explains: 
If my assessment is correct that the dialectic of pattern/randomness is displacing 
presence/absence, the implications extend beyond narrative into many cultural 
arenas. In my view, one of the most serious of these implications for the present 
cultural moment is a systematic devaluation of materiality and embodiment. I find 
this trend ironic, for changes in material conditions and embodied experience are 
precisely what give the shift its deep roots in everyday experience. In this essay I 
have been concerned not only to anatomize the shift and understand its 
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implications for literature but also to suggest that it should be understood in the 
context of changing experiences of embodiment. If on the one hand embodiment 
implies that informatics is imprinted into body as well as mind, on the other it also 
acts as a reservoir of materiality that resists the pressure toward 
dematerialization.299 
 
 She explores new media literature to elucidate this point, but I see digital community artworks, 
especially a scaled up digital community artwork like We Feel Fine, as a more salient example of 
how random interactions within a equally random data set can produce affective, therefore 
embodied, responses in users.  
 By embracing affective computing, whether it be specifically targeted affective 
technologies, social media platforms, or digital community artworks, the neglectful shift towards 
a “devaluation of materiality and embodiment” becomes less worrisome as emotive HCI and 
CMC is highly embodied. We Feel Fine is accessible to anyone with an Internet connection and 
it relies on a certain level of engaged reflexivity to spur the feedback that is a digital emotion. 
Yet, as Harris and Kamvar have shown, the aesthetic package and sheer volume of the site ignite 
the feedback process rather quickly. New media installation art, such as Tina Gonsalves’s 
interactive video Chameleon (2008-2010), ambitiously engage emotional cognition, and the 
result is a highly affective viewer experience. Chameleon is a wall of networked monitors 
displaying emotional expressions of humans that develop their own algorithmic code of 
expressions based on emotional responses from the virtual group and the viewer. Gonsalves 
describes the work as a “poetic interactive video and sound art installation driven by emotional 
expression of [the] participant.” Art critic Darren Tofts, in a review of the work, gushes, 
“Chameleon interprets the notion of empathy as a kind of code that can be simulated in an 
installation context. The work continues and expands upon the artist’s interest in the intimacies 
                                                
    299 N. Katherine Hayles, “Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers,” October 66, (Fall, 1993) 
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and vulnerabilities of human emotions. It is a genuinely interdisciplinary work that breaks new 
ground in terms of the dialogue between art, science and technology.”300 Chameleon embraces 
the process of digital emotions in installation form, no doubt, but so does We Feel Fine, a digital 
community artwork that is accessible to most, was developed in 2006, and is an active part of the 
network it seeks to describe. Delving into a neon, kitschy artwork that embraces our status 
update culture and encourages affective feedback is pop culture at its finest.  
 
 Participatory art, as Rudolf Frieling so aptly describes, often vanishes altogether “into the 
fabric of real life.” Digital community artworks are no different. Woven into the pulsing digital 
network, the projects reflect the interactions that we have come to cherish both on and off line, 
but that are simply scaled up. Living on the web, digital community artworks are subject to the 
seeming contradiction of being both expansive and limited as they are always being refreshed, 
yet archived, linked, frozen in time, or removed completely. One emotive inscription can become 
viral, such as the postcard that inspired the Please Don’t Jump Campaign, or the 9/11 postcard, 
or they can fall from the feed, as many emotions on We Feel Fine do each day. Digital 
community artworks thrive on the feedback of digital emotions because they rely on users to 
supply the empathy needed to perpetuate not only the emotion, but the artwork as well. The 
result is an active, emotive culture of empathy that boasts a range of emotional experiences. 
Digital community artworks embrace the power of aesthetics to create a rich, digital experience 
for the user, while also recognizing the inherent artfulness often lying dormant in the personal 
narratives of millions of users. The websites showcase these narratives and combine with other 
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narratives, thereby creating a portrait of the emotional web that is an aesthetic unto itself—an 
aesthetic of listening amidst the noise of millions of online transactions. I believe that digital 
community artworks embrace the transformative potential of digital emotions as they balance the 
individual with the collective and technology with the human. They have the potential to create 
massively scaled up emotional repertoires for millions of users to share within the network, and 
such a normalization of emotionals knowledge could truly change the world. We aren’t there 
yet—4chan, in all of its id glory will continue to remind us how precarious transindividuation 
can be—but the window is open, no doubt.  
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Coda 
 
 I recently attended a small conference titled “Theorizing the Web” hosted by the 
University of Maryland, and after I presented a condensed version of this research an audience 
member expressed a profound thought that has stuck with me ever since. She said that our lives 
are being programmed in another department. There we were, a group of academics “theorizing 
the web,” as though it were an already established, petrified system, when the system we all seek 
to understand is currently in production. Whether in a university training a new generation of 
computer engineers, in Silicon Valley, or in the local advertising agency, the people making 
these decisions seem to be elsewhere. Lev Manovich has a point when he decries the conflation 
of new media art and advertising, but when one of the only places where all of the chips come 
together is in an ad campaign, so what? Maybe we have a thing or two to learn from I Love Bees 
and other private sector collaborations. We definitely can learn from Rosalind Picard’s call to get 
studies out of the lab and into our daily lives—the biggest, most accurately complex lab of all—
where the humble user/theorist can influence our digital futures to our benefit.  Our lives are 
being programmed in another department, but they can be imagined anywhere.  
 As we continue to communicate, and thus emote, in digital space, we must assume that 
our emotional repertoires are adjusting to this transition. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the emotions involved in the feedback process between digital technologies and our bodies is 
something entirely new considering the massive connectivity that the network provides. As the 
arguments surrounding emotions rage on, it seems almost foolish to introduce yet another 
complication, term, or concept to the debate, yet it seems equally if not more naïve to pretend 
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that we are not participating and creating an entirely new emotional paradigm. This research 
began with two simple questions: are there such things as uniquely “digital” emotions, and, if so, 
what are they? Based on the wide spectrum of emotional encounters in digital space, and the 
unique ways in which they affect individual users and online communities, I have tried to show 
that there is a unique process that describes distinctly “digital” emotions, and that their influence 
will alter the ways in which we understand each other in the twenty-first century.  
   The framework of digital emotions is constructed with substantial malleability to adjust 
to the inevitable changes in digital technologies and digital communication. At the heart of the 
framework are embodiment theories of emotion, a loose set of theories that argue the importance 
of culture and simulation to create and shape our emotional lives. Whether one subscribes to the 
theory of mirror neurons as “empathy” neurons, or Damasio’s “as-if” body loop, the importance 
of neural plasticity and (re)experience to construct identity and build relationships seems to be 
established. Embodiment theories also dramatically widen the scope of what our “emotional 
lives” entail—our emotional lives are our rational lives, our social lives, our cultural lives, and 
perhaps the very foundation of the self. Digital space and the many media that construct it utilize 
similar feedback tools of simulation to create emergent systems within the network. The eruption 
of digital culture over the past few decades is the result of hypersimulation and has thus been 
criticized for being false, illusory, or somehow less than the “real” world. Yet, new neurological 
research suggests that simulation is the bedrock of what makes us emotional humans. Embracing 
the natural role of simulation in our lives can perhaps allow us to embrace the simulation of 
digital space as a new frontier of human connectivity and emotional experiences that is not only 
equal to, but in a process of becoming, our lived environment. As the line between digital space 
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and the “real” world continues to fade, perhaps we can embrace the power of simulation as 
empathy and use it to our advantage.  
 Embodiment theories privilege the phenomenological experience, which democratizes 
this type of emotion theory and research. Feelings matter, so when users describe being 
emotionally transformed after spending fifteen minutes on the We Feel Fine website, that 
information is valuable. It tells us something about the power of mass assembled emotions in 
digital space. Embracing what web users tell us about their emotional experiences in digital 
space is an important piece in understanding the influence of emotions in networked 
communication. Furthermore, it allows us to see popular media spaces in a new light—as 
affective media. The examples discussed through this text—iCalm, Easy with Eve, I Love Bees, 
4chan, Facebook, Twitter, PostSecret, Dear God, We Feel Fine, and many others—each utilize 
simulation and culture in different ways, yet they are all transforming the way we relate to 
technology and the ways in which we understand ourselves and each other. The dynamism of 
culture is electric, and our culture is being shaped by our interactions in these spaces, for better 
or worse. The role of digital narratives and lived action are conflating to become just lived action 
and the speed at which these digital emotions navigate the network makes studying them in 
context all the more important. Harnessing the power of culture and simulation as a medium of 
affect can transform theses space and the future of the network, and the potential is not lost on 
people like Rosalind Picard, Jane McGonigal, and Jonathan Harris. As more and more computer 
engineers begin to bridge the gap between the program and the emotive user, the more the 
emotive user (and the theorist) have to meet them in the middle with some potential ways of 
seeing.   
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 Of course, digital emotions are not without their problems. The network is full of tensions 
and contradictions that expose the most precious and cruel aspects of our dynamic emotional 
lives. Anonymity plays a complicated role in digital emotions, as does the process of remediation 
in dramatically scaled up communities on the web. The process of digital emotions relies on the 
power of empathy to perpetuate emotional experiences in digital space, yet empathy, although 
innate, can be suppressed and twisted based on individuals paradigm scenarios. In a digital world 
where the power and context of the subjective experience is being constantly negotiated with the 
power and context of the network, it is easy to generalize experiences. The framework of digital 
emotions suggests that understanding emotion in digital space as a process that values the 
successful interplay between technology, community, and aesthetic experience can help 
illuminate some of the more salient interactions on the web, while still respecting individual 
experience. Perhaps once users can see the process, they will be affected by it.  
 This framework of digital emotions that I have presented is theoretical, untested, and ripe 
for interrogation. It is also ready to be populated with hundreds if not thousands of new 
applications that enrich the spectrum I explored in part two. I hope that the framework helps the 
everyday user understand the implications and possibilities of our interactions in digital space, 
and I also hope that it opens the door to more collaborations between neuroscientists, media 
theorists, computer engineers, artists, and everyday users. Our brains are plastic, and this 
plasticity relies on patterns of experience and recognition to shape what we know to be the world 
and ourselves. The network mirrors this plasticity, and in both cases the power to influence 
behavior exists within the very system that it seeks to define. Confronting this change with the 
power of empathy could revolutionize the revolution, no matter how short the message. That’s 
my quasi-utopian future.  
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